FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.- This common order shall dispose of Writ Petitions No. l3479, l4702 and l2l38 of l998 as they involve common questions of law and fact dialling in question the same notifications.
2. ' The Government of the Punjab, Revenue Department, issued two notifications dated l8-5-l998 under the provisions of Section 6 of the Punjab land Revenue Act, l967. The Tehsil/Sub-Division Sarai Alamgir with its existing boundaries was detached from District Jhelum and attached to District Gujrat. The District Gujrat was divided into three Tehsils of Gujrat, Kharian and Sarai Alamgir with revenue estates included in the existing Tehsils. By another Notification dated 28-5-l998, the Government of the Punjab, local Government and Rural Development Department, excluded the area of Sarai Alamgir from Zila Council, Jhelum and included the same in Zila Council, Gujrat. It was further directed that the Muslim members of Zila Council, Jhelum, from the area of Tehsil Sarai Alamgir would be deemed to be the elected members of Zila Council, Gujrat and that the fresh elections would be held to fill up the seats of non-Muslims. The petitioners have called in question the validity of the aforesaid notifications.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner (W.P. No. l3479/98) argued that the provisions of the Punjab local Government Ordinance, l979, had been violated by the Government in issuing the impugned notifications. A particular reference was made to the provisions of Sections 6(6), 8.9(b), l0, l4 and 23 of the Ordinance and the Rules made thereunder. It was submitted that Zila Council, Jhelum, was constituted with 47 members vis-a-vis Zila Council, Gujrat with 88 members. The population of District Jhelum as ascertained in the recent census was ll,03,904 whereas that of Gujrat was l8,42,285. The poling of the elections to the Zila Councils and other local bodies was held on 20-5-l998 just two days after the impugned notifications dated l8-5-l998 had been issued.
There was no proper delimitation of the constituencies of the Zila Councils. Certain other factors had also been dis-regarded while issuing the impugned notifications. The learned Counsel relied on the case of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and another v. President of Pakistan and others (K.l.R. l998 SC l) in support of his contention that every citizen particularly belonging to the Districts of Gujrat and Jhelum had locus standi to maintain a writ petition against the impugned notifications.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners (W.P. No. l4702/98 and W.P. No. l2l38/98) argued that the area of Tehsil Saria Alamgir was excluded from Gujrat District and attached to District Jhelum for the first time by notification dated l2-6-l993 of the Punjab Government. Writ Petition No. 8096/93 against the said notification dated l2-6-l993 was dismissed on 7-2-l994 by a learned Single Judge of this Court. It was observed that the exercise of power under section 6 of the Punjab land Revenue Act, l967, by the Government dividing the Districts into various Tehsils in view of the administrative convenience was not to be interfered with. It was pointed out that earlier a notification similar to the impugned one was issued on l2-9-l997 but was withdrawn by the Provincial Government by another notification dated 7-l0-l997. Neither the welfare nor the convenience of the people of Saria Alamgir Tehsil was taken into consideration by the Government while issuing the impugned notifications. Clause (d) of. Article 27 of the Constitution of Pakistan was pressed into service in support of the proposition that the State was under obligation to ensure expeditious and inexpensive justice. Reference was also made to the case of Dr. Hameed Ahmad Ayaz v.
Government of Punjab (PlD l997 lahore 434). It was further' conreitded that the impugned notifications of executive nature were issued mala fide without giving any reasons therein. It was lastly contended that the ,vested rights of the people of the area once created could not have been taken away on the principle of locus Poenitentiae in view of the dictum laid down in the case of Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi (PlD l969 SC 407).'
5. On the other hand, the learned Advocate-General, Punjab, submitted that the area comprising Sarai Alamgir Tehsil had always been a part of District Gujrat with River Jhelum as a dividing line. A copy of the Punjab Gazetteer l92l published by the Government of the Punjab was also referred in order to demonstrate that area of Sarai Alamgir was to be historically a part of Gujrat. He pointed out that Sarai Alamgir was upgraded as a Sub-Division on l-7-l993. The matter of constituting Divisions or Sub-Divisions of Various Districts was for the executive alone to determine on the political thicket and the power of judicial review was not available. Reference was made to the case of M.D. Tahir, Advocate v. Chief Secretary, Government of the Punjab, lahore arid another (l995 ClC l687)(lahore). The petitioners did not have locus standi and were not aggrieved persons within the meaning of Article l99 Of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Reliance was placed on Wukala Mahaz Barai Tahafaz Dastoor v. Government of Pakistan and others (l993 P.Cr.l.J. 744)
(lahore). It was further submitted that no roving inquiry could be made into the filed of the Government for the purposes of recording findings of mala fides or otherwise in view of the law laid down in the case of The Federation of Pakistan through the Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan Rawalpindi v.- Saeed Ahmad Khan and others (PlD l974 SC l5l). He emphasised that the policy and political matters were not justiciable. The High Court was required to exercise judicial restraint to pass executive orders. The case of The Government of N.W.F.P, through the Secretary to the Government of the N.W.F.P. Communications and Works Department, Peshawar (PlD l973 SC 5l4) was referred. It was lastly contended that the Zila Councils, Jhelum and Gujrat were not impleaded, by the petitioners, as necessary parties in the absence where of the writ petitions were not maintainable.
6. Mr. Maqbul Elahi Malik, Advocate, appearing for the applicants/elected members of the Zila Council from ,Sarai Alamgir Tehsil argued that the questions involved in the present petitions had nothing to do with the delimitation of the electoral units. The election and related matters were provided in sections 9 and l4 of the Punjab local Government Ordinance, . l979. The Provincial Government was empowered to exercise the powers for re-constitution of the Zila Councils and the Sub-Divisions from time to time. The case of Aftab Hussain v. The Province of East Pakistan and 2 others (PlD l970 Dacca 798) and Diwan Azmat Said Muhammad v. Haji Bakhtiar Saeed (l996 ClC l427)(lahore) were relied. He further argued that a notification dated 25-5-l998 had already been issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Jhelum, excluding the returned candidates/applicants from Sarai Alamgir Sub-Division from Zila Council, Jhelum.. By another notification issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Gujrat,. All the members of Sarai Alamgir Sub-Division were added in.The Zila Council, Gujrat.
7. Dr. Mohy-ud-Din Qazi, Advocate, appearing for the Administrators, Zila Councils Gujrat and Jhelum as well as the Municipal Committee, Sarai Alamgir, argued that the members of Zila Council, Jhelum, from Sarai Alamgir Tehsil had already become members of Zila Council, Gujrat.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. Section 6 of the Punjab land Revenue Act, l967, under which the notifications dated l8-5- ^ l998 were issued reads as under:- "6. Divisions to be divided into Districts and Districts into Sub- Divisions etc.-(l) Each Division shall be divided into such Districts, and each District may be divided into such Sub-Division or Tehsils (Which also include Talukas), as Government may, by notification, direct.
(2) Government may, by notification, vary the number and limit of Divisions, Districts, Sub-Divisions of Tehsils in the Province."
The other notification dated 28-5-l998 was issued under sub-Section (5) of Section 6 and Section 7 of the Punjab local Government Ordinance, l979, which portions are reproduced as under
(5) Government may, by notification, extend, curtail or otherwise alter the limits of a local council or declare that any local council shall cease to be a local council with the following consequences and such other consequences as may be enumerated in the declaration-
(a) in cases where the local area comprising a local council ceases to be a local council-
(i) if the control of the local area is not placed under any other local authority, the balance of the local council fund and other property vesting in the local council shall vest in such local authority and the liabilities of the local council shall stand transferred to such local authority; and(ii) if the control of the local area is not placed under any other local authority, the balance of the local council fund and other property vesting in the local council shall vest in Government and the liabilities of the local council shall stand transferred to the Government;
(b) in cases where any local area forming part of a local council ceases to be a part of that local council-
(i) if the control of that part of the local area is placed under some other local authority, such portion of the local council fund and other property vesting in the local council and such portion of the liabilities of the local council, as the Government may, by general or special order, direct shall be transferred to that other local authority; and
(ii) if the control of that part of local area is not placed under some other local authority, such portion of the local council fund and other property vesting in the local council shall vest in Government and such portion of the liabilities of the local council shall be transferred to the Government as the Government may, by general or special order, direct."
7. Division, amalgamation and re-constitution of local council.-(1) Government may, by notification, divide a local council into two or more local councils or amalgamate two or more local councils into one local council and may specify in the notification the consequences which shall ensue upon the publication of such notification.
(2) When as a result of such division or amalgamation any new local council is constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Ordinance or in the manner specified in the notification, the directly elected Muslim members of any local council so divided or amalgamated shall become the members of such local council or local councils as Government may, by notification, specify as if such members had been elected to that local council."
9. From the perusal of section 6 of the Punjab land Revenue Act, l967, it would appear that primarily it is for the Government to vary the limits of a District or a Sub-Division of Tehsils in the Province without there being any particular conditions or limitations on the exercise of its powers. Once the administrative changes in the territorial limits of a District or a Sub-Division are t ought about, the consequential steps as contemplated by sub-section (5) of Section 6 and section 7 of the Ordinance are necessarily to be taken in order to avoid any anomalous situation I If the notification under section 6 of the Act of l967 is held to be valid, the other notifications under sub-section (5) of section 6 and section 7 of l979 Ordinance may not be seriously objected to, of course, subject to certain safeguards and other consequences which are to follow. The petitioners failed to show by placing any relevant material that action on the part of the Provincial Government in issuance of the impugned notifications was tainted in mala fides or otherwise suffering from any legal infirmity.
The matter of constituting or reconstituting Divisions, Districts or Sub-Divisions is essentially an administrative matter to which the presumption of regularity is attached. The relevant provisions of the Punjab land Revenue Act, l967, or the Punjab lo-.i Government Ordinance, l979, do not contemplate the ascertainment of the wishes or the views of the inhabitants of such areas by undertaking an exercise like that of referendum or franchise. Ordinarily, such like policy decisions taken by the Government, are not open to exception unless the same are shown to be un- reasonable, unfair or otherwise mala fide or without jurisdiction. No reasons were required by law to be recorded in the issuance of the impugned notifications. A learned Single Judge in Chamber of this Court was right in dismissing the earlier Writ Petition No.8096/93 by taking the view that this Court while exercising the constitutional jurisdiction was ordinarily not to sit in judgment over the decision of the Government regarding the division of the Districts into various Tehsils keeping in view the administrative convenience.
10. A similar question was examined by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The Chittananjan Cotton Mills ltd. v. The Commissioners, Narayanganj Municipality and another (PlD l958 SC (Pak)
430). In the precedent case, certain areas were added to the limits of Narayanganj Municipality by the order of Government which was challenged. It was observed that a presumption of regularity of the Government actions was attached and the burden of showing otherwise was on the person who alleged, contrary. While interpreting the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, l932, it was held that the law did not lay down a procedure for the consideration of the objections, and did not give the objector the right to be heard in person or to substantiate by evidence his objections. There was, therefore, no lis in the sense in which the existence of a lis or an issue made the proceedings judicial or <7a5/-judicial and the final order to be made by the Government remained essentially an administrative order without the proceedings of a quasi- judicial in nature.
11. In the case of Messrs Amin Jute Mills ltd., Chittagong v. The Chittagong Municipality and others (PlD l970 Dacca 338)' a Division Bench of the erstwhile East Pakistan High Court took the view that the Government had full authority to demarcate or re-demarcate the areas of the urban or the rural municipalities. An area of one council could be excluded and included into an area of another council. This judgment was affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan as reported in l969 SCMR 320; Both the aforesaid judgments were followed by this Court in the case of Sun Shine Cotton Mills ltd., Sheikhupura v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Sheikhupura and 3 others (PlD l978 lahore 263).
12. A Full Bench of Bombay High Court in the case of Suryakant Walchand Shah and etc. v.
Shahnawz Hanifsaheb Bhoka/'e and etc. (AIR l986 Bombay 5) took the view that once an additional areas were included in the District by a Provincial Government necessary consequences were to follow automatically. Somewhat similar observations were made in the case of Aftab Hussain (Supra).
13. We should not be understood as laying down as a rule of them as if notification issued by the Provincial Government under Section 6 of the Punjab land Revenue Act, l967, and under sub- section (5) of section 6 and section 7 of the Punjab local Government Ordinance, l979, are immune from being called in question. The power of judicial review is available in appropriate cases of infraction of law or unfairness, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or malafides on the part of the Government. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, no exception can be taken to the validity of the impugned notifications. The areas excluded from District Jhelum and re-included in District Gujrat had throughout remained a part of District Gujrat sine times immemorial. It was considered to be in the public interest to keep the areas of Saria Alamgir Sub-Division as a pan of District Gujrat.
14. Since we are deciding the writ petitions on their merits, the questions, of locus standi of petitioners and the non-impleadment of Zila Councils, as necessary parties are left to be examined in some other proper case.
15. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in these writ petitions which are dismissed in limine.