' SABIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---The admitted facts appear to be that the petitioner applied for registration as an Industry-wise Trade Union to the respondent No,1 vide application dated 7-7- 1992. It appears that on 18-8-1992-the respondent No,2, which is a rival Trade Union, preferred certain objections, regarding registration of the petitioner. The petitioner was apprised of these objections on 4-11-1992 and the matter was fixed for hearing on 15-11-1992. According to the petitioner while their representative appeared before the respondent No,1 on that day nobody appeared for the objector and after a copy of the objections having been made available to such representative the matter was adjourned to 28-11-1998. On the adjourned date as well no appearance was made on behalf of the objector/respondent No,2 and consequently the respondent No,1 passed an order, the operative part whereof reads as under:- "As the objector has not appeared and there is nothing on record for reason of his failure to appear, his application, as stated above, is dismissed for non-appearance and non-prosecution. The applicant union is hereby registered. A formal certificate of registration is issued in favour of the applicant union."
2. Nevertheless it appears that pursuant to the aforesaid order an entry regarding registration of the petitioner had been made in the Register of Unions and a proper certificate of registration was submitted before the respondent No,1 for signature on 30-11-1992, the respondent No,1 instead of signing the same recorded an order that on 29-11-1992 a about 1.00 p.m. He received an application dated 25-11-1992 from the respondent No,2/objector seeking adjournment of the hearing on 28-11-1992 but this application had not been transmitted on to him till the order dated 28-11-1992 regarding issuance of formal registration certificate was passed. Consequently, he decided to issue notices to the parties for appearance. Thereafter, by a further order dated 4-1- 1993 the respondent set aside the "ex parte" order dated 28-11-1992, the petitioner has called in question the aforesaid order dated 4-1-1993 through this petition.
3. Mr. Ashraf Hussain Rizvi, learned counsel for the petitioner, primarily argued that once a registration certificate had been directed to be issued by the respondent No,1 vide order dated 28- 11-1992 he had no power to review his earlier order and such registration could only be cancelled under section 10 of the Industrial Relation Ordinance by order of the Appellate Authority, which in the instant case would be Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission. He placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in National Bank of Pakistan, People's Federation v. National Industrial Relations Commission (PLD 1975 Karachi 320). Moreover, he contended that on general principles the petitioner lost locus poenentiae to recall the order dated 28-11-1992 inasmuch as it conferred vested rights upon the petitioner. Finally he argued that the respondent No,2 had no locus standi to object to the petitioners registration and the respondent No,1 was not justified in recalling his order merely to hear the respondent No,2. Reliance was placed, inter alia, on a recent pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court in Essa Cement Industries Workman Union v. Registrar of Trade Union (1998 PLC (Labour) 500).
4. No appearance was made on behalf of the respondent No,1.
5. Mr. Ali Amjad, learned counsel for the respondent No,2, on the other hand, without demurring, the proposition of law laid down in the Division Bench decision of this Court, candidly conceded that if a registration certificate had actually been issued, the respondent No,1 indeed had no power to cancel the same. He nevertheless pointed out that in the instant case there was nothing on record to indicate that the certificate in question had actually been issued and, therefore, the respondent did have locus poenentiae. He pointed out that under Section 9 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, a Registrar was empowered to issue a certificate of registration in the case a Full Bench of the NIRC in terms of section 22(b) (2) was empowered to cancel the registration of a Trade Union. Since no registration certificate had actually been issued, the question of cancellation could not arise. Mr. Rizvi attempted to meet the argument by contending that a certificate had been duly signed but the petitioner had not been able to obtain a copy thereof. While there is nothing on record to substantiate Mr. Ravi's assertion and it appears that the order dated 1-12-1998 was passed before signing the certificate. We are doubtful whether the respondent No,1 after having passed a clear order that a formal certificate be issued still retained the power to-recall such order. Alternatively Mr. Ali Amiad argued that any authority performing quasi-judicial functions had enhanced the power to recall ex parte orders passed by it, and indeed his view is supported by authority. The crucial question, nevertheless, is whether the order dated 28-11-1998, can be treated as an ex parte order. There seems to be great force in Mr. Rizvi's last contention that the respondent No,2 had no legal right to be heard at the stage of the petitioner's application for registration as a Trade Union and the law on this question has been authoritatively settled by the Honourable Supreme Court in Essa Cement Industries Workers Union v. Registrar Trade Union, and it may be pertinent to quote the following observations of Memoon Kazi, J. :-- "It, therefore, follows that neither the employer nor a trade union already existing in the same establishment can claim locus standi to challenge the decision of the Registrar merely on the ground that no opportunity of hearing was provided to it or an objection raised by it before the Registrar was not considered before such decision."
6. In view of the above we are of the opinion that the respondent No,1 gravely erred in treating the matter as something, akin to adversary litigation and proceeded on the assumption that the respondent No,2 might be prejudiced in case the registration certificate was granted without hearing him. Obviously the order dated 28-11-1998 direct issuance of a registration certificate indicates that the aforesaid did not find any defect in the petitioner's application for registration, though he took an unusually long time to finalise the matter. In any case if the respondent No,1 subsequently come to know that the petitioner has been registered in contravention of the requirement of law he could always make a complaint to the Full Bench of the N.I.R.C.
' For the foregoing reason we would allow this petition and direct the respondent No,1 to issue a certificate of registration to the petitioner as soon as the copy of this order reaches him.