' SH. RIAZ AHMED, J.--The facts giving rise to the institution of this petition seeking leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 2-7-1997 delivered by a learned Judge of the Balochistan High Court are that respondent No,1 Khair Muhammad instituted a suit for possession through pre- emption in the Court of Majlis-i-Shoora at Loralai praying that decree for possession through pre- emption be passed in respect of the suit property because he was owner of the land situated adjacent to the suit property. It was averred in the plaint that on 30-3-1996 petitioner Muhammad Yagoob had sold the suit land in favour of respondent No,2 for a consideration of Rs,52,000 and a mutation was also entered into the Revenue Record, but with a view to defeating the right of pre- emption of the plaintiff, the vendor and the vendee, i,e, Muhammad Yagoob petitioner and the respondent No,2 got recorded in the Revenue Record that the land had been transferred in favour of the respondent No,2 in lieu of a contract for consideration of the development of land undertaken by the respondent No,2.
2. The petitioner and the respondent No,2 submitted written statements controverting the claim of the plaintiff/respondent No, 1 . During the pendency of the suit, on 30-10-1996 the attorney of the petitioner and the respondent No,2 submitted compromise deed before the Majlis-i-Shoora praying that the suit instituted by the respondent No,1 be decreed in his favour. After filing of the compromise the petitioner then filed an application stating therein that the power of attorney executed by him in favour of Khair Muhammad respondent be cancelled. When the matter came up before the Majlis-i-Shoora for consideration, instead of probing into the controversy, the suit was rejected by one of the members of the Majlis-i-Shoora while the Sessions Judge, the Chairman of the Majlis-i-Shoora accepted the compromise and disposed of the suit in terms thereof. It may be mentioned here that under section 5 of the Balochistan Civil Disputes (Shariat Application)
Regulation, 1976, in the event of difference of opinion between the Chairman and Members, the decision of the former prevails, as such the suit was decreed vide order dated 26-3-1977.
3. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, an appeal was preferred in the Balochistan High Court, which has been dismissed vide order impugned against which leave is sought.
4. It was contended before us that since no sale had taken place, therefore the suit for possession through pre-emption as instituted by Khair Muhammad respondent was incompetent and therefore, the decree passed by the Chairman of the Majlis-i-Shoora was void. It was further contended before us that before the acceptance of the compromise by the Majlis-i-Shoora the petitioner had submitted application requesting that the power of attorney executed by him in favour of his attorney as well as the compromise be cancelled. It was further contended that this application had been moved immediately on coming to know that the respondent No,2, who was acting as 'attorney of the petitioner had defrauded him and therefore on 3-11-1996 after 2/3 days of the submission of the compromise deed, steps for cancellation of the power of attorney were initiated. It was further contended before us that the application moved seeking cancellation remained pending and it was not disposed of by the Chairman of the Majlis-i-Shoora till disposal of the suit.
5. After careful analysis of the facts of the case, we are of the view that it is a fit case in which leave should be granted to consider as to whether the compromise deed entered into by an attorney on behalf of the principal could have been acted upon when the principal had already taken steps seeking cancellation of the power of attorney which had been brought into the notice of the Majlis- i-Shoora, but without passing any orders on such application seeking cancellation of the power of attorney, a decree was passed on the basis of a compromise deed between the attorney and the vendee. Order accordingly.