1. ' The facts leading to present application for bail are that applicant/accused Shahjee is facing trial under section 17(3), Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979 in Sessions Case No,698 of 1997 before learned IXth Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi (South) arising out of F.I.R. No,235 of 1997 of Police Station Gulshan-e-Iqbal, East Karachi.
2. ' The brief facts of the prosecution case as disclosed in the F.I.R., lodged by one Muhammad Naveed on 13-4-1997 are reproduced hereinbelow:-- ' "I am residing on aforesaid address. Today i,e, on 13-4-1997 I left my father at the shop of Warsi Hair Dresser. After making purchase for breakfast I was waiting for my father near the shop in my Honda Civic Car No,Z-5017, of silver colour, Model 1994 when at about 9-35 p.m. Two youngsters, wearing Shalwar Kameez, out of whom one wore a beared and they appeared to be Pathans and they were armed with T.T. Pistols came towards me. They raised arms at me and sat in the car.
3. While they were in the car they were trying to find out the switch fixed in the car for the prevention of .The theft. They proceeded towards Disco Bakery. Due to traffic jam the car slowed down. I immediately got down from the car and raised hue and cry and rushed towards my father. In the meantime S.H.O. Gulshan-e-Iqbal alongwith police party reached there and I narrated the incident to him. He apprehended the accused with the car. Accused disclosed their names as Shahjee son of Haroon Khan and Jaweed son of Hakeem Khan. Two T.T. Pistols with loaded magazines each containing 5 live bullets were recovered from their possession. Police secured the car and arms. I have come at police station alongwith police, and report. Investigation may be made. The applicant/accused applied for bail before the trial Court but it was dismissed by impugned order, dated 18-8-1998.
4. ' I have heard Mr. Al-Haj Farid Gul Khan, learned Advocate for the applicant/accused and Mr. Muhammad Saad Khan, learned Advocate for the State. The later opposed the grant of bail. I have also perused the material placed on record.
5. The perusal of record shows that applicant/accused alongwith his companion snatched the car from complainant on the point of T.T. Pistols after putting him in the fear of death. It was a sheer luck of the complainant that due to traffic jam car slowed down when he stepped out of it and at that juncture police mobile reached and police men within short span of time arrested the applicant/accused and his companion and recovered weapon of offence i,e, T.T. Pistols and snatched vehicle from their possession. The F.I.R. Was promptly lodged which contains the names of accused.
6. ' .The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant/accused that nol identification test was held has no force as the name of applicant/accused transpires in the F.I.R.
7. ' The plea that offence squarely falls under section 411, P.P.C. Is also not tenable because it is not a case of knowingly retaining the stolen property simplicitor but in the present case the applicant/accused was one of the culprits who snatched the car on the point of pistol and while he was taking away the car snatched by them it was secured from his possession in presence of complainant within a few minutes of the incident. Thus, he is prima facie liable for offence under section 17(3) of Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979.
8. ' The pleas that no specific role or overt act was ascribed to the applicant/accused, or that purchasing of the articles for breakfast at the night time suggests that the story was concocted are also misconceived. Overt act coupled with specific role of snatching the car alongwith co-accused has been ascribed to the present applicant/accused and it is common that people purchase articles for breakfast on the proceeding night.
9. The ground of statutory delay is also not available to applicant/accused Li looking towards the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Proviso (3) to Li section 497(1), Cr.P.C. Is controlled by proviso (4) to section 497, Cr.P.C. While considering the bail plea on the ground of statutory delay Court has to take into consideration the evidence collected by the prosecution, and if case falls within the purview of proviso (4) to section 497(1), Cr.P.C. Court can refuse bail.
10. ' Now-a-days in the city of Karachi, vehicle snatching has become order of the day and Courts cannot be oblivious of this situation. In the unreported case of Rizwan Hussain v. The State Criminal Petition No,41/K of 1998 Honourable Supreme Court has laid down as follows:-- "We find that the order passed by the learned Judge in Chambers is not open to exception. The learned Judge in the High Court obviously could not be oblivious of the high incidence of cases of car-snatching in the city of Karachi. Therefore, in our opinion, he rightly invoked the Fourth Proviso to section 497(1), while rejecting the petitioner's bail application. The petition is, therefore, dismissed and leave is refused."
11. The vehicle snatching is also an act of terrorism. In this context I am fortified by the unreported D.B.
12. Decision of this Court in case of Dhani Bux and others v. The State Criminal Bail Application No,289 of 1998 to which I was also a member and also by the case of Muhammad Shafique v. The State 1998 PCr.LJ 1299.
13. ' The authorities Sher Ali alias Sheri v. The State 1998 SCM R 190, Zahid Hussain Shah v. The State PLD 1995 SC 49, Roshan and others v. The State 1989 PCr.LJ 609, Mamoori alias Mamoora v. The State 1972 PCr.LJ 816, Amir v. The State PLD 1972 SC 277 and Khalid Saigol v. The State PLD 1962 SC 495 cited at Bar by the learned counsel for applicant/accused are of no avail to him as the facts and circumstances of the cited cases are altogether different and distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case. For the reasons stated hereinabove the bail plea of the applicant/accused merits no consideration. Consequently .Bail application stands dismissed.
14. ' The observations made hereinabove are of tentative nature and the trial Court will not be influenced thereby in any way at the time of final decision of the case and, it will be free to arrive at its own findings after evaluating the evidence which is recorded in the case at the stage of trial.