' Through this writ petition, the petitioners, six in number, seek quashment of order of respondent No,4 (Judicial Magistrate Model Town, Lahore) summoning the petitioners alongwith others as accused persons in the complaint lodged by respondent No,3 under section 452/354/148/149/506, P. P.0 .
2. The petitioners, in the first instance, filed an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. Before the trial Court which was dismissed vide order dated 10-3-1998.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners when confronted with the proposition that the writ petition is not maintainable as another remedy under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Is available to him, stated that this writ petition may be treated as an application under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. I accordingly treat the writ petition as application under section 561-A, Cr.P.C.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended, that in the first instance, the complainant- respondent No,3 made an attempt to get the case registered with respondent No,2 on 13-11-1996 against four persons. However, respondent No,2 did not take any action. The learned counsel contends that the complaint under section 200, Cr.P.C. Was filed before respondent No,4 against 14 persons. According to him, increasing the number of persons from four to fourteen itself shows that the complaint is false. It was next contended by the learned counsel that the petitioners were summoned by respondent No,4 alongwith others as accused persons on 14-12-1996 but no progress has been . Made so far. He submitted that three persons amongst the array of the accused are intentionally not appearing being in connivance with the complainant, want to prolong the agony of the petitioners to face the rigors of a protracted trial.
5. The complainant/respondent No,3 in the first instance submitted an application to S.H.O. Police Station, Liaqatabad Lahore voicing her grievance on 13-11-1996 but it seems that the same went unattended, with the result that the present complaint was filed on 1-12-1996. To support her complaint, she examined herself by way of preliminary evidence and also produced two witnesses namely Israr Charles and Naeem Imroz, both named in the complaint, who supported her in material particulars. On the basis of this preliminary evidence, trial Court was persuaded to issue process against the petitioners. On 14-12-1996.
6. The petitioners made an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. On 18-11-1997 stating therein that the complaint was false, there were contradictions as to the number of accused in the application to police and the complaint made to the Court and that in her preliminary evidence, no case has been made out against them. The assertions made were stoutely denied by the counsel for the complainant and a speaking order was passed by respondent No,4 on 10-3-1998. Coming to the conclusion that prima facie, a case made out.
7. The grounds usually available under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. For quashing criminal proceedings inter alia are:-
(a) jurisdictional defect.
(b) patent violation of some provisions of law.
(c) the allegations as contained in the complaint or F.I.R. Even if believed no case is made out and the continuation of the proceedings amounts to sheer abuse of process of Court.
(d) when an endeavour is made to enforce civil liability through the machinery of criminal Courts.
(e) in certain cases an in ordinate delay amounts to abuse of process of Court.
On the other hand it has been repeatedly held by the superior Courts that the prosecution should be given full chance to prove its case; interference at pre-trial stage has not been considered favourably. Reference is invited to Muhammad Khalid Mukhtar v. State PLD 1997 SC 275.
8. In the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners, no such ground is available to him. Criminal proceedings should be allowed to take its normal course which should not be stiffled or guillotined. The question of insufficiency of evidence or its non-credibility is no ground to quash proceedings nor allied question for appreciation of evidence can be taken into consideration at this early stage.
9. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that no progress has been made in the trial for one and a half year and this in itself 1 contributes a good ground for interference, I am guided by recent judgment of the Supreme Court pronounced in State v. Gulzar Muhammad and others 1998 SCM R 873, wherein it was held that the delay by itself is no ground to quash proceedings. However, the delay during the trial has to be taken into consideration upon the facts of every case. In the case in hand the delay has been occasioned by the absence of three accused. To say that the procrastination of the trial is due to the connivance of the complainant is not only a far fetched argument but is also not borne from the record.
10. Respondent No,4 applied his mind to the preliminary evidence produced by the complainant and after due consideration came to the conclusion that, prima facie, a case is made out as such process in the form of summons was issued. The petitioners are, therefore, required under the law to appear before the Magistrate, contest the proceedings and prove their innocence during the trial. In any case, the trial Court is directed to complete the proceedings within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this order. Proper steps in the form of non-bailable warrants, be taken to secure the attendance of all the three accused persons. If, however, still they did not appear, the case of the remaining accused can be segregated and treated as separately.
Resultantly, I find no merit in this petition which has been treated as application under section 561- A, Cr.P.C. And is dismissed.