' Instant appeal is directed against the order, dated 17-9-1986 passed by Ch. Muhammad Jehangir Khan Goraya, Magistrate Section 30 (Judicial), Kasur/Camp at Chunian whereby he acquitted the accused/ respondents Nos.1 and 2 in a case registered against them vide F.I.R. No,134 of 1986 under section 307/34, P.P.C.
2. Briefly stated the facts are that on the basis of complaint referred above a case under section 307/34 P.P.C. Was registered against the accused/respondents Nos.1 and 2. The accused/respondents Nos.1 and 2 moved an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. The trial Court after giving notice to the State passed an order under section 249-A, on Cr.P.C., dated 17-9-1986, and acquitted them i,e, respondents Nos.1 and 2.
3. The prosecution felt aggrieved of the said order and has filed the instant appeal.
4. The only point upon which the instant appeal has been admitted vide order, dated 6-2-1988 is that the impugned order had been passed without framing charge under section 242, Cr.P.C.
However, now during the arguments it is also asserted by the learned A.A.-G. That trial Court could not pass the impugned order as the respondents have been specifically named in the F.I.R. And a specific role has been attributed to each of them.
5. The contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant have been controverted by the learned counsel for the respondents. It is submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that trial Court was fully competent to pass an order under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., even without framing the charge. In support of his contention he has relied upon The State v. Muhammad Rafiq and others PLD 1983 Quetta 122; Muhammad Sadiq v. Anwar Majeed and others 1989 PCr.LJ 1223, and Ch. M. Ashraf v. The State 1990 PCr.LJ 347. He further contends that occurrence took place on 30-3-1986 whereas F.I.R. Was lodged on 1-4-1986 and respondent No,3 acquitted them on 17-9-1986, that a period of more than 12 years has passed since the order of acquittal was passed and under these circumstances retrial is also not warranted and approved by the superior Courts and has relied upon Philail Khan v. The State 1972 SCM R 95. He thus, submitted that impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or misreading of evidence and prayed for the dismissal of the appeal. He also submitted that prior to the instant F.I.R., another F.I.R. No,132/86 under section 302/34 was registered at the same police station against 7 persons including complainant and injured of instant F.I.R. No,134 of 1986. He further submits that as a result of compromise the accused named in F.I.R. No,132 of 1986 stand acquitted.
6. Admittedly F.I.R. No,134 of 1986 under section 307/34, P.P.C. Was registered on 1-4-1986 at the instance of Muhammad Malik, against Muhammad Younas and Abdul Rauf accused/respondents for committing murderous assault upon Muhammad Malik and Ehsanul Haq. During the pendency of that case respondents Nos.1 and 2 moved an application under section 249-A Cr.P.C., upon which the lower Court issued notice to the State and after hearing the learned counsel for the State passed the impugned order on 17-9-1986. The only point pressed into service at the time of filing this appeal was that the trial Court could not pass the order under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Without framing a formal charge under section 242, Cr.P.C. A perusal of section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Does not impose any such restriction on the power of trial Court. The only precondition contained in the said section is that notice to State is mandatory and an opportunity of hearing is to be afforded. Both the preconditions have been complied, as is evident from the impugned order. Even otherwise it has been held in the authorities referred above that there is no restriction on the power of trial Court to pass an order under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. And 265-K, Cr.P.C. Without framing any charge.
This being the factual position the impugned order, dated 17-9-1986 does not suffer from any illegality. Consequently appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.