IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J. - Constitutional Petitions 12 to 15 and 21 to 23 of 1999, filed by Messrs Halcrow-Ulg, Engineering- Consultants, principally involves, question of jurisdiction of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 mw-Commissioner, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (respondent No. 1 in all Petitions), to award compensation of un-availed leaves, gratuity, bonus etc., claimed by the respondents, being former employees of the petitioners, in various capacities, details whereof, are being mentioned hereinafter. Therefore, we have proposed, to dispose of all these petitions, by instant common judgment.
2. Briefly, the facts relevant for disposal of petitions are that private respondents had been working with the petitioners. Their particulars, with nature of job, are given in the following Chart:- S.No. C.P.
Number Name of Respondent -Employee. Designation as disclosed in the application. Monthly Pay.
1. 12/99 Shahbaz Ali son of Muhammad Naseem Quadri. Assistant to Office Manager. Rs.6,050.00
2. 13,99 Ehsanul Haq son of Ghualm Hussain. Store Keeper. Rs.4000.00
3. 14/99 Mst. Shafia Fahim Khan wife of Fahim Senior Bilingual Secretary. Rs. 11,200.00
4. 15/99 Tasleem son of Noor Muhammad. Print Operator Rs.4000.00
5. 21/99 Gul Muhammad son of Abdullah Khan.' Driver. Rs.4,430.00
6. 22/99 Muhammad Imtiaz Ali son of Chaudhary Muhammad Sharif. Driver. Rs.4,430.00
7. 23,99 Sabir Hussain son of Sirajuddin. Data Logger. Rs.9,600.00
3. All respondents filed separate applications on 22nd( October, 1998, under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (herein-after referred as 'Act of 1936') claiming identical Relief, therefore, prayer clause from one of them i.e. C.P. No, 12/99, is reproduced herein-below:- "The applicant prays that a direction may be issued under sub-section (3) of Section 15 for:-
(a) Payment of his delayed wages as estimated or such greater or lesser amount as the authority may find to be due.
(b) Compensation amounting to Rs. 1,50,000/-.
(c) Cost of this application Rs. 1,000/-."
Petitioners, opposed the applications, both on the question of jurisdiction of Authority as well as on merits. It seems that the Authority assumed the jurisdiction, without considering to the objection of petitioners, therefore, they instituted Constitutional Petitions 425 to 430 of 1998, which were disposed of on 10th December, 1998, in terms; that the Authority shall dispose of the question of its jurisdiction, first of all, as far as possible, within to weeks. On remand of case, vide order dated 26th December, 1998, the Authority assumed the jurisdiction. Concluding para of order, reads as under:- "In view of the above, without touching the merits of the case, accordingly held the Commissioner who is also an Authority under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, has the jurisdiction to decide cases towards grant of Gratuity/non-payment of dues/delay in payment of wages etc. Which has as such been claimed in the present application."
Thereafter the Authority decided applications on merits, vide order dated 1st January, 1999, granting thereby, the relief as prayed for, relating to Bonus of three years, Gratuities, etc. As such, instant petitions, have been filed, to claim the relief; that the orders dated 26th December, 1998 and 1st January, 1999, be declared, as without lawful authority and of no legal effect, and on setting aside the same, the applications filed by private respondents, be dismissed.
4. Raja M. Afsar, learned counsel, on behalf of petitioners, argued that under the Act of 1936, Authority can assume jurisdiction, if applicant satisfied that he is a 'workman', as defined under the Factories Act, 1934, or that he is employed in the Establishment of Pakistan Railways or that his salary is less than Rs.3000/-. According to him, as admittedly in the cases of respondents, these three elements are lacking, therefore, the Authority had no jurisdiction. He further emphasised that although application was submitted before the Authority under the Act of 1936, but the Presiding Officer to usurp the jurisdiction, in the order dated 26th December, 1998, by construing himself to be the 'Commissioner' under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred as 'Act of 1923') as well as Authority under the Act of 1936, concluded, that it has the jurisdiction to decide the case. Whereas even the Commissioner, under Standing Orders 10(c) and 12 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred as 'Ordinance of 1968'), has ho lawful authority to grant the relief, as claimed for; because for such relief, Forum of Labour Court, has been prescribed under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Thus, according to him, the impugned orders, having been passed without lawful authority and jurisdiction, are directly amenable to the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, even without availing the alternate remedy of tiling an appeal, as it has been held in PLD 1961 SC 119, PLD 1972 SC 279, 1972 SCMR 256 & 257, 1985 SCM R 1570 and 1991 SCMR 591.
5. Respondent No. 1-Mr. Akbar Azad, appeared in person and supported, both the orders, by arguing that respondents had instituted the applications, before the Authority under the Act of 1936 cwni- Commissioner under the Act of 1923, for grant of Gratuity, Bonus etc. Under the Standing Orders 10(c) and 12 of the Ordinance of 1968, therefore, being in capacity of 'Authority' and 'Commissioier', had rightly assumed the jurisdiction, to grant reliefs to respondents. Reliance was placed by him on PLD 1991 SC 183.
6. Mr. S.A.M. Qadri, learned counsel for private respondents, argued that alternate remedy of filing an appeal was available to petitioners within the meaning of Section 17 of the Act of 1936, but the same was not availed, for the reason, that it was obligatory upon the petitioners, for making the appeal competent, to deposit with the Authority, amount payable under the directions, and as the amount has not been paid, therefore, to circumvent the statutory provision, directly Constitutional Petitions, have been tiled, which as such, are liable to be dismissed, in view of the judgment pronounced by Hon'ble Supreme Court reported' in 1991 SCMR 591. Learned counsel further argued that the respondents have filed composite applications, for the recovery of wages, as well as Gratuity, Bonus etc. Invoking the jurisdiction of Joint Director, Labour, conferred upon it under the Act of 1936 as an 'Authority' and 'Commissioner' under the Act of 1923, therefore, it had the jurisdiction to grant the relief. Thus, the impugned orders, having been passed with lawful authority and jurisdiction, do not call for interference by this Court in exercise of discretionary powers, under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
7. We have heard the arguments of parties' counsel and also gone through the relevant provisions of law, carefully.
8. In our considered opinion, the principal question for concentration is; whether the impugned orders passed by respondent No. 1, are with or without lawful authority and jurisdiction.
9. In this behalf, first of all, it may be seen that the applications dated 22nd October, 1998, were filed by respondents, before respondent No. 1, in its capacity as 'Authority' under the Act of 1936. A thorough perusal of the application, at all does not suggest that they ever made an attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of Commissioner under the Act of 1923, neither subsequent to filing of applications, even an effort was made, to amend the same, by bifurcating the claims separately, which can be granted by the Authority and the Commissioner, under both the Statutes i.e. The Act of 1936 and the Act of 1923, respectively. It so happened that when this Court in earlier round of litigation on filing of C.Ps. Nos. 425 to 430 of 1998 by petitioners directed the Authority to first of all decide the question of jurisdiction then respondent No. 1 to confer upon itself the jurisdiction to hear applications observed as under:- "Assuming for the sake of arguments that the present forum is not available to the applicant then the question arises where he/they can approach for the redress of grievances, if any? So far as the provisions of the Ordinance relating to Bonus and Gratuity are concerned cannot be taken or treated as redunant. W.P. Lahore High Court had held that an Advocate/Legal counsel although represents as party but he is more an Officer of the Court than for the party he represents, and in such cases he is duty bound to assist the Court/Tribunal and to point out as where the remedy lies so that the matter, if any, is referred to it so as to save time/money of the litigants; It would not be out of place to be mentioned here the workers are generally illiterate persons mostly lay man and oftenly proletariate and applications by them are mostly not happily worded; and on the other had the employers are bourgeoisie who are well-equipped on account of financial resources who resist 'such claims hundred percent, knowingly that the worker is likely to get exhausted in due course on account of financial constraints; In view of the above, without touching the merits of the case, accordingly held the Commissioner who is also an Authority under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, has the jurisdiction to decide cases towards grant of Gratuity/non-payment of dues/delay in the payment of wages etc. Which has as such been claimed in the present application".
The above abservations of respondent No. 1, persuades us to hold, that the Authority indirectly had admitted that it had no jurisdiction, to grant the relief of Bonus and Gratuity to the respondents, under the Act of 1936. Therefore, it had exercised the jurisdiction, as Commissioner under the Act of 1923. Thus, it would be imparative to examine; whether the payment of Bonus and Gratuity, could legitimately be granted by respondent No. 1, in capacity of Commissioner under the Act of 1923, to private respondents, under Standing Orders 10(c) and 12 of the Ordinance of 1968.
10. Before dilating upon this question, it may be noted that the Ordinance of 1968, was promulgated, to amend and consolidate the law, relating to industrial employment in the Province of West Pakistan, and its Section l(4)(a) provides, that it applies to every industrial establishment or commercial establishment wherein twenty or riore workmen are employed, directly or through any other person whether on behalf of himself or any other person, or were so employed on any day during the preceding twelve months; and such classes of the industrial and commercial establishments as Government may, from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette, specify, in this behalf. Taking into consideration these provisions, with Standing Order 10-C of the Ordinance of 1968, relating to payment of Bonus, one can conveniently conclude, that such relief can only be granted to the workmen; because, every Employer making profit in any year shall pay for that year within three months of the closing of that year, to the workmen, who have been in his employment in that year tor a continuous period of not less than ninety days a bonus in addition to the wages payable to such workmen, Likewise, under Standing Order 12, on the termination of employment of a permanent workmen, for any reason other then misconduct, one month's notice shall be giv;n either by the Employer or the workman and one month's wages calculated on the basis of average wages earned by the workman during the last three months shall be paid in lieu of notice, and as per its sub-section (6), if a workman resigns from service or his services are terminated by the Employer, for any reason other than misconduct, he shall, in addition to any other benefit to which he may be entitled under the Ordinance, or in accordance with the terms of his employment or any custom, usuage or any settlement or an award of a Labour Court under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, be paid gratuity, equivalent to twenty days wages, calculated on basis of wages admissible to him in the last month of service, if he is a fixed-rated workman or the highest pay drawn by him during the last twelve months, if he is a piece-rated workman for every completed year of service or any part thereof, in excess of six months.
11. As we have observed herein-above, that the relief of Bonus is admissible, only to the workman.
Similarly as per the provisions, referred to herein-above, the relief of gratuity under the Ordinance of 1968, is also admissible to a workman.
12. Mr. S.A.M. Quadri, learned counsel, stated that as respondents are workmen, therefore, they are entitled tor giant of both the reliefs, by the Commissioner under the Act of 1923.
13. We afraid, the contention putforth by learned counsel is not correct, because as per Section 2(i) of the Ordinance of 1968, 'workman' means; any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward. Since in instant case, no evidence was led on behalf of respondents before the respondent No.1, to establish, that they were working in Industrial or Commercial Establishment, therefore, is absence of such evidence, they cannot be deemed to be 'Workmen'.
14. Respondent No. 1, vehemently argued that under Standing Order 12(8) '& (9) of the Ordinance of 1968, it is the Commissioner, Compensation, who determines the allocation of deposits and also gets recovered the gratuity, if it has not been paid.
15. Raja M. Afsar, learned counsel, contended that sub-orders (8) & (9) of Standing Order 12, can be invoked, only when question of allocation of amount of gratuity, amongst the legal heirs arises, or when the heirs/dependants are not getting the gratuity. Whereas in the instant case, the respondents, admittedly are not the heirs/dependants of the deceased Employees, rather they themselves are claiming, bo:h the reliefs independently.
16. On having gone through sub-orders (8) & (9) of Standing Order 12 of the Ordinance of 1968, we are inclined to agree with the learned counsel for petitioners. At this juncture, reference to the Judgment relied upon by respondent No. 1, reported in PLD 1991 SC 183 (Muhammad Habib Khan Vs. Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited and another) wherein, it has been held, that Labour Court would not be the exclusive forum for adjudication of a claim under S.O. 10- B, inasmuch as the special remedy under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, would be only available to the workman, whereas a claim under S.O. 10-B was admissible to the workman as well as, in the case of his death, his heirs'. It would also be appropriate at this stage, to observe, that under Standing Order 10- B (5) of the Ordinance of 1968, the Commissioner, Compensation, has been authorized tc. Settle the claims of Workman or his heirs, for recovery of compulsory Group Insurance. Whereas, for the purpose of Standing Order 10-C, pertaining to payment of Bonus, no such jurisdiction, has been conferred upon the Commissioner. Similarly, as for as calculation of Gratuity and its payment, is concerned, the allocation of the share, amongst the heirs of deceased Worker and its recovery on behalf of heirs of deceased, can be undertaken by the Commissioner under sub-orders (8) & (9) of Standing Order 12, but as regards the workman, himself, he cannot approach the Commissioner under the Act of 1923. For the redressal of his grievance, in this behalf.
17. Thus, we are inclined to conclude; that as per the proved facts available on record, the respondents are not the 'workmen' as defined under Section 2(i) nor they proved through evidence, that they are 'workmen', therefore, the Authority (respondent No. 1) on even exercising the jurisdiction in capacity of Commissioner under the Act of 1923, had no lawful authority to grant them relief.
18. As we have already observed herein-above, that as per the impugned order dated 26th December, 1998, the Authority had assumed the jurisdiction to give relief to respondents, by invoking his jurisdiction as Commissioner under the Writ Petition No. 13432/97;
(ii) Crl. Original No. 894/W/97 pertaining to contempt of Court for disobedience of its Order, dated 9.6.1997;
(iii) Writ Petition No. 14147/97 filed in respect of transfer matter; and
(iv) Writ Petition No. 17477 of 1998, seeking direction in the nature of mandamus to treat the writ petitioner as DSP (Traffic), tfere disposed of in the manner indicated in the impugned order.
2. It will be better to refer in brief to the relevant factual aspect of the controversy which led to the filing of the said Civil Miscellaneous and Writ Petitions, wriich were disposed of by the learned Judge through the judgment challenged in this Civil Petition.
3. Niamat Ali Goraya, Deputy Superintendent of Police (Traffic) and Syed Intisar Hussain Jafari, Deputy Superintendent of Police (Traffic) moved the High Court in Writ Petition No. 13432/97, with a prayer that the Chief Secretary Services to Govt, of Punjab and Secretary Home Department, the three respondents therein, be directed to place before the Provincial Selection Board the 'working paper' for consideration of the petitioners for promotion as Superintendents of Police (Traffic), and to direct, the respondents to complete the process for this purpose before the forthcoming meeting of the PSB scheduled for 10.6.1997. This relief was sought on the allegations that on 9.5.1984, amendment was made in the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, to the effect that by amending Chapters XII, XIII and XIV provisions were made that Sergeant Inspectors (Traffic) will be borne on the separate Provincial Roll, to be maintained in the office of Inspector General of Police and that there will be separate Sub-Cadre for Traffic Sergeant Inspectors. It was also provided that they will remain in traffic till their retirement and will be eligible for further promotion as Deputy Superintendent of Police and Superintendent of Police (Traffic) in their on Sub-Cadre. It was "further provided that the seniority of Sergeant Inspectors would be fixed separately from the police force and maintenance of a separate select list in the office of Inspector General of Police, Punjab". It was alleged that the petitioners completed for the posts of Traffic Inspectors and on selection they were appointed as such on 24.7.1984, and they earned promotion as Deputy Superintendent of Police on 31.1.1993 and 23.1.1996, respectively. It was averred that according to Police Service Rules, 1973, the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police shall be promotion post and the same was fo be filled on the basis of seniority-m-fitness from the Inspectors of Police of the respective branch on the 'select list' to be maintained by Inspector General of Police separately for each branch. It was alleged that Inspector (Traffic c'-m;qc inrinriivl in the. Deniitv Simerintendent Services Rules, 1979.
[Vol.XVIII Raja Muhammad Farooq Sajid, DSPV. L&S.C. 119 Naimat Ali Goraya, DSP, Traffic (Abdur Rehman Khail, J) considered for promotion as Superintendents of Police (Traffic) under Section 8 of the Punjab Civil Servant Act, 1974. It was explained that out of 8 sanctioned posts of Superintendent of Police (Traffic) none is held by any Officer of the Traffic Branch. It was stated that in view of separate Sub- Cadre further promotion as Superintendent of Police (Traffic) the seniority list- of Deputy Superintendent of Police (Traffic) was separately circulated. This position was further clarified in Para 7 which reads: - 'That it. Is pertinent to mention here that the Provincial Government, in its meeting held on 15.11.1994, categorically decided to merge Highway Traffic Police with the District Police with a separate and permanent district based cadre with no deputation's, it was further decided that the post sanctioned *for Traffic Branch cannot be distributed amongst other/various branches viz General Executive Branch. The available eight posts of the Superintendents (Traffic) were decided to be filled up from amongst Deputy Superintendent of Police (Traffic)".
It is stated that the Home Department had prepared a 'working paper' for consideration of Provincial Selection Board for promotion of Deputy Superintendent of Police including the petitioner.
Para 9 of the Writ Petition shows the grievance for redressal of which the Writ Petition was tiled and as it is most relevant for the disposal of the controversy, therefore, it is reproduced in toto which reads:- "That the grievances of the petitioners being voiced through this Constitutional petition are that the meeting of the Provincial Selection Board is likely to be held on 10.6.1997 and the Working Paper already prepared for consideration of the petitioners for promotion to the rank of Superintendents of Police (Traffic) is not being sent to the Provincial Selection Board. It is pertinent to note that the meeting of the Provincial Selection Board was initially scheduled for 10.9.1996 and subsequent thereto, to more meetings of the said Board were convened but could not be held for the reasons best known to them. The case of the petitioners for promotion is being procrastinated to the seniors detriment of the petitioners. The Services, General Administration and Information Department of the Government of the Punjab vide letter dated 15.12.1996 requested the Home Department, Government of the Punjab that the submission of Select List of Deputy Superintendents of Police (Traffic Police Cadre) for promotion as Superintendent of Police (Traffic) be expedited immediately and the progress made in this regard may also be intimated. The SGA&I Department, Government of the Punjab has now again given a reminder to the Home Department vide letter dated S.6.1997 with the request that the case of the Deputy Superintendents of Police (Traffic) oe sent to the Provincial Selection Board for consideration for promotion as Superintendent of Police (Traffic)". -It is alleged in para 10 of the said Writ Petition that inspite of this the Home Department is not sending the 'Working Paper' to Provincial Selection Board for promotion of the petitioners. It was found that the Deputy Superintendents of Police belonging to the General Executive Cadre are creating hurdles in this matter to achieve their on goal. This apprehension was expressed in this way "these officers are in predominant majority and have been able to prevail upon the concerned officers in the Home Department to put Obstructional support in the way of promotion of the petitioners to the rank of Superintendent of Police". This inaction of the Home Department was described as malafide and at the behest of the Deputy Superintendent of Police of the General Executive Cadre in order to deprive the petitioners of their legal rights. This Writ Petition No. 13432/97 was disposed of on 9.6.1997, in the following manner: - "Rana Muhammad Arshad, Advocate for the petitioners.
Mr. Yawar Ali Khan, AAG on Court call.
Mr. Rizwan Ullah Baig, Secretary Police.
Copy of this petition was handed over to the learned AAG in the morning who sought time to obtain instructions in the matter. Learned AAG has reappeared and stated on instructions from Rizwan Ullah Baig, Secretary, who is also present in Court, that the required DPC shall be held within a period of one month from today wherein the ;ases of the petitioners alongwith the similar cases shall be considered and decided. It is submitted that the working papers shall be prepared and submitted to committee within the period afore-quoted. In view of the undertaking aforenoted this petition has borne fruit, therefore, the same is disposed of as fructified".
Crl. Original No. 894-W/97 w&s filed by the Writ Petitioners, requesting the Court to initiate contempt proceedings against the respondents for not fulfilling the undertaking made on their behalf. * Writ Petition No. 14147/97, was filed by Niamat Ali Goraya, to challenge his transfer. C.M. No. 3/97 was submitted by the respondents in Writ Petition No. 13432/97 alleging therein that the order dated 9.6.1997, passed in the Writ Petition [Vol.XVIII Raja Muhammad Farooq Sajid, DSPV. L&S.C. 121 Naimat Ali Goraya, DSP, Traffic (Abdur Rehman Khan, J) was obtained from the Court by concealing material facts and "manoeuvring in a way that no breathing time was given to Mr. Rizwanullah Baig, Deputy Secretary (Police) to make a genuine undertaking before the Court and that in any case Mr. Rizwanullah Baig was not authorised to make such a statement". Writ Petition No. 17477/98, was instituted by Pervaiz Shah'Qandhari and another, praying therein that they should be considered for promotion as Superintendent of Police in Traffic Cadre.
4. We heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and went through the available record.
5. The basic Writ Petition is No. 13432/97, and the crucial order is the one dated 9.6.1997, passed in the said Writ Petition as the other Civil Misc. Applications arise from the said order and out of the other to Writ Petitions, W.P. No. 14147/S 7 deals with the transfer of Naimat Ali Goraya, while Writ Petition No. 17477/98 almost relates to the same factual aspect and relief as Writ Petition No. 13432 of 1997. We have reproduced exclusively the contents of Writ Petition No. 13432 of 1997, so as to highlight the relief claimed therein. The pith and substance of the relief sought in that Writ Petition is that after amendment in the Punjab Police Rules on 9.5.1984, a separate Sub-Cadre for Traffic Inspectors was created, therefore, these Inspectors will be eligible for fiirther promotion as Superintendent of Police in their on Sub-Cadre. Their case is that their seniority will be fixed separately from the other police force and for this purpose a separate 'Select List' in the Office of the Inspector General of Police is to be maintained. The plea of these Inspectors (Traffic) is that the available eight posts of Superintendent of Police (Traffic) shall be filled from their Cadre. Their apprehension, as reflected in Writ Petition and as reproduced above, is that the Deputy Superintendents of Police of General Executive Cadre have an eye on these eight vacant posts and they have been able to prevail upon the concerned officers in the Home Department to obstruct and delay the process of their case before the Provincial Selection Board. It was observed in the impugned judgment:- "It is really strange to note that a separate cadre having been created by way of amendment in the rules and the petitioners having opted and competed lor this, separate cadre in the year, 1984 had earned promotions in the said cadre and that they having completed the requisite length of service required lor promotion as Superintendents of Police (Traffic) and working paper has also been prepared for submission to the Provincial Selection Board, their cases were not considered for the reason that Inspector General of Police in his whim or wisdom has chosen to make a proposal thereby intending to amalgamate the cadre of traffic with general executive cadre and in that eventuality the 8 posts allocated separately for the traffic cadre shall no more be available for the said cadre resultantly, the petitioners would not be able to get the promotion, it is highly unjust and illegal to keep the petitioners at the threshold of their promotion till such time that the very prospects thereof, are made non-existent by amendment in the rules whereby the separate cadre itself would be wiped out. The petitioners and others having opted for the separate cadre in 1984 had legitimate expectations to rise in the said cadre, which would not be endered nugatory by withdrawing the appointment. It is no doubt true that the authority having the power to make an order or rule has also the power to undo it but this it subject to exception that where the order has taken legal effect and in pursuance thereof certain rights have been created in favour of the individual, such rule or order cannot be withdrawn or amended to the detriment of those rights. The power to withdraw or amend the rules even it be conceded, the resultant withdrawal or amendment, as the case may be, shall only apply prospectively and not retrospectively. As observed earlier, it would be guillotining the petitioners' case simply because amendment in the rules is in the offing meaning thereby that it has not been taken any shape and there is every possibility that it may not materialise, therefore, it is uither proper nor legal to defer the cases of the petitioners till such time that the rules are amended, in the circumstances, the functionaries of the Province of the Punjab have wrongly proceeded to defer the cases of the petitioners on the ground that some amendment is on the anvil whereby the rule creating a separate cadre is about to be withdrawn".
6. Thus from the tenor of the contents of the Writ Petition and the above para from the impugned order it is obvious that the relief sought in the Writ Petition is that on account of the amendment in the Rules the petitioners are entitled to promotion in their on Sub-Cadre, and their counter-parts in the other Branches cannot be considered for promotion in the vacancies reserved for Traffic Branch. They, therefore, filed the Writ Petition requesting therein that their case should be separately piocessed by the Home Department and the Provincial Selection Board should only consider the eligible officers of the Traffic Branch for promotion and not the officers of executive branch. This controversy thus relates to the interpretation of the relevant rules and notification which deal with terms and conditions of the service of Writ Petitioner, and such a controversy is in the exclusive domain of the Service Tribunal as the jurisdiction of all other forums including the High Court is ousted under Article 212 of the Constitution. The claim [Vol.XVIII Muhammad Fazil Malik V. The General Manager, L&S.C. 123 Pakistan Railways Headquarters Officer, Lahore (Sh. Riaz Ahmed, J) of the petitioners is that they are senior to respondent No. 1 and as such they are fit to be promoted to the office of Superintendent of Police in preference to respondent No. 1. It has also been argued before us that the petitioner No. 1, Raja Muhammad Farooq Sajid (C.P. 92S-B/99) was at the top of the seniority list and, on that count he has been recommended for promotion. They further urge that there is only one cadre for pr amotion and the promotion is to be made only on the basis of one unified seniority list. We would not comment on these pleas regarding seniority as the party aggrieved by the seniority can approach the competent forum. We, therefore, convert these petitions into appeal and while accepting the the impugned orders, holding that the High Court had no jurisdiction in the matter on account of the bar as contained in Article 212 of the Constitution. We also direct that whatever has been stated or observed in the impugned orders, would not affect further course of litigation, if any, before the competent forum. Parties to bear their on costs.