' The claim of the petitioners who are employees in the Employees' Old-Age Benefits Institution is founded on the EOB-I (Employees Service) Regulations, 1980, which have been framed by the Board of Trustees of the Institution in exercise of powers conferred by section 45 of the EOB-I Act, 1976.
2. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that house rent allowance was agreed to be enhanced to 70% by the respondent No.2 institution but such decision has not been given effect to.
3. In the comments which have been submitted by the respondent No.1, it is stated in reply to para. 7 of the petition as follows: "Earlier in October, 1991, the rates of House Rent Allowance were enhanced from 55% to 60% by this Division. All allowances special pays including house rent allowance were freezed at the level drawn/admissible on 31-5-1994 vide Finance Division O.M. No.1(2)-Imp/94(i), dated 15-6-1994. This decision was made by the Cabinet and also approved in the Budget by the National Assembly as that decision had become a part of the Finance Bill, and Finance Division is not in a position to amend that decision without the approval of the National Assembly."
4. According to respondent No.1, the freeze on increase in the house rent allowance has become effective from 31-5-1994 and there is no prohibition against payment of the allowance as was payable or could be paid before such date.
5. According to the petitioners, the respondent No.2 institution had decided to enhance house rent allowance to 60% before 31-5-1994 and an alternate prayer has been made for payment of the said allowance at the rate of 60% of the basic pay. Be that as it may, the position taken by the respondent No.1 is clear in regard to the payment of allowance as were paid before 31-5-1994 and we do not want to dilate on that any further. As to the grievance of the petitioners for payment of the house rent allowance at the rate of 70%, suffice to observe that the base for such claim is the regulations which have been referred to hereinabove and such regulations cannot have the status of the statutory rules. The petitioners, admittedly, are not civil servants and the service regulations, framed by the Board of Trustees, do not create a right which can be enforced through Constitutional jurisdiction. The mere fact that the respondent No.2 was established under a statute cannot change the position either. We are fortified in this view by judgment in the case of Principal, Cadet College, Kohat and another v. Muhammad Shoib Qureshi (PLD 1984 SC 170) where the enforceability of the regulations and bye-laws framed in exercise of statutory powers were considered and the dictum was laid down as follows: It is, therefore, evident that where the conditions of service of an employee of a statutory body are governed by statutory rules, any action prejudicial taken against him in derogation or in violation of the said rules can be set aside by a writ petition. However, where his terms and conditions are not governed by statutory rules but only by regulations, instructions or directions, which the institution or body, in which he is employed, has issued for its internal use, any violation thereof will not, normally, be enforced through a writ petition."
6. Such view was also reaffirmed in the case of Mehdi Khan v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan reported in 1989 SCM R 345.
7. Following the principles laid down-by the Humble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the above- referred judgments, we do not find this a fit case for interference in exercise of powers under Article 199 of the Constitution.
8. This petition, in the circumstances, is without merits and is dismissed with no order as to costs.
The pending application is also dismissed.