' RANA BHAGWAN DAS, J.--This judgment shall dispose of aforesaid two petitions calling into question the validity of octroi schedule prescribed by Town Committee, Digri notified in the Sindh Government Gazette dated June 7, 1980 whereby octroi within the limits of the Town Committee on a number of goods is being charged on ad valorem basis and not on the basis of weight unlike the octroi rates being charged within the limits of Town Committee, Tando Ghulam Ali and Municipal Committee, Mirpurkhas.
2. Petitioners are the businessm en engaged in different kind of business including electronic goods, iron merchandise, leather articles, auto parts, general store, Kiryana etc. In Petition No,3264 of 1993, the relief prayed is that Town Committee, Digri be directed to revise octroi schedule and prepare it on the basis of weight as required by West Pakistan Municipal Committee, Octroi Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as Octroi Rules). It is the case of the petitioners that businessmen and shopkeepers of Digri had expressed their resentment and protest against the octroi schedule leading to a complete strike for five days in the month of July, 1979 resulting in unlawful arrest and wrongful detention by the local administration, of about 17 persons for about 11 days, which was highlighted in local press.
3. Petitioners as well as other citizens also made a number of representations from time to time to higher authorities including the Chief Minister, Sindh and Federal Minister for Production whereupon Minister, Local Government in the Government of Sindh responded to their grievances and made a direction to the respondent Town Committee to revise the octroi schedule and bring it at par with the octroi schedule of Municipal Committee, Mirpurkhas with immediate effect and to issue necessary notification in this behalf. Such directive conveyed to the respondent Town Committee, vide letter dated 16-10-1993 however was not implemented and instead a collusive Suit No,279 of 1993 was filed by the octroi contractor namely M/s. Bismillah & Company against the Town Committee as well as Province of Sindh before the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Mirpurkhas in which an interim order maintaining status quo was granted on 23-10-1993. Later on the direction given by the Minister was withdrawn as conveyed by the Local Government Department to the respondent Town Committee vide letter dated 24-11-1993 with the consequence that the suit before the Civil Court was withdrawn. On account of this development during the pendency of C.P. No,3264 of 1993 petitioners were obliged to file C.P. No,408 of 1994 calling into question the order dated 24-11-1993 as void ab initio, illegal, without jurisdiction and to have been passed without lawful authority. In the subsequent petition prayer is that the earlier order dated 16-10-1993 passed by the Minister, Local Government, Government of Sindh be restored and Town Committee be directed to act accordingly in consonance with Rule 46 of the Octroi Rules.
4. In both the petitions, respondent Town Committee filed parawise comments justifying the validity of the octroi schedule and denying the violation of any provision of law. Non- implementation of the directive by the Minister was attributed to the suit filed by the contractor and the order for maintenance of status quo passed by the Civil Court followed by withdrawal of the directive of the Minister.
5. In earlier Constitutional petition parawise comments were filed on behalf of Government of Sindh purportedly by a Section Officer in the Local Government department expressing lack of concern but admitting the directive issued by the Minister for Local Government requiring respondent No,1 to revise the octroi schedule and to bring it at par with that of Municipal Committee, Mirpurkhas.
Essentially it was made to appear that it was a dispute between the petitioners and Town Committee, Digri.
' No comments at all were, however, submitted in C.P.No, 408 of 1994 on behalf of the Government of Sindh, despite sufficient time.
6. At the hearing Mr. M.M.Aqil Awan, learned counsel for the petitioners referred us to the copies of representations made by the petitioners and other shopkeepers against the introduction of octroi on ad valorem basis and press 'clippings highlighting grievances of the citizens of Town Committee against unjust, excessive and illegal levy of octroi. Learned counsel also referred to us the octroi schedule introduced by Town Committee, Tando Ghulam Ali a town situated about 14 miles away from Digri and the octroi schedule enforced by Municipal Committee, Mirpurkhas situated about 27 miles away from Digri. Admittedly both the local councils are collecting octroi on the basis of weight except for charcoal, coal, gas sylenders, electricity, lubricants, sewing machine, knitting machine, typewriter, electronic goods and cattle etc. Which are subjected to levy of octroi on the basis of per unit or per bag as the case may be.
7. Learned counsel was at pains to refer to Rule 46 of the Octroi Rules which reads as under:-- "46. Octroi on goods other than those imported by Sea shall be calculated on the gross weight of the consignment including packing and other containers; provided that where the containers outweigh the principal goods, or are to be used frequently, the Municipal Committee may, with the approval of the Controlling Authority, determine the standard weight on the basis of which such goods or containers shall be taxed."
' Main grievance of the petitioners is that Town Committee, Digri has been charging octroi on a large number of goods in violation of Rule 46 of the Octroi Rules and thereby violating fundamental rights of the petitioners and other citizens of Town Committee, Digri as envisaged by Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution. It would be pertinent to reproduce both Articles hereunder:-- "18. Freedom of trade, business or profession.--Subject to such qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by law, every citizen shall have the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation, and to conduct any lawful trade or business: ' Provided that nothing in this Article shall prevent--
(a) the regulation of any trade or profession by licensing system; or
(b) the regulation of trade, commerce or industry in the interest of free competition therein; or
(c) the carrying on, by the Federal Government or a Provincial Government, or by a Corporation controlled by any such Government, of any trade business, industry or service, to the exclusion complete or partial of other persons.
25. Equality of citizens.--(1) All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law.
(2) There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the protection of women and children."
8. It is further contended that the respondent Government of Sindh having realized the gravity of the situation and reasonableness of the petitioner's demand had conceded to their representations vide order dated 16-10-1993 passed under section 62(1)(b) of the Sindh Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) which was not implemented by the Town Committee who sabotaged it in collusion with the contractor by resorting to luxury of uncalled for litigation and obtaining an order of status quo from the Civil Court. Learned counsel submitted that subsequent withdrawal of the directive through letter dated 24-11-1993 by the Government of Sindh was wholly unwarranted and without lawful authority inasmuch as no opportunity of showing cause against contemplated withdrawal was afforded to the petitioners/citizens.
9.. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent Town Committee vehemently urged that the petitioners and for that matter every citizen aggrieved by assessment of octroi on any goods or the liability of the goods could make an appeal to the Taxation Officer under Rule 48 in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXVIII of the Octroi Rules which having not been availed of, the petitioners have no locus standi to maintain the petition. Learned counsel! Impugned the directive by the Minister, Local Government requiring the respondent Town Committee to revise the octroi schedule and to bring it at par with that of Municipal Committee, Mirpurkhas. Mr. G.H. Abbasi, also contended that under Rule 19 of the Rules of Business, 1973 framed by the Provincial Government in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 139 of the Constitution, a Provincial Minister though responsible for all matters relating to his department was not competent to issue the directive to the respondent Town Committee without the approval of the Chief Minister. According to the learned counsel Rule 46 of the Octroi Rules is not a self-operative provision of law but subject to Rule 48 of the Octroi Rules. Learned counsel vehemently urged that the octroi schedule being invariably subject to approval by the Provincial Government which is empowered to supervise and control the Local Councils, issue directions to such Councils, to carry out inspection through an Inspection Team and to enquire into the affairs of the Councils, under the provisions of sections 53, 54 and 56 of the Ordinance, it is not open to this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to the local council as well as the Provincial Government to revise the octroi schedule as arithmetical calculations and mathematical computations cannot form the subject-matter for exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction by this Court.
10. On his part, learned Additional Advocate-General representing the Provincial Government adopted an attitude of lack of concern for. The reason that the dispute involved in the petitions essentially is between the petitioners and the respondent Town Committee and that the Provincial Government is not directly concerned with it. He, however, supported the directive issued by the Minister, Local Government directing the revision of octroi schedule issued with lawful authority but later on withdrawn by the Government.
11. Adverting to the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners it may be observed that Rule 46 of the Octroi Rules enjoins upon the Town Committee to calculate the octroi on the grosss weight of the consignment including packing and other containers. The only exception to rule envisaged under the law is to the effect that where the containers outweigh the principal goods, the Municipal Committee may with the approval of the Controlling Authority, determine the standard weight on the basis whereof such goods or containers shall be taxed. This rule is, however, not attracted in case of goods imported by sea and the goods carried in bulk at wagon rates. In the case of goods carried in bulk at wagon rates the octroi shall be charged on the weight for charge shown in the Railway receipt as contemplated by Rule 47 of the Octroi Rules.
While learned counsel for the petitioners is right in seeking to enforce the provisions of Octroi Rules relating to assessm ent and collection of octroi which have the force of law being statutory Rules as laid down in Multiline Associates v. Ardeshir Cowasjee 1995 SCMR 362, learned counsel for the contesting respondent was not in a position to convince us as to under what authority the respondent Town Committee was authorised to burden the citizens of Digri with assessment of octroi on the basis of valuation of goods instead of weight thereof as required by statute. The fact that within the octroi limits of Town Committee, Tando Ghulam Ali and Municipal Committee, Mirpurkhas octroi is being charged on the basis of weight with a few exceptions is beyond the pale of any controversy. It is also not disputed that both these Towns are situated in the close vicinity of Town Committee, Digri. To our mind, by reason of excessive levy of octroi on most of the consumable goods, petitioners are deprived of their right to freedom of trade, business or profession as guaranteed under Article 18 of the Constitution. Likewise by charging octroi from the citizens of Digri in a manner unfavourable to them as compared to the persons residing in the towns situated in the close vicinity, seemingly they appear to be deprived of their right to be treated equally and equal protection of law as envisaged by Article 25 of the Constitution.
12. Indeed, the doctrine of equality before the law and equal protection is the anchor sheet of the Constitution and it prescribes in unequivocal terms that every citizen of the State is to be equally treated and is to enjoy equal protection of law. Equal protection theory prevents discriminate treatment of individual or a group of individuals at the expense of other individuals or class of the people similarly situated. Even handed fair treatment to every citizen is ordained by the Constitution. In fact the rights guaranteed by the Constitution are presently applied throughout the universe and practised in the civilized world. Such rights are recognized in Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Human Rights, 1950. Such rights do provide in unequivocal terms a safeguard against discrimination/amongst the persons placed in similar circumstances. In case, the citizens residing in a nearby locality are subjected to lesser rate of octroi there is no good reason as to why the petitioners and for that reason the citizens of Digri be treated with discrimination. The inequality and discrimination in the matter of levy of octroi on the goods in which the petitioners are dealing is quite likely to interfere with their right to trade or profession and lawful occupation. Surely their trade and business is bound to be adversely affected on account of adverse circumstances owing to discriminatory and unreasonably higher assessment of octroi by the respondent Town Committee. A reference may be made to Independent Newspapers Corporation v. Chairman, Fourth Wage Board (1993 SCMR' 1533) in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court interpreting Article 19 of the Constitution laid down that the freedom of expression includes the right to receive information through organs of public opinion and the freedom of press on its turn rests on the assumption that there is a wide dissemination of information. Such dissemination inevitably contemplates absence of restraints. Thus any measure which directly or indirectly puts restraint on or curtails the circulation of newspaper, due to any factor, including cost of nroduction and resultant increase in the price thereof should, in so far as possible, be avoided.
13. Reverting to the ground with regard to acceptance of a long standing demand of the citizens of Town Committee, Digri, it may be pertinent to note that their repeated representations culminated in a directive for revision of the octroi schedule and to bring it at par with that of Municipal Committee, Mirpurkhas. In our view, the Minister Incharge of Local Government Department was fully authorised and competent to issue the directive in consonance with the spirit of section 62 of the Ordinance to which no exception could be taken by the Town Committee but unfortunately the said directive was not implemented and allowed to be thwarted by the respondent in active connivance with the octroi contractor by resorting to unnecessary litigation. Indeed such directive was binding on the Local Council as would appear from the provisions contained in subsection (2) of section 62. We are not inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent when he says that the Minister was not competent to make this direction without the express authority from the Chief Minister. There is a presumption of law to the effect that the official acts lave been regularly performed . Indeed letter dated 16-10-1993 addressed by the Local Government Department, Government of Sindh to the respondent Town Committee expressly manifests that this directive was given by a competent authority in exercise of the powers conferred on the Government by section 62 referred to hereinabove. Obviously no material has been placed before this Court to take a contrary view. In case the respondent desired to believe us that the Minister Local Government acted without lawful authority in making the aforesaid directive the onus is on such respondent to substantiate the contrary. The very fact that this directive was conveyed by the Government of Sindh Local Government Department to the respondent Town Committee with copies endorsed to all other relevant quarters reflects that the directive was lawfully given and it was made competently. Moreover, Provincial Government has expressly admitted this position in the parawise comments which tends strong support to the legitimate inference arising in the circumstances.
14. Now having accepted quite reasonable and just demand of the citizens of Town Committee Digri respondent Government is required to demonstrate extraordinary grounds for withdrawal of such policy decision but no ground whatsoever has been shown for reverting to the original position after 38 days of the issue of directive. Indeed no comments have been filed in the petition impugning the withdrawal of earlier order upholding the case of the petitioners. We are, therefore, inclined to the view that subsequent withdrawal of the earlier order by the Government of Sindh was neither justified nor warranted in the peculiar circumstances of the case.
15. As to the jurisdiction of this Court it is always subject to law and. The Constitution. In the face of the record and in the peculiar circumstances of the case we 'see no strong reason for denying the discretion and equitable relief to the petitioners who are otherwise entitled to it under the law.
Admittedly respondent are acting in connection with the affairs of the Province and we think that the prayers solicited in the subsequent petition can be lawfully granted without any hesitation. In the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction this Court is under a duty to protect fundamental rights of the citizens guaranteed under the Constitution as well as law. Indeed ouster of jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred and the superior Courts have adequate jurisdiction to enforce and protect the rights of the citizens by making proper directions in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Evidently the petitioners have no other adequate and alternative remedy available under the law for the enforcement of their rights and a reference to Rule 48 of the Octroi Rules in this behalf is completely out of context and highly mis-conceived.
16. For the aforesaid facts and reasons, we declare that the withdrawal of the order dated 16-10- 1993 by the Government of Sindh is unwarranted, invalid and without lawful authority.
Consequently earlier order dated 16-10-1993 is declared to have been passed in recognition of the valuable rights of the petitioners and to have been passed justly, fairly, reasonably and competently.
Accordingly, we direct the respondent Town Committee and Government of Sindh to revise the Octroi schedule in consonance with Rule 46 of the Octroi Rules and in line with the lawful direction given by the Government of Sindh. Both the petitions are accordingly disposed of but with no order as to costs.