' MAMOON KAZI, J.---This appeal by leave of this Court, is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court in I.C.A. No,453 of 1992, dated 5-4-1993.
2. The appellant is the Executive Head of a registered charitable organization known as "The Society of Franciscan Sisters of Marry in Pakistan". The said Organization had opened up a number of schools on charitable basis to impart education to children in Pakistan. Once of such institutions set up by the said Organization was Khatoon-e-Fatima Girls High Court situated at Renala Khurd.
3. In 1972, possession of the school was taken over by the Government of the Punjab under Martial Law Regulation,
118. However, no one had laid any claim then to ownership of its building. In 1991 when the respondent No,5 took over as Principal of the said school, she not only stopped payment of rent for the School-building or committed other similar acts of harassment, but she also started claiming ownership of the school building on behalf of the respondent No,1 and tried to block the appellant's access to church which was part of the School-building. The petitioner first complained about such excess to the Deputy Commissioner, Okara, the respondent No,2, but when no satisfactory action was taken by him in the matter, the petitioner sought redress by filing a writ petition before the Lahore High Court. However, the petition was disposed of by the learned Judge in Chambers as it was held that the dispute related to title of property in consequence of Martial Law Regulation 118, and therefore, if the petitioner was so advised, the matter could be agitated by her before a civil Court.
4. Leave was granted by this Court to examine, whether the said view taken by the learned Judge in Chambers, was in accordance with law as enunciated by this Court in Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America v. The Government of Punjab (1987 SCM R 1197).
5. Sahibzada Anwar Hamid, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that at the time of take over of the said school under Martial Law Regulation 118, ownership of the School-building vested in the said Organisation. According to the learned counsel, the property in question had been gifted to the said organization by the provious owner of the building who also owned a fruit farm in Renala Khurd. He has also referred to certain documents relating to ownership of the property to refute the claim of the respondent No,5 that the said building had always remained under ownership of the Provincial Government.
6. Although, we may not disagree with the view taken by the learned Judge in the High Court that when any controversy arises in relation to ownership of a property, the same must be referred by the parties to a civil Court, but what the learned Judge appears to have failed to notice is that admittedly, the said building was taken over under Martial Law Regulation 118. The said Regulation which was promulgated by the then Chief Martial Law Administrator on the 1st April, 1972 was continued to be in force by Article 280(3), of the Interim Constitution which came into force on the 21st April, 1972. Thus, after lifting of Martial Law on 21-4-1972 the said Regulation became an Act of the appropriate legislature. On 21-8-1972, it was amended by Ordinance XXVI of 1972 which was subsequently replaced by an Act of Provincial Legislature namely, "Martial Law Regulation No,118 (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1973". It would be advantageous to reproduce Para. 5 of Martial Law Regulation No,118 which provided thus:-- "(5) Such Privately-managed school as the Central Government, in the case of a school situated in the Islamabad Capital Territory, and the Provincial Government in any other case, may, by notification in the official Gazette issued at any time on or after the first day of October, 1972, specify in this behalf shall vest in the Central Government or, as the case may be, in the Provincial Government, together with all property attached to it."
4. In the case reported in 1987 SCM R 1197, reference to which has just been made in this judgment, import of the word 'vest', accruing in the said Regulation was examined by this Court and it was held that the said word is of variable import, not having a fixed connotation and, thus, it does not necessarily mean to 'vest in title'. It was further held that merely because the privately managed school, alongwith their assets were to vest in the Government under the terms of para. 5 of the said Regulation, it did not imply that the Government had become owner in relation to the buildings wherein schools or colleges were being run. This judgment, in our view, leaves no doubt that Martial Law Regulation 118 was in no way intended to have an effect to make the Government the owner of the property in which the privately managed schools were being run. It, therefore, provides a complete answer to the question requiring determination in this appeal. Admittedly, as was pointed out earlier, the school before its takeover by the Government was being managed by the said Organization and at that time no one had laid any claim to the ownership of the property in question. It was only after the said takeover when the respondent No,5 was appointed as the Principal of the said School that the question regarding ownership of the building appears to have been raised. However, as by virtue of the said Martial Law Regulation, only the management of the school was intended to vest in the Government, neither the Government nor the respondent No,5 had a right to dispute title of the said Organization on the basis of the said Regulation. If any person has a rival claim over the said property independent of Martial Law Regulation No,118, the same can be established before a Court having jurisdiction in the matter. Therefore, none of the said respondents has any right under the law to cause any kind of harassment to the appellant or any other person connected with the said Organisation, or to block access of any such person to the Church or to interfere with the appellant's rights over the said property.
8. In the result, the judgment of the learned Judge in Chambers is set aside and the petition filed by the appellant is allowed to the extent as just pointed out in his judgment. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.