1. ' I propose to dispose of these Revision Applications No,100 of 1998, 101 of 1998 and 102 of 1998 by a common order since the facts and law involved therein are identical. By order dated 1-2-1999 1 had dismissed these Revision Applications in limine for reasons to be recorded. Following are the detailed reasons for the same:- ' These Revisions arises from order dated 22-4-1998 in Civil Appeal No,17 of 1994, 18 of 1994 and 19 of 1994 by the IInd. Additional District Judge, Badin which in turn arise from an order dated 9-3-1994 in F.C. Suit No,92 of 1989, 144 of 1989 and 146 of 1989 by the Senior Civil Judge, Badin.
2. ' Brief facts of the case are that the appellant filed a suit for damages in the amount of Rs,24,500 against the Respondents in all the three revisions for alleged malicious prosecution by them. It appears that thereafter the applicants did not pursue the matter at all and kept on seeking adjournments and were given last chance by the Senior Civil Judge at one time or the other. It is particularly distressing that even after 9 years of proceedings the applicant/plaintiff in the three suits did not produce any evidence whatsoever and kept on seeking adjournments on one excuse or the other. When this matter came up for plaintiff's evidence on 9-3-1994 while the defendants were present the plaintiff was repeatedly called absent till the end of the Court time and consequently the learned Senior Civil Judge, Badin dismissed the suit for non-prosecution. The learned Appellate Court after perusal of the records of the case came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was singularly negligent during the proceedings and had failed to bring any evidence even though 9 years had elapsed since the filing of the suit. He also recorded that the plaintiffs had been given various opportunities during these 9 years to bring their evidence but they failed to do so and consequently he deserves no sympathy and accordingly he dismissed the Plaintiff's Appeal. The learned Additional. District Judge, Badin came to the conclusion that this suit was filed purely to harass the respondents and to, as he puts it, have "Sword of Damocles" hanging over the respondents.
3. ' In so far as the appellant is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants has waxed eloquent on the point of the proceeding being decided on merits being in the interest of justice. There is obviously no cavil to that proposition and the superior Courts have repeatedly favoured disposal of legal proceedings on merits rather than technicalities. Nevertheless as is well-known, the trend these days is often to initiate proceedings and then keep on procrastinating these for some ulterior motive of the petitioners. This is usually done by seeking adjournments on one excuse or another and if ever the Courts take strict view of the absence of the parties the counsel and the proceedings are dismissed the parties are quick to seek restoration, pleading that it will be in the interest of justice if the decision is on merits. By now this has become a hackneyed phrase instead of a phrase that upheld a lofty principle which is adhered to by all civilized nations. By resorting to such methods the parties. And regrettably the counsel who represent them. Have at naught the lofty principles of mimic and 11:1%c made a mockery of justice and have thereby contributed towards destroying the credibility of judicial system as whole by giving rise to large pendency of cases before the superior Courts and thereby leading to delays. "Justice delayed is "justice denied" is an oft repeated phrase but delays are inevitable in any system of justice because of elaborate procedures that here to be followed to meet out even handed justice. Even, Shakespeare, the famous bard, accepts its inevitability in one of his play and terms it as "Laws delays". To the extent that such delays are unavailable in pursuit of justice these ought to be condoned but not if these are contrived and are used as means to thwart justice. The question is, therefore, whether the Courts must continue to pay lip service to the concept of fair play and justice' as enunciated by our predecessors who gave us the common law while being fully aware of the difference in the temperament and mentality of the litigants in our society and that of the society whose system we tend to emulate. With greatest respect to the pronouncements of the superior Courts as a ratio decidendi or obiter dicta, I wish to submit that time has come when in order to preserve the institution of judiciary it is incumbent upon the Courts to condone negligence or default of the parties to a proceedings or their counsel only when such negligence or default occurs due to reasons beyond the control of the persons concerned and definite proof to this effect is made available by them.
4. In this case the sole reason which the counsel for the applicant urges for his absence on the day when his suit was dismissed is that he was preoccupied before this Court. He nevertheless has not filed copy of cause list to show that he was required to be in the High Court on that particular day nor has he given the case number of the case that he was allegedly pursuing in the High Court on that day. In any case, I feel that the time has come when the excuse of a counsel of being busy before another Court must not be accepted as a reason for his absence because more often than not this is stated by way of an excuse rather than as a fact. Besides it is incumbent upon a counsel to ensure that he is available to represent his case if he chooses to accept a brief. It is obvious that the Courts are not required to await the convenience of the counsel in fact it is the counsel who must await the convenience of the Courts. I feel that it is necessary that such tendency, which has by now attained the proportion of a malady must be curbed without any further delay. In view of the discussion above, I find that the applicant has been grossly negligent and has not been able to explain the absence on the day when his case was called before the Senior Civil Judge for evidence and hence, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned orders and, therefore, I dismiss these revisions in limine.