' This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 arises out of three suits filed by the parties against each other. On 10-8-1992 Mst. Zubaida, respondent No,3 filed suit for dissolution of marriage on various grounds, including Khulai . Thereafter the petitioner filed suit for restitution of conjugal rights against her on 2-11-1992. While the above suits were pending, respondent No,3 filed suit for maintenance allowance for herself and her minor children, who are respondents Nos.4 to 7. All these suits were heard and tried by the Judge, Family Court together.
The learned Judge, Family Court came to the conclusion that respondent No,3 was entitled to Khula' and, thus, decreed her suit for dissolution of marriage. The suit of the petitioner for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed. The suit for maintenance to the extent of respondent No,3 was dismissed whereas it was decreed qua the minors fixing their maintenance of Rs, 200 per month per child from the date of institution of the suit i,e, September, 1992 and also for future. This is vide judgment dated 27-6-1994.
2. The petitioner filed appeal before the District Judge, only regarding the maintenance allowed to the minors. The appeal was disposed of on the statement of the petitioner that in case the past maintenance amount of Rs, 17,600 was allowed to be paid in instalments, he was ready to pay future maintenance to the minors at the rate of Rs,200 per month. In response to this the counsel for the respondent abandoned the amount of Rs, 2,600 from the decretal amount and asked for payment of Rs,15,000 in three equal instalments of Rs,5,000 each, payable in three years. This arrangement was accepted by the petitioner. In this view of the matter, the appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge on 13-2-1995. The petitioner has filed this petition now, to challenge the said order/judgment.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner instead of pointing out any fault with the impugned orders, has contended that the petitioner being father of respondents Nos.4 to 7 can take care of them better than respondent No,3, their mother and that he is not duty bound to pay their maintenance.
4. I am afraid that in these proceedings which emanated from the suit for maintenance, the matter of custody of the minors, cannot be agitated. Contest throughout had been with regard to the quantum of maintenance and not the custody. So far as the maintenance dispute is concerned, the same was settled by the parties, through an arrangement of a compromise. Statements of the parties/counsel were recorded by the learned Appellate Court and appeal disposed of accordingly. This is indeed a consent decree, that has been passed by the Appellate Court, it cannot be assailed in writ jurisdiction.
5. In Haji Muhammad Asghar v. Malik Shah Muhammad Awan PLD 1986 SC 542, it was held by their lordships that where a party to the proceedings before the Court enters into the agreement of its own free will for disposal of the matter in a particular way, it cannot turn round and successfully plead that it had no legal right to consent or that the Court could not act on such a consent. In such-like situations the doctrine of election, approbation and reprobation comes into play.
Similarly. In A.R. Khan v. P.N. Boga PLD 1987 SC 108 the sanctity of compromise agreement, its efficacy and binding nature was recognised.
6. The petitioner herein having led the Court to dispose of the appeal on the basis of a compromise, cannot now turn round and challenge the same. The petition is wholly misconceived and incompetent in law.
' In view of the above, this petition has no merit and is dismissed accordingly: