' By this order I want to dispose of Petition No,7 (38) 99-L filed by the petitioner Union during the pendency of the case under section 22-EE with the prayer that the holding of fresh referendum anywhere in the establishment be stopped.
2. The main case has been filed under section 22-EE with the prayer to declare the whole of the establishment of Punjab Small Industries Corporation to be one collective bargaining unit on 15-1- 1999. In the said case the service of the parties have not yet been completed and now an order for publication in the newspapers has been made on 13-5-1999 for service of the respondents. The application under decision was filed on 2-2-1999 in which an interim order dated 3-2-1999 was passed and in the meantime the present position was ordered to be remained undistributed. The application was filed when referendum proceedings under section 22 of IRO, 1969 were pending before the Registrar of Trade Unions, Faisalabad Region, between the respondents Nos.29 and 30 Unions of the PSIC Faisalabad Region. Respondent No,30 filed reply to the application as well as made application for the vacation of the interim order dated 3-2-1999. The arguments of the learned counsel for the relevant parties were heard at length on 15-4-1999.
3. Counsel for the respondent No,30 Union .mainly relied upon the Division Bench decision of the Karachi High Court in case of Sui Gas Employees' Union v. N.I.R.C. and 4 others (1991 PLC 651) and contended that this Commission has no jurisdiction to stop or prohibit the referendum proceedings during the pendency of a petition under section 22-EE of IRO filed by a Trade Union of workers. I asked the learned counsel for the petitioner union to show any contrary decision of law declared by any superior Court contrary to the said decision but he failed to cite any decision.
4. In the decision referred by the learned counsel for the respondent No,30 Union the section 22-EE of IRO, 1969 has been interpreted in detail. The Honorable Court reached to the conclusion that this Commission is empowered to stop proceedings for the determination of Collective Bargaining Agent only in case of a reference made by the Federal Government as has been given in the second provision to sub-clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 22-EE of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The context of the proviso is reproduced hereunder:-- "Provided further that after the receipt of a reference for determination of a collective bargaining unit, the commission may stop or prohibit the proceedings to determine collective bargaining agent under section 22 for any establishment or group of establishments which is likely to be affected by a decision under this section."
5. The main case has been filed by a Trade Union of Workers and no reference has been made by the Federal Government, In this admitted position the above-quoted statutory provision does not permit this Commission to stop or prohibit the proceedings for the determination of CBA under section 22 of IRO. The decision of the Hon'ble Karachi High Court (supra) is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present situation. In para.8 of the said reported decision it has been held: -- "On mere reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the N.I.R.C. with regard to stopping or prohibiting the proceedings under section 22-EE is limited and can be exercised only on receipt of a reference to be made by the Federal Government under section 22- EE(1)."
6. In para. 10 of the decision (supra) it is further held:-- "We are, therefore, of the firmed opinion that the power thus conferred to N.I.R.C. cannot be exercised to grant stay in proceedings commenced on an application filed by the petitioner."
7. The facts of the reported case were also identical. An application for the case under section 22- EE was filed and this Commission refused to grant the stay and dismissed the application.
Aggrieved by the order the petitioner union filed writ petition in humble Karachi High Court which was also dismissed in the decision (supra) referred to above. The said judgment is still holding the field and no contrary decision by any humble superior Court has been referred by the counsel for the petitioner Union.
8. The learned counsel for the respondent No,30 Union also invited my attention towards an earlier decision of the Commission passed in case of Punjab Urban Transport Corporation lab our Union, Rawalpindi v. Registrar of Trade Unions, Punjab Region and another (1981 PLC 7). In this decision an unreported decision of the Division. Bench of this Commission has been relied upon. In para.6 of the decision it has been held:-- "The proviso made below clause (c) of section 22-EE(1) is absolutely clear and leaves no doubt that the proceedings to determine CBA could be stopped or prohibited only after the receipt of a reference for the determination of CBU."
9. Further in para.7 of the decision an order for the vacation of said order was passed in the following manner:-- "I do not agree with the view that a 'reference' and the 'application' were one and the same thing as in that case there was no necessity of adding 'after the receipt of a reference for determination of the CBU'. Since this provision is not applicable in respect of an application made in this behalf by a Trade Union or a Federation of such Unions. I vacate the stay order issued on 8-9-1980."
10. I have been left with no alternative but to vacate the stay order dated 3-2-1999 in the light of clear statutory provisions referred to above as well as the abovementioned reported judgments. In addition to the said legal position there is another aspect of the case that the learned counsel for the respondent No,30 Union submitted that the legal maxim viz.: "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (The mention of one is exclusion of another), is also attracted in the instant situation. As the statutory provisions empowered this Commission to stop or prohibit referendum proceedings in case of receipt of a reference from the Federal Government, therefore, in the light of aforementioned maxim the power to grant stay in all other cases is totally excluded. Reliance in this behalf may also be made upon Division Bench decision of humble Lahore High Court (1981 PLC 219). From this aspect of the case the prohibitory order dated 3-2-1999 is also liable to be vacated being without jurisdiction.
11. For the reasons given above, I recall the interim injunction order dated 3-2-1999 and dismiss the Application No,7(38)99-L filed by the petitioner Union. I proceed further to deal with the main case under section 22-EE of IRO in accordance with the provisions made in the said section for which the main case has already been fixed for 13-5-1999.