' This Criminal Acquittal Appeal has been filed against the judgment, dated 6-11-1995 passed by learned District and Sessions Judge, Badin in Sessions Case No,188 of 1990 (The State v. Amir Baksh and another) whereby the respondents were acquitted of the charge.
2. Office has raised objection on the maintainability of this appeal on the grounds of limitation. The impugned judgment was passed on 6-11-1995, while the application for certified copy was filed on 12-11-1995. Cost was paid on 16-11-1995 and the certified copy was delivered to the appellant the same day. Therefore, the learned counsel for the State argues that the appellant is entitled for exclusion of 5 days in computing the period of six months. It is admitted that the instant appeal is governed by Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which provides a period of six months to the State to prefer appeal against the order of acquittal. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellant was required to file appeal on 11-5-1996, whereas this appeal was filed on 23-5-1996, after a delay of nearly 12 days.
3. We have heard Mr. Agha Khuda Baksh, Advocate for the appellant/ State and Mr. Muhammad Ishaque Khoso, Advocate for the respondents who is on pre-admission notice. Along with this appeal, an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (M.A. No,606 of 1996) has also been filed seeking condo nation of delay. In the supporting affidavit, the grounds shown for delay are due to departmental sanction and the time consumed in correspondence with the concerned department. This affidavit has been filed by a clerk working in the office of Advocate-General, Sindh. No copy of any correspondence or the name of the concerned department has been shown to indicate that who was responsible and what were the grounds for not granting sanction earlier.
Be that as it may, on the last date of- hearing, time was granted to Mr. Agha Khuda Baksh to cite any law in support of his contention that due to communication, which is spread over a period of six months, the State is entitled to condemnation of delay. Today, he has cited the case of Sardar Muhammad Akbar v. Qasim and 2 others PLD 1988 Pesh. 130, wherein it was held by a learned Single Judge of Peshawar High Court, inter alia, that the High Court is competent to condone delay in filing special leave petition beyond limitation. There is no cavil to this proposition of law but in order to bring a case for condo nation of delay, appellant is required to show that there was sufficient cause and cause beyond his control to file the appeal within the prescribed time. The period of six months is more than sufficient and in cases of delay the appellant is required to explain the delay of each and every day satisfactorily. In these circumstances, we are not inclined to condone the delay in filing the instant criminal acquittal appeal. See Crown v. Fatal Karim PLD 1954 Baluchistan 331.
4. Before parting with this order, we would like to mention the rule laid down by a Full Bench of Honorable Supreme Court in the case Hussain Bakhsh v. Allah Bakhsh and others 1981 SCMR 410 which describes that how an appeal against acquittal is to be treated which is filed beyond the period of limitation. Following is the relevant observation of the Honorable Supreme Court:- "4. It must also be stated that it has been the consistent view of this Court, as expressed in Nazar v.
The State .1968 SCMR 715, Jalal Khan v. Lakhmir 1968 SCMR 1345, Muhammad Khan v. Sultan 1989 SCMR 82, Piran Ditta v. The State 1970 SCMR 282 and Nur Muhammad v. The State 1972 SCMR 331, that in petitions against acquittal delay cannot be condoned unless it is shown that the petitioner was precluded from filing his petition in time due to some act of the respondents; or by some circumstance of a compelling nature, beyond the petitioner's control. The reasons for taking the strict view is that in most jurisdictions an acquittal, once recorded by a competent Court is final, and the matter cannot be reopened at the instance of any party including the State. However, under our law, an acquittal can be challenged in certain circumstances, but if it is not challenged within the period allowed by law, it becomes final. In these circumstances it is only just and proper that a petition against acquittal must not be entertained if it is filed beyond time, unless it be shown that the petitioner was prevented from moving the same by an act of the acquitted accused; or by some circumstance of a compelling nature beyond the control of the petitioner.... "
(Emphasis added by us).
5. The only reason shown for seeking condemnation of delay is that a lot of time was consumed in obtaining departmental sanction. This ground is not sufficient. This cannot be termed to be a "circumstance of a compelling nature beyond the control of the appellant". Nothing has been alleged against the acquitted accused which may have resulted in causing delay. .The ground shown for causing delay in filing appeal is neither reasonable nor cogent. This appeal merits dismissal.
6. As a result of the above discussion, we dismiss this Criminal Acquittal Appeal being time-barred.
Consequently, M.A. No,606 of 1996 has become infructuous and stands dismissed, accordingly.