IHSAN-UL-HAQ CHAUDHARY, J.--- The relevant facts for the decision of this revision petition are that the petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of agreement dated 12.7.1992 whereby defendant No. 1 has agreed to Sell vacant plot measuring 4 marlas. It was pleaded that instead of completing, executing and registering the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff defendant No. 1 has illegally and mala fide sold the same through registered sale-deed dated 8.9.1992 to defendant No. 2. Who purchased the same in spite of notice of agreement in favour of the petitioner, therefore, the registered sale-deed was illegal and liable to be set aside. The suit was contested by the respondents. The trial Court following issues:-
(1) Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action and locus standi? OPD
(2) Whether the suit is not maintained in its present form? OPD
(3) Whether the suit is collusive between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1? OPD
(4) Whether the defendant No. 2 is entitled special costs under section 35- A CPC? OPD
(5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree for specific performance of the contract and sale- deed dated 8.9.1992 in favour of defendant No. 2 is liable to be set aside? OPP
(6) Relief.
2. The plaintiff-petitioner produced five witnesses and himself appeared as PW1 while defendant No. 2 examined four DWs and her Special Attorney Zulfiqar Khan appeared as DW2. The plaintiff produced agreement to sell Ex.PK site-plan Ex. P2 and certified copy of sale-deed dated 8.9.1992 Ex.
P3 while the original was produced by defendant No. 2 as Ex. D1 but besides this she also tendered in evidence special power-of-attorney as Ex. D2. The learned trial Court after hearing the arguments decreed the suit vide judgment dated 4.11.1996, which was assailed through an appeal.
The same came up ultimately for hearing on the file of Mian Muhammad Anwar Naseem, the then Addl. District Judge, Kasur, who accepted the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 7.4.1997. The result was that the suit of the petitioner was dismissed. The plaintiff thereafter filed the present revision petition, which came up for limine hearing on 16.5.1997. The same was admitted inter alia on the ground that the judgment rendered by the learned Addl. District Judge was no judgment in the eye of law in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 1970 SC 173). The notices were issued to the respondents. Ch. Muzammal Khan, Advocate has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 while nobody has appeared on behalf of respondent No. 2 in spite of service, therefore he was proceeded ex parte.
3. The revision was called. Nobody has entered appeared on behalf of the petitioner. The judgment was patently perverse and violative of the provisions of section 27(b) of the' Specific Relief Act and Order XL1 read with Order XX CPC, therefore, I decided to exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction.
The suit was for specific performance. It was pleaded by the plaintiff that the vendor proceeded to sell plot to defendant No. 2 during the subsistence of agreement to sell in his favour while defendant No. 2 in spite of notice of this agreement purchased the same, therefore, he had prayed for setting aside of the sale-deed. The Appellate Court did not advert to legal question as to whether the appellant was purchaser for consideration without notice of previous agreement to sell or not? Therefore, the sale-deed could not be preferred in view of the provisions of section 27(b). The same reads as under:- "27.(b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract;"
This is a basic provision. The trial Court has rendered a speaking judgment with reference to evidence on record and judgments in the cases of Hajui Abdul Rehman and 3 others v. Noor Ahmad and 3 others (PLD 1974 Baghdad-ul-Jadid 25) and Mst. Khair-ul-Nisa and 6 others v. Malik Muhammad Ishaque and 2 others (PLD 1972 SC 25) while the Addl. District Judge accepted this appeal on the sole ground that he would prefer a registered sale-deed over mere agreement to sell and observed that "he could safely hold that the agreement dated 12.7.1992 was written in order to damage the interests of the appellant."
It is clear from the judgment of the Addl. District Judge that he even did not go through the judgment of the trial Court and precedents referred to by him otherwise it was not possible to record above findings. He has failed to decide the appeal by a speaking judgment. He has neither referred to evidence nor arguments nor issues in clear violation of provisions of Orders XL1 and XX CPC.
4. The learned counsel for respondent No. 1 was directed to justify the judgment of the Addl. District Judge with reference to section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act and Order XX, Rule 5 CPC but he failed to defend the judgment.
5. The learned Addl. District Judge has neither noted the points argued before him by the parties nor disposed of the issues with reference to evidence. It is relevant to note here that as per record none of the issues ft^med by the trial Court was given up by either of the parties, therefore, he was under legal obligation to decide all the issues. The judgment rendered by him is no adjudication in the eye of law of rights of the parties. In this behalf, reference can be made to judgment in the case of Mollah Ejahar Ali (Supra). The relevant portion reads as under:- "To deal with the second contention first, there is no doubt that the High Court's order which is unfortunately purfunctory gives the impression of hasty off-hand decision which, although found to be correct in its result, is most deficient in its content. If a summary order of rejection can be made in such terms, there is no reason why a similar order of acceptance saying "there is considerable in the substance in the petition which is accepted",.Should not be equally blessed. This will reduce the whole judicial process to authoritarian decrees without the need for logic and reasoning which have always been the traditional pillars of judicial pronouncements investing them with their primary excellence of propriety and judicial balance. Litigants who bring their disputes to the law Courts with the incidental hardships and expenses involved do expect a patient and an judicious treatment of their cases and their determination by proper orders. A judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its mind to the resolution of the issues involved for their proper adjudication. The ultimate result may be reached by a laborious effort, but if the final order does not bear an imprint of that effort and on the contrary discloses arbitrariness of thought and action, the feeling with the painful results, that justice has neither been done nor seen to have been done is inescapable. When the order of a lower Court contains -no reasons, the Appellate Court is deprived of the benefit of the views of the lower Court and is unable to appreciate the processes by which the decision has been reached, In this case the learned counsel naturally criticised the High Court's order for its utter barrenness but he was definitely at an advantage in presenting the various aspects of his argument without any hindrance offered by the ineffectiveness of the impugned order."
It may be noted here that this was a judgment of the High Court in Constitutional jurisdiction where only the principles of CPC are applicable while in civil cases these principles are strictly to be followed in view of the provisions of Order XL1, Rule 31 and Order XX, Rule 5 CPC. Reference can also be made to Juma Khan v. Mst. Shamim and J others (1992 CLC 1022), Muhammad Mustaqeem v.
Abdul Haleem (1992 CLC 435), Wakil Khan v. Mst. Aasia Begum and another (PLJ 1978 Lahore 186), Sahib Jan v. Ahmad Khan and others (1990 ALD 493) and Syed Farand Raza Rizvi v. Syed Zaheer Mustafa (1988 M LD 463).
6. The upshot of the above discussion is that in suo motu exercise of revisional jurisdiction the impugned judgment and decree dated 7.4.1997 by Muhammad Anwar Naseem, the then Addl.
District Judge, Kasur, is set aside. The result is that the appeal would be deemed pending on the file of the District Judge, Kasur, who shall decide the same afresh. In accordance with law.