The petitioners were proceeded against in case F.I.R. No,267 of 1990 registered under section 337- A/452/440/148/149, P.P.C. At the instance of Israr Ahmad Khan respondent No,4 alleging inter alia that he was present in his office when the petitioners forcibly entered the office. Abdul Waheed caught hold of him and after hurling abuses took out pistol from the fold of his Shalwar and inflicted a blow with its butt on his eye-brow. Khan gave him a fist blow, thereafter, Abdul Waheed gave him a slap on his face and also kick blow on his abdomen. The case was registered on 20-12- 1990. The challan was submitted some-time thereafter and case is pending now in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate Section 30, Faisalabad.
2. Through the instant writ petition quashment of the proceedings before the learned Magistrate has been sought on the ground that although a period of more than nine years has elapsed yet no progress has been made by the prosecution. What to speak of conclusion of the trial, not a single prosecution witness has been examined so far. The case has a long rather chequered history. After the submission of challan an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.0 was moved wherein the learned Magistrate was pleased to order the confinement of case to record on 16-9-1992. This order was challenged by the petitioner on the ground that under section 249-A, Cr.P.0 the order of acquittal should have been passed instead of consigning the case to record. Vide order, dated 9- 9-1993 the case was remanded to the learned Magistrate with a direction that parties may appear on 30-9-1993. Then thereafter, both the parties kept on repeating applications one after the other.
No progress was made towards the conclusion of the trial. Again the petitioner moved an application before the learned Additional Session Judge praying that the trial could not be concluded, as such the petitioner may be acquitted of the charges against him. It was ordered on 3-4-1997 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the trial be concluded within a period of two months.
3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No,4 i,e, complainant has contested the application on the ground that petitioners themselves had been responsible for causing delay. In order to ascertain whether the delay has been caused by the prosecution or by the petitioners themselves, I perused the interim orders with the help of the learned counsel for the parties which revealed that a number of adjournments were granted to procure the attendance of the witnesses but they did not turn up, so much so, on more than one occasion, bailable warrants even non- bailable warrants were issued to procure the attendance of the witnesses but of no consequence.
The learned counsel, therefore, has argued that adjournment in a trial is not granted as a matter of routine. Section 344, Cr.P.0 envisages that there should be reasonable ground to grant adjournment. It is further argued that keeping in view the allegations against the petitioners and the amount of time consumed in conclusion of the trial as well as proceedings before higher forum, the petitioners have practically undergone punishment more than what could be inflicted by the trail Court after recording their conviction. There is no denying the fact that aforesaid accused persons have a right of expeditious trial. It is true that on account of pendency of large number of cases, the delay is caused in conclusion of the cases but at the same time a balance has to be maintained in between the accusation and amount of the delay caused in conclusion of the trial. Where delay in a particular case amounts to abuse of process of Court, has to be adjudged by keeping in view the facts and attending circumstances of that case. A perusal of interim orders indicate that a large number of adjournment were granted to the prosecution but no prosecution witness could be examined. Mere assertion that the complainant or his witnesses were prevented by the petitioners, cannot be accepted in absence of any relevant material. I find that inordinate delay in this case does amount to abuse of process of Court. The petitioners have undergone agony and ordeals of long trial and other proceedings and the same cannot be kept pending for inordinate period. I, therefore, accept this petition and quash the proceedings against the petitioners, before learned Trial Magistrate Section 30, Faisalabad in case F.I.R. No,267 of 1990, dated 20-12-1990 under section 337-A/452/440/148/149, P.P.C. There will be no order as to costs.