' SH. IJAZ NISAR, J.---This appeal by leave of the Court is directed against the judgment, dated 16- 10-1993, passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, in Civil Revision No,83-D of 1989.
2. The irelevant facts are that Raja Karamatullah and his brother, the appellants herein had purchased land measuring 764 Kanals and 17 Marlas from Habibullah for Rs,5,64,273 vide sale- deed registered on 8-5-1974. Sardar Muhammad Aslam Sukhera, respondent herein, being the first cousin and co-sharer of the vendor pre-empted the sale. The vendee/appellants contested the suit, inter alia, on the valuation for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction. The superior right of pre-emption in favour .Of the respondent was also challenged. Considering the question of the valuation of the suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction, as preliminary in nature, the learned trial Court by order, dated 21-7-1980 determined the court-fee on the basis of 15 times of the net profits arising from the suit land during the year preceding the date of institution of the suit.
From the statement of net profits (D-1), produced by the appellants it was found that the net profits were Rs,10,795.93 in the relevant year. On this basis, the Court calculated the court-fee payable as Rs,12,145.50. Since the plaint was stamped with court-fee of Rs,22.50 only the trial Court required the respondent to make up the deficiency of Rs,12,128. The valuation of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction was also fixed at 15 times of the net profits i.e, 1,61,938.95. This order was unsuccessfully challenged in revision before the District Judge, Kasur, and thereafter through Civil Revision No,1880 of 1980 in the High Court, which was dismissed on 9-5-1981.
' After the deficiency in the court-fee, as determined by the learned trial Court, was made up the suit was tried on merits and was decreed by the learned Civil Judge, in favour of Sardar Muhammad Aslam Sukhera preemptor/respondent vide judgment and decree, dated 5-10-1981.
3. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants filed R.F.A. No,170 of 1981 in the High Court, which was returned with the direction to file the same before District Court. The order reads as follows:-- "The value of the suit for purpose of jurisdiction equivalent to thirty times the revenue which had been settled on the land in dispute was, as stated in para. 7 of the plaint, Rs,1366.50. The appeal against the decree of the learned trial Court in the circumstances, under section 18 of the Punjab Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 (II of 1962), and in view of what has been laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Illahi Bakhsh v. Bilqees Begum PLD 1985 Supreme Court 393, ought to have been filed by the appellants in the District Court which was competent to entertain and decide it. The appeal did not lie in this Court. The memorandum of appeal will be returned to the appellants for lodging the appeal in the Court where it should have been filed."
4. In pursuance of the order of the High Court, the appellants received back the memorandum of appeal on 9-5-1987 and filed the same in the Court of District Judge alongwith application under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act on 18-5-1987. An objection was raised on behalf of the respondent that the appeal was beyond limitation. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned District Judge by judgment, dated 5-12-1988 held the appeal to be time- barred. He maintained the finding of the learned trial Court with regard to the superior right of pre- emption vesting in the respondent being collateral and co-sharer, for, it had not challenged before him by the appellants. Dealing with the question of limitation the learned District Judge observed as under- "It is pertinent to point out that the appellants had filed two revision petitions against the interlocutory orders of the trial Court before the learned District Judge, Kasur, who disposed of the revision petitions vide orders, dated 23-5-1979 and 23-10-1980. The appeal lies to the Court who also can hear revision. The appellants: therefore, were bound with their words and conduct as well.
The Second Revision Petition bearing No,1880 of 1980 (No, 1880 be read as 1888) was filed before the High Court which was dismissed as withdrawn on 9-5-1981. Finally the High Court by its order, dated 17-3-1983 (the date, 17-3-1983 be read as 17-3-1987) had laid the matter at rest by holding with reference to Supreme Court Authority (PLD 1985 SC 393) and section 18 of the Punjab Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 that value of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction was equivalent to 30 times of the land revenue as stated in para. 7 of the plaint as Rs,1,366.50. The High Court pointed out the mistake of the appellants about choosing the wrong forum by saying 'the appeal ought to have been filed by the appellants in the District Court, which was competent to entertain and decide it. The appeal did not lie to this Court.' The High Court, thus, gave bit of its mind by pointing out the error, and at the time directing the appellants to file the memorandum of appeal in the Court where it should have been filed. The words underlined are also pointer to the previous omission of the appellants. I am really surprised by audacious argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that this order of the High Court did not represent correct legal position and the memorandum of appeal was illegally returned to be re-filed to the District Court, Kasur. The order of the High Court is binding on this Court and also on the parties under Article 201 of the Constitution of Pakistan and the only way for the counsel for the appellants to avoid the High Court decision was to challenge it in the Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the appellants cannot be heard to say that the valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction was other than stated by the High Court or that the memorandum of appeal could not be returned to be re-filed in the District Court, Kasur. Now I am left with no option but to ask for explanation from the appellants for delay towards the period from 5-10-1981 to 17-3-1987 and then from this date to 9-5-1987 and again from this date to 18-5-1987 when it was actually re-filed before the District Judge, Kasur. The appellants cannot plead ignorance of law on the famous legal maxim ignorentia legis non excusat. Any legal advice given by the advocate negligently, carelessly and without application of mind is not a sufficient justification for the condonation of delay as ruled in numerous authorities of the High Court and the Supreme Court, the latest being PLD 1985 SC 393. At least after this pronouncement of law, the learned counsel for the appellants had no reason to keep the matter pending in the High Court and he should have recoursed the Court of the District Judge after withdrawal of the appeal from the High Court. In law Courts legal provisions have to be strictly observed as by lapse of time the other party gains very valuable and substantial rights in property which cannot be otherwise defeated or ignored. The party guilty of negligence, therefore, has to suffer the consequences."
' The District Judge further observed that:- "The right to file appeal in this case accrued immediately on the passing of the impugned decree and the period of limitation started running, from that date and according to the provision of section 9 of the Limitation Act, it continued running and did not stop at any time before the appeal was filed in competent Court (District Judge Kasur). The period of limitation for filing the appeal is 30 days, but the instant appeal was filed before the competent forum after a delay of about 6-1/2 years without any excusable justification."
' The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that "the period during which the file of the case remained in the High Court from 8-10-1981 to 17-10-1987 was not condonable, inter alia, for the reason that the time spent in pursuance of erroneous filing of appeal before the incompetent forum is not a sufficient ground as ruled in 1985 SCMR 902. The delay is also not condonable from the time from 17-3-1987 to 9-5-1987 and 9-5-1987 to 18-5-1987 for reasons aforementioned.
5. Feeling aggrieved the appellants filed Civil Revision No,83 of 1989 in the High Court, which was dismissed on 16-10-1993. It was urged before the High Court that the entire period from the date of presentation of memorandum of appeal before the High Court on 8-10-1981 up to the date when the said appeal was decided on 17-3-1987 alongwith period from 17-3-1987 to 26-4-1987 spent for obtaining certified copy of the order of the High Court should be excluded for computation of the period of limitation for filing appeal before the learned District Judge under section 14 of the Limitation Act.
6. The learned High Court while dealing with the above question observed:-- "I am afraid from a bare reading of this section it is manifest that the same is applicable only to suits and applications and not to appeals. The exclusion of time under the said section as claimed by the petitioners is wholly untenable. Since I have held that this section of its own terms is not applicable as regards appeals, therefore, I need not go into the question whether the petitioners were prosecuting the appeal before this Court with the diligence in good faith or not as envisaged by this section which aspect of the case shall be dealt with while determining the question whether there was sufficient cause under section 5 of the Limitation Act, to condone the delay in filing the appeal on the touchstone of the criteria as laid down by the superior Courts for condonation of delay under section 5 which is materially different as under the said section petitioners were required to explain delay of each day as against exclusion of time under section 14 which on the proof of prosecution of other civil litigation diligently and in good faith could be claimed as a matter of right."
7. Dealing with the proposition that act or omission of the Court should not be allowed to prejudice the right of a party, the learned High Court observed as under:-- "The argument no doubt engaged my serious consideration but on close scrutiny I find, that the same cannot be entertained without doing violence to the finality attached to the judgment, dated 17-3-1987 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in R.F.A. No,170 of 1981 apart from the fact that the learned Single Bench of this Court even otherwise has no jurisdiction to go behind the judgment passed by the Division Bench in the same case at earlier stage. In the said judgment it was clearly held that the appeal did not lie before this Court and after recording this finding the memo. Of appeal was ordered to be returned. If the petitioner felt aggrieved he should have challenged the said judgment before the higher forum and cannot now argue that the same should be ignored. The principle that no act or omission of a Court should prejudice right of a party in the litigation is not attracted in the case of legal effect arising from a judgment passed in an appeal which if a party wants to avoid has to get the same set aside from the higher forum. The argument is, therefore, repelled."
' The learned High Court upheld the finding of the learned lower Appellate Court that the appeal was barred by time and that it did not suffer from any material irregularity and illegality.
8. The appellants challenged the judgment of the High Court in this Court and leave was granted to consider the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that if the initial institution of the appeal was well within time whether it could subsequently be held to be barred by time particularly when in essence, the order of the High Court was one of transfer of the appeal from its file to that of the District Judge.
9. The sole point regarding determination is whether the appellants are entitled to the condonation of delay in filing the appeal. For the determination of this question the mentioning of certain dates would be relevant. The respondent/pre-emptor had filed the suit on 10-5-1975 which was decreed on 5-10-1981. The appellants instead of preferring appeal in the Court of the District Judge filed the same in the High Court. On 17-3-1987 the High Court ordered the return of memo. Of appeal for filing the same in the Court of the District Judge, which was received back on 9-5-1987 and filed in the District Court on 18-5-1987.
10. Since the jurisdictional value of the suit was based on 30 times of the land revenue viz Rs,1366.50, the appeal was competent before the District Court under section 18 of the Punjab Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, and in view of the law laid down in Ilahi Baldish and others v. Bilqees Begum (PLD 1985 SC 393). After the direction of the High Court about the return of memorandum of appeal on 17-3-1987, the appellants were under a legal obligation to receive the memorandum of appeal and to file it in the District Court without any loss of time. The order of return of the appeal by the. High Court having not been challenged in the Supreme Court at the relevant time, the District Judge was not competent to re-open the same, nor could the appellants assail its validity. It is well- settled proposition that the question determined by the Appellate Court becomes conclusive and cannot be attacked in the subsequent proceedings arising from the order passed on the basis thereof. The appellants having themselves received back the memorandum of appeal and presented it before the District Judge could not criticize the legality of the order passed in the R.F.A.
11. The appellants acted negligently in approaching the District Court. Instead of receiving the memorandum of appeal immediately they applied for certified copy of the judgment, dated 17-3- 1987, which was not at all necessary because the copy of the said judgment was to be appended, with the appeal by the office while returning it to the appellants which they had to collect from the office.
' If the appellants are given the benefit of time spent by them for obtaining certified copy of the said judgment, even then they were negligent because the copy was prepared and delivered to them on 26-4-1987 but they did not receive the memorandum of appeal till 9-5-1987. There is no explanation for the period from 26-4-1987 to 9-5-1987, even after obtaining the memorandum of appeal on 9-5-1987 the same was presented before the District Court on 18-5-1987. No reasonable explanation was advanced in the application for condonation of the delay. It was stated that since Raja Karmatullah, appellant No,1, who was incharge of the prosecution of the case had permanently settled in U.K., therefore, the delay occurred, The learned High Court rightly rejected this explanation, in that, the same learned counsel, who had filed R.F.A. In the High Court, had received the memorandum of appeal on 9-5-1987 and for all purposes he continued to be the counsel for the appellants.
12. The forum of appeal is regulated by the jurisdictional value in the plaint. In pre-emption suits the jurisdictional value of the suit is regulated by amount of 30 times of land revenue as held in Noor Muhammad and others v. Mst. Kaneez Fatima (PLD 1980 Lah. 431) and Illahi Bakhsh v. Mst. Bilqees Begum (PLD 1985 SC 393). In the plaint the valuation of court-fee and jurisdiction was separately assessed. The valuation of court-fee was assessed as 15 times of the annual net profits while jurisdictional value was assessed at Rs,1366.50 being 30 times of the land revenue. Resultantly, there was no ambiguity and the first appeal could have been filed in the District Court which having been incompetently filed in the High Court was rightly returned for re-filing in the District Court. And the appellants would be required to explain this delay for the period commencing from the date of decree till the filing of the appeal before the District Court. Even if the period during which the first appeal remained pending in the High Court is ignored, still the appellants need to explain the delay after the order of return of memorandum of appeal i.e, 17-3-1987 till the filing of the appeal before the District Judge i.e, 18-5-1987. The explanation in the application filed under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act is hardly satisfactory. There was no reason for applying certified copies and awaiting their delivery by the Copying Agency as the appeal was simply to be received and re-filed before the District Judge. Even if the explanation of having applied for copies is attached some importance, yet the appellants are required to explain their failure to refile the appeal immediately on receiving the certified copies of the orders of the High Court. The memo of appeal was received by them on 9-5-1987 and there was no reason to file the appeal on 18-5-1987 after 9 days delay, not only that, the conduct of the appellants demonstrates acute negligence but also their application fails to explain delay for each day from 9-5-1987 to 18-5-1987.
13. In the presence of section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, there could be no doubt or complication to determine the forum of appeal. Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act would come into play only if the delay appears to be condonable because of the appellants prosecuting their case with due diligence, The time consumed in pursuing the appeal in wrong forum could not be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Ghulam Ali v. Akbar alias Akoor and another (PLD 1991 SC 957) may be cited in this behalf. In Abdul Ghani v. Mst. Mussarat Rehana (1985 CLC 2529) it was observed that for bringing the case within the ambit of principles governing section 14, the appellant has to show that he prosecuted his remedy before the wrong forum in good faith. In Government of Pakistan v. Rafi Associates Limited (1985 CLC 2234 Kar.) choosing wrong forum lacking due care and attention were not considered as acts done in good faith. The principle that the act of Court shall prejudice nobody is not attracted in the present case, as the delay was on account of the appellant's own negligence and not due to the act of Court. The exclusion of time for filing appeal in wrong Court was considered in Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar (PLD 1977 SC 102, at page 107) and it was observed that:- "Now if an appellant proves that he filed his appeal in the wrong Court despite due care and attention it means that the presentation of the appeal in the wrong Court was on account of circumstances beyond his control. No doubt, what such circumstances are must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and in Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur Singh's case, Sir George Rankin set aside the finding of the Chief Court that the appellant's Advocate had been very negligent in filing the appeal in the wrong Court because the facts relevant to the question of the Court in which the appeal was to be filed were very complicated. Similarly, an appellant can bring his case under section 5 if he can show that there is some ambiguity in the law governing the forum in which the appeal is to be filed. Or, to take another example, an appellant can rely on section 5, if he can show that he was misguided by the practice of the Court or by an erroneous judgment of the Court but, in the instant case, the provisions of section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance are plain beyond any doubt and as there is also no complication whatsoever about the facts relevant to the question of the proper forum for filing the appeal, it is clear that the presentation of the appeal in the District Court was an act of gross negligence."
The rule laid down in Syed Haji Abdul Wahid and another v. Syed Sirajuddin (1998 SCMR 2296) that if the appellant is able to establish that he followed the remedy before a wrong forum, acting with due care and caution, the delay in filing the appeal may be condoned is not attracted, because conduct of the counsel for the appellants in the circumstances outlined above, smacks of negligence and carelessness.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appellants have failed to satisfy us that they had been prosecuting their remedy before the wrong forum in good faith and are, therefore, entitled to the condonation of delay in filing the appeal before the District Court. In consequences, the learned High Court and the District Court had rightly dismissed the appeal on the point of limitation. Thus, finding no illegality in the said judgments, we dismissed the appeal, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
' I agree with the conclusion.