' Muhammad Tariq was, as he claims, Press Secretary of Officers Union, Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd, serving at Peshawar. He was transferred vide order dated 23-9-1997 to the Bank's Audit Centre, Lahore, and relieving letter was issued on 25-9-1997. Muhammad Tariq assailed the transfer order before the National Industrial Relations Commission at Islamabad, and the learned Senior Member (Syed Ijaz Hussain Gilani) suspended the order on 30-9-1997. The management filed a writ petition in the Preshawar High Court and the NIRC's order dated 30-9-1997 was suspended on 30-10-1997.
The management filed an appeal before the Full Bench of the N.I.R.C. and the learned Single Member's order was suspended on 16-6-1998 and finally set aside on 24-10-1998, by the Full Bench of the N.I.R.C., presided over by Mr. Muhammad Zaman Qureshi.
2. Initially a letter of charge was issued to Mr. Tariq on 20-11-1997. Many more letters of the kind succeeded. When NIRC Member Mr. Bahadur Ali's judgment/order ceased to hold the field, Mr. Tariq assumed the charge of his post at Lahore on 25-8-1998. He was, however, issued a letter of enquiry on 11-9-1998. He admits having participated in the proceedings of the enquiry. In consequence of the enquiry held against him he was dismissed from service with effect from 14-11-1998.
3. Validity of the aforesaid order was assailed by Muhammad Tariq by filing a grievance petition under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The impugned order has been rendered by the Punjab lab our Court No,1, Lahore, on 12-3-1999. The learned lower Court is of the view that different objections raised in the grievance petition by the management of the M.C.B. can best be examined and adjudicated upon, when the parties lead evidence in the course of further proceedings. The employee's contention rose to the effect that what has been held by the NIRC has nothing to do with the grievance petition has beer up-held. It is however to be noted that although under section 22-A(8) (g), the NIRC can deal with cases of unfair labour practices, specified in section 15, and even a Labour Court can embark upon a case of this nature, but under section 22(12), Labour Court will be competent to proceed with such a case only if it has not already been dealt with by the N.I.R.C. True, the employee has knocked at the door of the Labour Court in order to impugn the order of his dismissal from service, which, according to him, has illegally, unfairly and inequitably been rendered, but the basic question is the one that has throughout been agitated before the N.I.R.C. namely, shifting of the employee from Peshawar to Lahore, in the manner of vindictiveness or vengeance, resorted to by the management, on having apparently been fed-up with the employee's bids made for undoing or defeating the orders of his transfer from Peshawar to Lahore. In the proceedings of enquiry initiated against the employee, he does not deny having taken part. Actually on another score the employee could not competently impugn the order of his dismissal from service. He was drawing monthly wages exceeding Rs,24,000 and he was also holder of power of attorney, so that he could not plead to be a workman and have recourse to a Labour Court for any purpose. Proper forum for the employee for agitating his rights, or redressing his grievances, if any, was certainly some other forum and not a Labour Court. Facts acknowledged and not denied need not be proved, and evidence indeed would not be required in this case, for establishing or repudiating the assertion aforesaid. The employee was by all means an officer and not a workman. He himself pleaded to be a member of the Officers Association. It is also to be kept in mind that in the domain of the lab our laws, provisions of the Civil Procedure Code and the rules of evidence are not to be comprehensively, scrupulously and strictly adhered to or followed. This man was so obstinate in his stand of remaining at Peshawar that he did not perform any duty anywhere and delayed his departure to Lahore over a period of about one year. Could it be treated to be lawful exercise of his service prerogative, enjoyment of a secured or vested right, for enforcement of which he was legitimately striving on a statutory legal plane? Orders of transfer of employees are normally not to be interfered with, since if it is done, it tantamount to hampering the internal working of an organization and disturbing or disrupting the normal course of events in any set-up. Beyond any manner of doubt, the impugned order delivered by the learned lower Court has to be treated to be a nullity in the eye of law, susceptible to interference by this Court in exercise of its provisional jurisdiction. The order cannot be sustained on any valid premises, and is hereby set aside, on acceptance of the revision petition, although with no order as to costs.