The instant Civil Revision challenges the concurrent findings of both the learned Courts. Below. The learned Civil Judge, Sialkot vide judgment and decree dated 20-12-1995 dismissed the suit of the petitioner and the rival pre-emptor Muhammad Akram and the learned Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 19-6-1998 also dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner/appellant and held that the petitioner had failed to fulfil the requisite "Talbs".
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the learned Courts below have wrongly held that the petitioner had to prove the date, time and place of "Talb-e-Mowathibat" in his plaint, while in the case of Amir Khan and 3 others v. Haji Ghulam Muhammad PLD 1997 SC 883 it is held that the pleadings are to be liberally construed and should not include the evidence: He further argued that both the learned Courts below have misconstrued the evidence with regard to the law of "Talbs" against the petitioner and have taken into consideration all the minor discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses which were not material and have based their judgments on two scores, firstly that the petitioner did not fulfill the requirement of "Talbs" and secondly there are discrepancies in the statement of the witnesses with regard to the making of "Talbs" and in this way have drawn wrong inferences from the evidence of the petitioner and have committed procedural as well as substantive illegalities and irregularities which need interference by this Court. He further submitted that the issue No,3 relates to "Talbs". The requirement of section 13(2) of the Punjab Preemption Act is to send information in the shape of a notice to the vendee. It is not written over there that the original notice be sent or the photo copy of the notice is sent. The intention of the Legislature is that the information should be conveyed to the other party and once a notice is sent the delivery is presumed. Relied on Haji Rana Muhammad Shabbir Ahmad Khan v. Government of Punjab Province, Lahore PLD 1994 SC 1. He further submitted that Article 29 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat elaborates that one notice to all the three vendees will be sufficient as the purpose of information that the suit is going to be filed is served. Abdul Malik v. Muhammad Latif 1999 SCM R
717. He further submitted that what are truthful witnesses. The truthful witnesses are defined in Muhammad Yunus Khan and another v. Muhammad Yusuf ILR (sic) All. 334 wherein it is held that all the witnesses are truthful witnesses except those who have committed slander. Similar view is reported in Jalal Din and another v. Nawab and others AIR 1941 Lah. 55 and 1994 CLC 1774. The contention of the witnesses is verified by the document Mark-A. Therefore, the finding of the learned Courts below that Talab-i-Mowathibat and Talb-i-Ishhad is not stated in the plaint does not carry any legal weight.
3. The learned counsel for the respondent submit that the suit is barred by time. He further submitted that Abdul Ghani filed a suit on 12-4-1996. The following issues were framed:--
(1) Whether the plaintiff had waived his right of pre-emption? OPD. 1 to 3.
(2) Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction? OPD 1 to 3.
(3) Whether the requirements of Talab are properly fulfilled? OPP
(4) Whether the suit is filed with collusion of the defendants Nos. 1 to 3 and the plaintiff is "Benami" only? OPD.4
(5) Whether the suit is barred by law? OPD.4.
(6) Whether the defendant No,4 has superior right of pre-emption for the suit property? OPD.4
(7) Whether the plaintiff has superior right of pre-emption for the suit property? OPP.
(8) Relief.
4. In respect of Issues Nos. 3, 6 and 7 P.W.1 appeared. The evidence of D.W.1 was recorded on 30-11- 1993. He has stated in his. Evidence that he got the knowledge on 28-2-1990 while the sale took place on 12-12-1989. The original notice was produced by him. This, fact shows that the original notice in respect of Talab-i-Ishhad was not sent to the defendant if the knowledge of the sale was communicated on 28-2-1990 the suit was filed on 12-4-1990. There is no crop of 'Charri' as stated by the witness in the month of March and April. Similarly from the statement of D.W.2 the information is stated to be on 30-11-1989 as his statement was recorded on 30-11-1993. AU these witnesses have not stated the day, date or the season. The suit was filed after four months of the knowledge of the sale as Khushi Muhammad one of the crucial witnesses had the knowledge of the sale on 12-12-1989. His statement was recorded on 30-3,71994. Abdul Ghani appeared as D.W.4. His statement was recorded on 19-10-1995 and he stated that he had the information about 5 years six and a half months before which means that he had the information on 4-3-1989. He has stated in the plaint that he got the information after 13 days Of the sale. He stated in cross-examination that the suit was filed after 5 years and then again stated that the suit was filed after 3 and a half months which means that the suit was filed after 19-6-1989 but although the suit was filed on 12-4- 1990. So these contradictions are not general contradictions but are material contradictions. He further submitted that no acknowledgement due was produced by the petitioner. In fact under the law he was required to send registered acknowledge due notice to all the vendees. The photo copy of the receipt Mark A shows the wrong address of Khamranwala. Such an address is not existing on the face of the plaint. This is the violation of the provisions of section 13(3) of the Punjab Pre- emption Act. Therefore, from the evidence it can be easily gathered that the petitioner got the knowledge an 12-12-1989 and he filed the suit on 12-4-1990 after four months. The petitioner has badly failed to prove the Talab-i-Mowathibat as all the three witnesses are self-contradictory. Their statements show that they are falsely deposing the same. He further submitted that the basic law is that when the Statute directs a person that things should be ordered to be done in particular manner it should be done in that manner. No evidentiary value is given to the postal receipt which is carrying a wrong address. Moreover, one notice sent to the three vendees and this was not actually delivered to the vendees as according to the vendor this notice was received by one Zafar Iqbal the nephew of the vendees. Moreover in exercise of revision the concurrent findings on point of facts cannot be disturbed in civil revision. Relied on Manzoor Hussain Shah v. Fazal Dad and another 2000 SCM R 216.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the record.
6. The right of pre-emption cannot be exercised unless the pre-emptor has performed the ceremony of Talab-i-Mowathibat immediately on hearing of the sale. Gul Hassan Shah v. Mulazim Hussain Shah 1995 SCM R 294 and also cited in 1996 SCM R 294. The plaintiff in every way has to prove that he made his demand Talab-i-Mowathibat before the filing of the pre-emption suit. If he fails to do so that right of pre-emption is always extinguished. Muhammad Ramzan v. Lal Khan 1995 SCM R 1510. Talab-i-Mowathibat means demand of jumping, by which a pre-emptor should make immediate assertion of his right on getting information of transfer of property. It means that the right of pre-emption must be asserted with utmost promptitude. Muhammad Sarwar v. Ashiq Ali PLD 1995 Lah.
133. The intention is always gathered from the words and the surrounding circumstances and it is also essential that the pre-emptor should use some words that he intends to pre-empt and is pre- empting. The second demand is by repeating the same words in the presence of witnesses and asked the witnesses to take money to the vendee and on his refusal to his first demand asked the witnesses to attest the refusal. Therefore, a pre-emptor under the law is bound to prove that he has fulfilled all the requirements of law and has complied with the claim and the claim was good. The second demand is Talab-i-Ishhad and the third one is Talab-i-Khushumat. Talab-i-Ishhad means demand by establishing evidence. Talab-i-Khushumat means demand by filing a suit. When a preemptor under section 13(3) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act had made Talab-iMowathibat he shall soon thereafter as possible but not later on two weeks from the date of knowledge make Talab-i-Ishhad by sending a notice in writing attested by two truthful witnesses under registered cover acknowledgment due, to the vendee, confirming his intention to exercise the right of pre- emption. This means that the time within which the pre-emptor makes Talab-i-Mowathibat and Talab-i-Ishhad and Talab-i-Khushumat is very essential in pre-emption matter in order to prove his claim.
7. I have gone through the evidence. In the plaint in paragraph 4 the plaintiff has stated that he came to know about the sale-deed 13 days before filing the suit but in the same paragraph he has not shown that he made immediate demand as discussed above about Talab-i-Mowathibat and also reiterated the same in the presence of truthful witnesses, rather the witnesses are not mentioned in paragraph 4. These witnesses are mentioned in the notice. The evidence of these witnesses also does not justify the accurate time of making Talab-i-Mowathibat. Regarding knowledge of information of sale statement of all P.Ws. Are contradicting. The receipt itself proves that no separate notices were sent to the vendees, rather one notice was sent and that was not the original one which was received by a nephew of the vendee and therefore, the defendant/respondent when appeared as D.W.5 refused the same. He has stated that he had offered this property to the petitioner to buy who refused the same as he had no money due to his involvement in marrying his daughter.
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that the plaintiff has failed to prove Talabs within the time- frame and manner under the provision of section 13(3), Punjab Pre-emption Act and has also failed to prove immediate assertion of his right on getting information of transfer of property through his evidence, therefore, both the impugned judgments and decrees are unexceptionable and are not interfered by this Court. Resultantly the Civil Revision is dismissed.
9. No order as to costs.