1. This petition under section 25-A of the I. R. O. had been filed by the applicant named above for his re-instatement in the service of the respon--dents with full back wages and benefits and such other dues as found to be payable to the applicant.
2. The brief facts of the case as stated by the applicant are that he was a permanent workman in the respondent's establishments and performed his duties during his tenure of service without any blames or cause of complaint. On account of ailment the applicant was disabled from performing his duties and availed medical leave with effect from 22-81974 and after being declared fit to resume his duties, has reported in the respondent's establishments on 30-9-1974 seeking to resume his duties. The applicant was, however, not allowed to resume duty by way of victimization without any order in writing and the applicant was constrained to send a detailed grievance notice dated 24-12-1974 by registered post but the same was received back as it was refused. It has been further stated that the Proprietor was out of County and the applicant had to wait for his return. The applicant was never informed of the alleged verbal termination in August 1974 or at any time thereafter till the date of filing of the petition.
3. It has been farther contended that the applicant continues to be in the service of the respondent and is entitled to receive wages for August, September, March October, November and December, 1974 and for January, February, March and April, 1975; besides his entitlement towards gratuity and leave encasements. Accordingly the applicant submitted grievance notice dated 19-3-1975 by registered post and the same was replied to by the respondents by his letter dated 28.3-1975. The applicant fur then stated that his reply was unsatisfactory and did not redress lawful grievance of the applicant, and hence the above petition.
4. The respondent in his reply statement objected to the maintainability of the petition under section 25-A of the I. R. O. on the following four legal objections:-
(a) "That the applicant was not a worker but Manager and the appli--cation filed by him is not maintainable ;
(b) That the applicant has no secured guaranteed right under any law, settlement or award
(c) That even otherwise the application in violation of the mandatory provisions of section 25-A of I.
5. R. O., is not maintainable ; and
(d) That even otherwise the application is time-barred as the cause of action arose in August, 1974."
6. On facts the respondent denied that the applicant was in the employment as a workman and stated that he was working in Messrs Orient Produce Export Syndicate in the capacity of Manager at a salary of Rs. 600 and allowance of Rs. 85 per month and was also working as Manager of Messrs Singhar, the sister concern of Messrs Orient Produce Export Syndicate and was drawing a salary of Rs: 200 per month. The respondent also denied that the applicant was performing clerical or manual duties and stated that his duties were supervisory, managerial and he was controlling work of respondent's establishments. The respondent further stated that on 17-8-1974 the applicant was verbally informed that his services were no longer required end he was offered salary for the month of August, 1974 along with one months salary in lieu of notice and payment in lieu of annual leave, if any subject to the adjustment of the amounts of the respondent outstanding against him.
7. The respondent admitted that he had gone abroad but prior to that the services of the applicant were terminated. It has been further stated that the applicant was employed in the Head Office of the respondent's establishment wherein only five persons were employed and it was governed by the West Pakistan Shops and Establishment Ordinance. The respondent further stated that the applicant's services were terminated in August, 1974 and the applicant was fully aware of this fact and he is not entitled to the benefits/claims prayed by him in this petition, and it was, therefore, prayed that the petition be dismissed.
8. The applicant filed his affidavit-in-evidence and was cross-examined by the learned Representative for the respondent. If he respondent Mirza Hashambbai filed his affidavit-in- evidence and was cross-examined by the Representative of the applicant.
9. I have gone through the evidence and the material on record and have heard the arguments advanced by the learned Representative on behalf of the parties. The learned Representative for the respondent also submitted written arguments and I lave perused the same.
10. I will first take up the objection that the petition under section 25-A. of the I. R. O. is time-barred. It has been contended on behalf of the Respondent that the applicant was duly informed b' the respondent on 17-8-1974, that his services were no longer required and will stand terminated by the end of the month, It has been further contended that with effect from 1-9-1974, the applicant ceased to be in the employment of the respondent's establishment and, therefore, tree cause of action if any, for filing the; above petition accrued to him on 30-8-1974 when his services were terminated. It has been further contended that in view of the provisions of subsection (1) of section 25-A of the I. R. O., the applicant was required to submit his grievance notice to the respondent within a period of three months from the elate on which the grievance arose; whereas grievance notice was submitted by the applicant on 24-12-1974, which was beyond the mandatory period provided by subsection (1) of section 25-A of I. R. O. and as such was of no consequence and it would he deemed as if no grievance notice was Submitted by the applicant. The learned Representative for the respondent further contended that not only tile applicant had failed to submit his grievance notice within the statutory period provided in law but also failed to file the petition in Court after the expiry of the period of limitation provided by Subsection (4) of section 25-A of the I. R. O. In this connection it has been contended that the grievance notice of the applicant dated 24-12-1974, Was replied to by the respondent by his letter dated 31-i2-1974 which was received by the applicant on 1-3-1975 and by virtue of the provisions of subsection 14 of section 25-A of the I.R.O., the applicant was required to file his petition in Labour Court within the period of two months from the date of communication of the decision of the respondent, and the petition ought to have been filed on or before, 1-3-1975; whereas the present petition was filed on 28-4-1975 and was clearly time-barred. It has been further con--tended that even if it is to be admitted that the letter dated 31-12-1974 were not served on the applicant, as alleged by him, the petition would still be time---barred inasmuch as the applicant was required by law to file his petition within two and a half months from the date of submission of his grievance notice, which expired on 8-3-75.With regard to the subsequent purported grievance notice dated 19-3-1975 and 25-3-1975 it has been argued by the learned Representative of the respondent that they could not be deemed to be the grievance notices nor would help the applicant in making his petition within the period of limitation inasmuch as the law does not require submission of subsequent grievance notice or repetition of grievance notices after the applicant had submitted his detailed grievance notice in which he had brought all his grievances to the notice of the respondent and had also asked the respondent to redress his grievance and to allow him to resume his duties and, thereafter, the only course open to the applicant was to file petition under section 25-A of the I. R. O. in Court within the statutory period referred to above.
11. The learned Representative for the applicant contended that the grievance notice dated 24.12-1974 was submitted by the applicant against illegal stoppage of the applicant by the respondent from performing his duties and the applicant had no knowledge of the alleged verbal termination of his services. It has been further contended that subsequently some time in March, 1975, the applicant came to know of the illegal verbal termination of his services by the respondent and as such it had became necessary for him to submit afresh grievance notice against his illegal termination and for calling upon the respondent to re-instate the applicant in service with all the consequential benefits. It has been further contended that till March,1975 the applicant having no knowledge of the alleged termination of his services the cause of grievance could not be said to have arisen on August 1974 and it arose in March, 1975 when the fact of illegal termination became known to the applicant. The arguments of the learned representa--tive for the applicant are devoid of force. The respondent in his reply statement as well as in his affidavit-in-evidence had specific tally st.3ted that on 17-8-1974 he had informed the applicant that his services were no longer required and he would be entitled to receive his salary for the month of August 1974, one month's salary in lieu of notice and encashment of annual leave subject to adjustment of the amounts of the respondent outstanding against him. The respondent was cross-examined at length by the learned Representative for the applicant and nowhere it was suggested to him that the statement made by him in para. 9 of his affidavit was not correct or false. Further the respondent in his cross- examination ascertained that he had terminated the services of the applicant verbally. The evidence of the respondent has gone unchallenged and unrebutted and the applicant's claim that he bad no knowledge of termination of his services in August 1974 cannot be entertained. Under the circumstances enumerated above, the case reported in 1974 PLC 205, cited by the learned Representative of the applicant in support of his contention that the grievance notice dated 19-3- 1975, submitted by the applicant immediately after the fact of termination of his services became known to him would be deemed to be valid and proper grievance notice, will be of no help inasmuch as it is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the cited case the grievance notice was submitted by the workers after the expiry of the statutory period of three months as soon as the facts of dismissal of the services came to his knowledge in that case it was an admitted position that the letter of dismissal was not served on the worker and he had no knowledge of his dismissal as he was in Jail, whereas in the present case there is evidence on record that the applicant had knowledge of termination of his services in August 1974 and further be had already submitted a grievance notice dated 24-12-1974 wherein am alleged that he had been illegally stopped from performing his duties. In the above circumstances the grievance notice dated 24-12-1974 was beyond the statutory period of three months and the petition in Court was also filed beyond the period provided in subsection (4) of section 25-A of the I. R. O. The applicant did not submit any application for condonation of delay in filing the petition and in the absence of the application for condonation of delay, the question of condoning the delay, does not arise. I, therefore, hold that the petition was filed beyond tile the period of limitation and was very much time-barred.
12. In view of my findings on the above legal objection, I do not consider it necessary to discuss the other legal objections raised on behalf of the respondent or to discuss the case on its merits.
13. Accordingly, I dismiss the petition under section 25-A of the I. R. O., 1969.