' RANA BlIAGWAN DAS, J.--- This High Court Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 18-3-1991 passed by a learned Single Judge in Suit No,329 of 1978 whereby the suit for compensation/ damages on account of malicious prosecution against the respondents was dismissed.
2. Initially apart from the respondents Government of Sindh was also impleaded as defendant No,5 in the suit but during the pendency thereof the said defendant was dropped and the suit proceeded against the present respondents. Case of the appellant precisely was that he was falsely and maliciously prosecuted on the complaint of respondent No,2 Mst. Tafwizul Kubra wife of respondent No,1 Munir Hussain Shirazi in connivance with respondents Nos.3 and 4 under the provisions of Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971 which prosecution after the repeal of D.P.R. Was transferred to ordinary Criminal Court where the case initiated against him was withdrawn by the Government of Sindh.
3. Averments of the plaintiff/appellant were denied in the respective written statements but except the plea of time bar raised by the Government of Sindh this issue was not agitated by any of the respondents in their respective pleadings.
4. On assessm ent of the evidence on record, learned Single Judge dismissed the suit on two grounds firstly that the suit was barred by time and hit by the provisions contained in Article 23 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act and secondly that by reason of dropping of Government of Sindh from the array of the parties, suit could not be decreed against the private respondents as well as the officials working under the Government of Sindh.
5. Upon hearing learned counsel for the appellant and examination of the record and proceeding, we find that in paragraph 14 of the- plaint, appellant averred that the case against him after its transfer to ordinary criminal Court was withdrawn on 3-10-1977 whereas the suit was brought before the Court on 11-4-1978 i,e, within one year as contemplated by the aforesaid provision of Limitation Act: Learned Single Judge was influenced by the circumstance that no order of withdrawal of the case against the appellant was produced in evidence, therefore, the suit would be barred by limitation which is not correct because this averment was neither disputed nor denied by any of the respondents including the Government of Sindh in the corresponding paragraphs of the written statement. It is well settled that the facts admitted need not be proved and there was hardly any occasion for the appellant to submit a copy of the withdrawal order since there was no controversy about this aspect of the case.
6. Adverting to the second aspect of the case on which the suit was dismissed, it is well-settled that the Government would be liable . For tortuous acts of its officers and employees, if such acts are either ratified by the Government or the Government is benefited by the acts performed by its officers. Admittedly, this was not a case of ratification of the acts attributed to the official respondents nor the Government derived any benefit out of the prosecution of the appellant as contended. The view of the learned Single Judge therefor suffers from a serious error of law and cannot be sustained. We are, therefore, of the view that dropping the suit against the Government of Sindh was not fatal to the proceeding as against the remaining respondents. See Muhammad Nawaz v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1975 BJ, 11 and Pakistan v. M. Yaqoob Butt PLD 1963 SC 627.
7. For the aforesaid facts and reasons, impugned judgment and decree are recalled and the to the learned Single Judge for a fresh decision according to law. It would be open to the parties to seek leave for bringing evidence on record before the Single Judge, if so desired. Costs of the appeal shall follow the cause.