1. ' AJMAL MIAN, C.J.---This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment dated 4-10-1997 passed by the learned Federal Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in Appeal No,323(L) of 1997, filed by the respondent against the order of his dismissal from service. The petitioners who are officials of the Post & Telegraph Department have filed the present petition.
2. ' In support of the above petition Maulvi Anwarul Haq, learned Deputy Attorney-General has contended that the impugned judgment is not sustainable as the Authorised Officer in question was also the Authority for the purpose of respondent and, therefore, the reason found favour with the Tribunal is not in consonance with law. We find that no such plea was urged before the Tribunal. However, even on legal plane the above contention merits rejection in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Communication Division, Islamabad and 2 others v. Zamir Ahmed (1996 SCM R 630) wherein inter alia the following has been held:-- "....No doubt, the said rules indicate bifurcation of the functions of the authority and the authorised officer, and the nature of the two functions clearly show that the person who may be designated as an authority would be higher in rank than the person who may be authorised to perform the functions of the authorised officer but, notwithstanding, rule 6-A, as the person to be designated as the authority has not been vested with any kind of appellate powers over the latter, possibility of prejudice being caused to the accused by overlapping of the two functions appears to be remote.
3. The learned counsel for the respondent has also, failed to spell out anything that may lead to an inference that any prejudice had been caused to the respondent in the present case. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent, therefore, appears to have little merit.
4. However, the Tribunal has simply relied upon its earlier judgment, which was not applicable in the present case, as was pointed out earlier. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the view taken by the Tribunal is not correct and the judgment of the Tribunal is liable to beet aside."
5. In the present case, since the penalty of dismissal which is a major penalty, was imposed which could only be awarded by the Authority and not by the Authorised Officer, the respondent was prejudiced by the factum that the same person acted in dual capacity, namely, as the. Authorised Officer as well as the Authority. In this view of the matter, we are inclined to hold that the impugned judgment is unexceptionable and, therefore, leave is refused.
6. The petition is dismissed.