DECISION ' The present appeal pertains to an order passed by the learned Presiding Officer (Muhammad Ehteshamuddin Kazmi) Sindh Labour Court No, VI, Hyderabad, whereby he dismissed petition filed under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 filed by the present appellant Shaukat Ali son of Saher Gul, on the ground that the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No, II, Karachi, who was holding the additional charge of Sindh Labour Court No, VI, Hyderabad, at that time, was not competent to pass an order of admission, as there had been no notification by the Government of Sindh under section 35 of I.R.O., 1969 whereby jurisdiction is conferred on various Labour Courts. The relevant paragraph of the impugned order runs as under:-- "5. In exercise of the powers conferred by the said section the Sindh Government issued notification dated 28-1-1976, whereby territorial limits of Labour Courts in the Province were notified.
The Sindh Labour Court at Hyderabad has been assigned the areas of Hyderabad, Thatta, Badin, Mirpurkhas, Dadu and Sanghar Districts, whereas Labour Court No, II, Karachi ws assigned the areas of other hand these Districts.
6. It is an admitted position on record that the notification as required to be issued under section 35 of I.R.O., 1969 has not been issued by the Sindh Government nor published in the official Gazette. The learned Presiding Officer of Sindh Labour Court No, II at Karachi at the relevant time was merely holding charge of Labour Court No,VI, Hyderabad. Holding of charge does not ipso facto confer jurisdiction of Labour Court No VI, Hyderabad to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court No, II at Karachi.
' It is very clear that the order of admission of the above grievance application filed by the applicant named above is without jurisdiction. The above application is dismissed accordingly."
2. I have heard Mr. Rana Mehmood Ali for the appellant.
3. After hearing the learned Representative for the appellant, I have come to the conclusion that the crucial point to be decided in the present appeal is as to what is the status of "Admission Order". Either it is a Judicial Order or is only an Administrative Order. Obviously a Judicial Order cannot be passed unless and until the relevant Court who passes such order has got the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter sub judice before it. On the other hand an Administrative Order does not go through the Judicial Process, and can only be passed on administrative grounds for which conferment of jurisdiction and Judicial Powers is not necessary. I have consulted Black's Law Dictionary which defines the various terms as under:-- Addition:.
' Implies physical contact, something added to another, structure physically attached to or connected with building itself. Mack v. Eyssell, 332 Mo. 671. 59 S.W. 2d 1049. Extension; increase; augmentation. Mayering v. Miller, 330 Mo. 885, 51 S.W. 2d 65,
66. That which has become united with or a part of; Additional: ' This term embraces the idea of joining or uniting one thing to another so as thereby to form one aggregate. Ex parte Boddie, 200 S.C. 379, 21 S.E. 2d 4.8; Charge; ' V. To impose a burden, duty, obligation, or lien; to create a claim against property; to assess; to demand; to accuse; to instruct a jury on matters of law. To impose a tax, duty, or trust. In commercial transactions, to bill or invoice; to purchase on credit, In criminal law, to' indict or formally accuse; Judicial Order: ' One which involves exercise of judicial discretion and affects final result of litigation. Happy Coal Co, v. Brashear, 263 Ky. 257, 92 S.W. 2d 23.27 See also Decision; Decree; Judgment; Order; Judicial Power: ' The authority exercised by that department of Government which is charged with declaration of what law is and its construction. The authority vested in Courts and Judges, as distinguished from the executive and legislative power, Courts have general powers to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between two persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision; and also such specific powers as contempt powers, power to control admission and disbarment of attorneys, power to adopt rules of Court etc. ' A power involving exercise of judgment and discretion in determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting interests of person or property, as distinguished from ministerial power involving no discretion, Inherent authority not only to decide,. but to make binding orders or judgments. Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal, 2d 431, 144 P. 2d 592. 594. Power to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before Court for decision. Power that adjudicates upon said protects the rights and interests of persons or property, and to that end declares, construes and applies the law; Jurisdiction: ' The word is a term of large and comprehensive import, and embraces every kind of judicial action. Federal Land Bank of Louisville. Ky v. Cromble, 258 Ky. 383, 80 S.W. 2d 39.40. It is the authority by which Courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund of City of Marietta v, Brooks, 179 OKI, 600, 67 P.2d 4.6; State v, True.
Me 330 A. 2d 787. The legal right by which Judges exercise their authority. Max Ams. Inc. v. Barker.
293 Ky. 698, 170 S.W 2d 45.48. It exists when Court has cognizance of class of cases involved, proper parties are present, and point to be decided is within powers of Court. United Cemeteries Co. v.
Strother, 342 Mo. 1155, 119 S.W. 2d 762, 765; Harder v. Johnson, 147 Kan 440, 76 P. 2d 763, 764. Power and authority of a Court to hear and determine judicial proceeding. In re: de Camillis' Estate, 66 Misc. 2d 882, 322 N.Y.S.2d 551, 556. The right and power of a Court to adjudicate concerning the subject-matter in a given case. Biddinger v. Fletcher, 224 Ga. 501, 162 S.E. 2d 414, 416.
' Areas of authority; the geographic area in which a Court has power or types of cases it has power to hear; Jurisdictional limits: ' The Constitutional or statutory parameters within which judicial power may be exercised such as limits based on the monetary value of the action. See Jurisdictional amount.
4. I intend to examine the facts of the present litigation in perspective of the abovementioned definitions as given in the Black's Law Dictionary. The facts indicate that the relevant application under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969 bearing No, 111 of 1996 was presented before the concerned Officer, who recorded his note thereon. There was no Judge and the additional charge was with the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No, II at Karachi, hence the concerned officer brought that application to Karachi and presented it before the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No, II at Karachi, who was also holding the additional charge of Court No,VI at Hyderabad. The learned Presiding Officer, Court No, II, admitted the aforesaid application for regular hearing by recording the following words:-- "Admit and register. Issue notice to respondent."
5. In my view the admission orders are generally of two kinds. The one which are recorded by lower Courts at the time of presentation of civil suits applications etc.; while the other kind is that which are passed by the superior Courts at the time of Katcha Peshi. I am of the humble view that the admission orders passed by the lower Courts are of administrative nature and do not require judicial consideration while the admission orders at the stage of Karcha Peshi require judicial consideration by the superior Courts. So far as the present order is concerned it appears to be an administrative order which did not require any judicial consideration. The matter was presented before the Sindh Labour Court No, VI as well. Since the application was within time and had no other legal defect, hence the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No, II, Karachi, passed the above mentioned administrative order. As such I am of the opinion that the admission order passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No, II, Karachi, whereby the said petition was admitted, was an administrative order and is not hit by the plea that it was without jurisdiction. The result is that the present appeal is allowed and the impugned order, dated 21-11- 1997 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No,VI at Hyderabad, is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Sindh Labour Court No, VI at Hyderabed, for proceeding further on merits.