' This judgment shall dispose of Writ Petitions Nos. 2739-96/BWP and 3544-96/BWP as they arise out of the same impugned judgments dated 5-9-1995 and 11-7-1996 passed by respondents Nos.2 and 1 respectively.
2. Respondent No.3 was employed as a Cashier with the petitioner Muslim Commercial Bank Limited at its Circle Officer, Rahimyar Khan. He was dismissed from service on the charge of misappropriation of Rs.1,003. Respondent No. 3 challenged his dismissal from service by filing a grievance petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which was dismissed by the Punjab Labour Court No.8, Bahawalpur, by judgment dated 5-9-1995. However, the appeal filed by respondent No.3 was accepted by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore, by judgment dated 11-7-1996. Consequently, he was reinstated in service but was ordered to be paid half of the service benefits for the period he remained out of service. The petitioner-Bank aggrieved of the reinstatement of respondent No.3 filed Writ Petition No. 2739/96/BWP whereas respondent No. 3 filed Writ Petition No. 3544/96/BWP for withholding 50% of the service benefits for the period he remained out of service.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner-Bank has submitted that in the absence of the existence of an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the very petition under section 25-A of the said Ordinance by respondent No.3 was not competent. Reliance was placed on the cases of Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem (1994 SCMR 2213) 'and Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others 1996 PLC (C.S.) 702 (Lahore) in support of his contention. The learned counsel also referred to the case of Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee and 2 others (PLD 1995 SC 423) in support of his contention that I should follow the law declared by another learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. (supra). It was further argued by the learned counsel that respondent No.3 had been dismissed from service for the misappropriation of a sum of Rs.1,003 as a Cashier, a position of trust in the Bank, and did not deserve any lenient view. It was further stated that respondent No.3 was dismissed from service by order dated 10-11-1994 after following the proper procedure of inquiry to which no valid exception could be taken. The learned counsel maintained that the judgment-findings dated 5-9-1995 by the learned Punjab Labour Court No.8, Bahawalpur, dismissing grievance petition of respondent No.3 were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the law applicable to the case which did not call for interference by the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.3 has stated that the findings of the learned Punjab Labour Court were laconic and perfunctory in nature. He argued that the statement made by the consumer concerned had clearly exonerated respondent No.3 of the charge. The amount in dispute had actually been deposited in the Bank by the consumer himself. In any case there was no misappropriation of the amount as alleged against respondent No.3. The learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, it was argued, rightly held that the so-called error was the consequence of some inadvertent omission which was not a palpable negligence.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. The learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal presided over by a former Judge of this Court has recorded findings of fact by taking particular view of the evidence on record. The findings of fact, thus, recorded cannot be taken any exception merely on the ground that another view of the evidence on record could also be taken as canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner-Bank. The learned Appellate Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion by taking into consideration over all facts and circumstances of the case supported by the documents and oral evidence on record that there was no mens rea on the part of respondent No.3. I also find that mere technical approach on the part of the Bank was not enough to saddle respondent No.3 with the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. No doubt respondent No.3 was holding the position of trust but there were no reasonable grounds to show that he was guilty of the breach of trust or confidence. Mere inadvertent omission on the part of respondent No.3 could not constitute a case of misconduct so as to destroy or tarnish the image of respondent No.3. It seems that there might be some other grounds, not brought to light, which prompted the local administration of the Bank to initiate the disciplinary action. Otherwise, there could be no rational basis for such an action particularly when the amount in question already stood deposited in the Bank. This Court while exercising the Constitutional jurisdiction is not expected to substitute the findings of fact recorded by a Judicial Tribunal of competent jurisdiction. It is now well-settled that this Court while exercising the power of review does not act as an Appellate Authority of the statutory Judicial Tribunals.
6. I need not decide the question of the existence or otherwise of the industrial dispute for the purpose of maintainability of the grievance petition under section 25 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in these proceedings. This objection was not taken before the learned Punjab Labour Court or the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. Moreover, such an exercise cannot be undertaken without recording evidence being a matter of factual inquiry.
7. As to Writ Petition No. 3544 of 1996/BWP filed by respondent No.3, suffice it to observe that the petitioner did not adduce any reliable evidence to the effect that he did not work for gain during the entire period of his dismissal from service. The learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal was, therefore, justified in refusing the payment of half of the service benefits to him.
8. In this view of the matter, I do not find any merit in either of these writ petitions which are dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.