' The facts leading to this second appeal are as follows: ' Zarina Alum respondent No, 1, filed an ejectment petition against Raja Muhammad Akbar Khan, respondent No, 3, alleging herself to be the landlady and him to be the tenant in respect of a house in Gal berg-II, Lahore, bearing No, 11-L, Gulberg. However, since, according to her, it was, in fact Raja Muhammad Akram Khan, the father of the said respondent, who was tenant originally and who had died before the institution of the ejectment proceedings, she realized that all the heirs of Raja Muhammad Akram Khan should have been impleaded. Accordingly she amended her petition and impleaded along with Raja Muhammad Akbar Khan, respondent No, 3, his two brothers, his mother and one sister. The brothers Raja Muhammad Afzal Khan and Raja Muhammad Azhar Khan and the mother Mrs. Raja Muhammad Akram Khan, are the appellants, before me while the sister Mrs. Rana Khurshid Anwar is respondent No,
2. But before the amendment of the petition respondent No, 3 had already filed his written statement in which he admitted that the house in question had been leased out to him by the husband of Mst. Zareena Akram and that there was no dispute with regard to the rate of rent. He also admitted that he had been paying rent to the husband of the said lady by means of cheques which, however, were not encashed. But subsequent to the amendment of the petition respondent No, 3, Raja Muhammad Akbar Khan, changed his position and denied the tenancy altogether. Appellants Nos. 1 and 2 Raja Muhammad Afzal Khan and Mrs. Raja Muhammad Akram Khan filed separate written statements though in almost the same terms as Raja Muhammad Akbar Khan, respondent No,
3. Raja Muhammad Azhar Khan appellant No, 3 was proceeded against ex parte as he failed to appear despite substituted service. It may however, be noted here that substituted service had been effected on him under a wrong name. He was mistakenly named as Raja Muhammad Tajjamal instead of Raja Muhammad Azhar. However, when he learnt of the proceedings against him he made an application for setting the ex parte order aside but as he did not pursue the petition, it was dismissed for non-prosecution. The learned Rent Controller then proceeded to decide the question of tenancy. In spite of the denial of tenancy by the alleged tenants he came to the conclusion on the basis of the earlier admission of Raja Muhammad Akbar Kban that all the heirs of Raja Muhammad Akram Khan deceased were the tenants of Mst Zareena Akram. As the rate of rent h ad not also been disputed by Raja Muhammad Akbar Khan, the learned Rent Controller directed all the respondents before him on the 6th November, 1971, to deposit the arrears of rent and also the future rent. The appellants challenged the said order before the Appellate Authority and so did respondent No, 3 by a separate appeal.
The learned appellate authority dismissed the two appeals on 16-1-1974 by single judgment and upheld the findings and order of the learned Rent Controller. Hence this second appeal by Raja Muhammad Afzal Khan, Mrs. Raja Muhammad Akram Kban and Raja Muhammad Azhar Khan. It is, however, necessary to note here that Raja Muhammad Akbar Khan, respondent No, 3, has not preferred a second appeal to this Court.
' The main grievance of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the appellants have been held to be tenants and jointly liable to deposit the rent on the basis of an admission made not by any of them but Raja Muhammad Akbar Khan, respondent 3. He contends that they are not bound by the admission of Raja Munammad Akbar Khan. Without framing an issue on the question of tenancy and without letting the parties adduce evidence, he asserts, the learned Rent Controller could not lawfully direct the appellants to deposit rent.
3. It is true that unless the learned Rent Controller decides that the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties he cannot assume the jurisdiction and therefore, cannot direct the alleged tenants to deposit rent. But in order to decide that question he does not necessarily have to frame an issue and try it as formally as a civil Court is expected to do. It has been held in Khadim Mohy ud-Din and another v. Rehmat Ali Nagra and another (1), that in the enquiry before the Rent Controller the parties have no right to insist on production of such evidence as they desire to adduce in support of their case and that these enquiries are such as are conducted by any Executive Officer. It has further been observed therein that though some of the functions of the Controller are judicial in character, he is not required to act judicially in discharging many of the functions. It is difficult to hold that the Controller while performing his functions under the Ordinance acts as a Court. At the most it may be said that he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. In view of this observation I am satisfied that the learned Rent Controller was justified in deciding issue of tenancy between the parties before him on the basis of whatever material was available to him on the record. It is, however, a different question as to whether that material was enough to support the finding arrived at by him. The material in question was the earlier written statement filed by Raja Muhammad Akbar Khan respondent No,
3. Thus we come to the first question raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, namely, whether the said written statement could bind the appellants. This point was examined in some detail in Aminar Rehman v. Shaukat Ali (2) and the ruling given therein reads as follows:- "The answer to the question as to whether an admission by one defendant in a suit is binding on his other co-defendants will, in my opinion, depend upon whether the said defendant was jointly interested with his co-defendants in the subject-matter of the suit, whether the admission related to the subject-matter in dispute and whether it was made by the declarant in his character of a person jointly interested with the other parties against whom the evidence is sought to be tendered. It is in this view that it has repeatedly been held that the admission by one of several joint tenants is binding also on the other joint tenants. Ambir Ali and others v. Lutfe All and others 21 C W N 996 and Bhutnath Bandopadhya and others v. /agar tarini Dasi 71 C L J 200."
In the present case in view of the identical nature of the defence set up by the appellants Nos. 1 and 2, and respondent No, 3 before the Rent Controller, it is clear that they are and have always been jointly interested in the subject-matter of this case. Therefore, in respectful agreement with the authorities cited above, I am of the view that the admission of respondent No, 3 would bind the appellants as it would bind the said respondent himself.
4. However, the learned counsel for the appellant has raised another question in respect of the earlier written statement filed by Raja Muhammad Akbar Khan, respondent No,
3. He contends that the said respondent never admitted Mst. Zareena Akram to be his landlady but only admitted her husband Sh. Muhammad Akram to be the landlord. But the said Muhammad Akram being admittedly dead and Mst Zareena Akram, respondent No, 1 being admittedly his widow, there could be no dispute with regard to her title to receive rent in respect of the premises in question. It is not the case either of respondent No, 3 or of the appellants that there being other heirs of Sh.
Muhammad Akram deceased the widow is not entitled
(1) PLD 1965 SC 459 (2) PLD 1956 Dacca "6 ' exclusively to receive the rent. In view of the definition of landlord given in section 2 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, I am of the opinion that in the circumstances of this case the learned Rent Controller was right in holding Mst. Zareena Akram respondent No, 1, to be the landlady on the basis of the admission of the respondent No, 3 to the effect that her huband was the landlord. It is also significant that having failed before the appellate authority, respondent No, 3 had not challenged that finding before this Court. This again amounts to an indirect admission of tenancy.
As the interest of respondent No, 3 and the appellants is common, all of them have been rightly held by the learned Rent Controller as well as by the learned appellate authority to be the tenants of respondent No, 1.
5. The next question argued by the learned counsel for the appellants is that appellant No, 3, Raja Muhammad Azhar Khan, having not been properly served, the order passed against him in his absence is not maintainable. But the fact that the said appellant had made an application for having the ex parte proceedings set aside clearly shows that he had knowledge of the proceedings. And the fact that he did not pursue the application indicates that he was not interested in contesting the application. If he was D interested, he could easily associate himself with the proceedings. The question of the tenancy was decided and the order of deposit was passed long after he had applied to the Rent Controller for having the ex parte proceedings set aside. It cannot, therefore, be said that the impugned orders were passed without notice to him.
6. In short for the reasons given above I am of the opinion that there is no substance in this appeal.
I, therefore dismiss it. The appellants shall bear the costs of respondent No, 1 in this Court.
PLD 1917 Lahore 665 Before Aftab Hussain, J Mst. DAULAT BIBI (REPRESENTED BY LEGAL HEIRS) AND 4 OTHERS Appellants Versus MULTAN IMPROVEMENT TRUST, MULTAN-Respondent Regular Second Appeal No, 124 of 1967, decided on 2nd February 1977,
(a) Punjab Town Improvement Act (IV of 1922)- -- Ss. 36, 38 & 42(2)-Presumption-Sections 36 & 38-Mandatory in character-Non-compliance with provisions of Ss. 36 & 38-Renders scheme, even though sanctioned by Government, a nullity- Section 42 makes sanctioned scheme to be conclusive evidence of its having been framed and sanctioned but does not provide for a conclusive presumption in favour of a null and void scheme.- [Presumption]. [pp. 668, 669]A & B Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor AIR 1936 P C 253 g Alta Muhammad Qureshi v. The Settlement Commissioner PLD 1971 SC 61 ; Mansab All v. Amir PLD 1971 SC 124 ; Allah Ditta v. Member Board of Revenue (Consolidation) PLD 1976 Lah. 897 and Lahore Improvement Trust v. Custodian of Evacuee Property PLD 1971 SC 811 ref.
(b) Evidence Act (1 of 11172)- -- Ss. 101 & 105-Burden of proof-Shifting of-Contention that although onus of an issue 13y on appellants )et it should have been proved by respondents since all relevant record lay in their possession - Held, not correct- Not necessary for respondent to produce evidence unless some evidence produced to shift onus on respondents.-[Burden of proof]. [p. 669JC
(c) Punjab Town Improvements Act (IV of 1922)- -- S. 98 (3) read with S. 59 and Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), Ss. 16 & 17-A-Limitation -Suit challenging legality and effectiveness of scheme as sanctioned by Government-Vesting of land in Government-Takes place atter taking over possession and not earlier-Possession of land taken over by respondent after dismissal of appellant's appeal-Appellant being still vested with property in dispute on date of filing of suit, no occasion, held, arose for a declaration of their title to such property-Suit, held further, not a suit for such declaration, hence, not within exception created by S. 98 (3) and having been filed more than nine months after arising of cause of action barred by time.- -[Limitation].
[pp. 670, 671] D, F & G Muhammad Sharif v. Lahore Improvement Trust PLD 1971 SC 460 distinguished. Associated Hotels of India Ltd. Etc. v. Jodha Mal Kothalia PLD 1954 FC 35 and Lahore Improvement Trust v. Custodian of Evacuee Property PLD 1971 Lah. 811 ref.
(d) West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance (XXX of 1963)- -- S. 2 (g)-Newspaper-Periodical in dispute found to contain certain news-Contention that such document not containing any news material or comments was not a newspaper, held, not correct in circumstances and notice published in such paper could not be invalidated. [p. 672]H Mian Mahmud All Qasuri for Appellants. Ch. Abdur Rehman for Respondent.
Dates of hearing : 28th October 1975; 5th November 1976; 27th, 28th January and 2nd February 1977.
' The Improvement Trust, Multan framed a scheme for establishing a market at Akbar Road on a total area of 8 kanals 17 marlas of land out of which the appellants owned about 7 kanals. The scheme was framed on the 29th February 1956. On the 10th February 1962, notice purporting to be under section 36 of the Town Improvement Act was published. Thereafter notices under section 38 of the Act were served upon the appellants. On the 6th June 1962, the Improvement Trust passed a resolution confirming the scheme on the ground that no objection had been filed. The scheme was sanctioned by the Government under section 41 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act and the Improvement Trust proceeded to execute it as required by section 42 of the Act. On the 27th June 1964, the appellants sent a notice under section 98 of the Act showing their intention to file a suit. A suit was actually filed on the 26th September 1964, for a declaration that the proceedings of acquisition were ultra vires, illegal and ineffective against their rights as also for a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant-respondelg from interfering with the possession. It was further prayed in the alternative that if the proceedings were held to be valid the defendant-respondent be restrained from interfering with the said possession until compensation is paid in the form of land. The grounds on which the vires of the scheme as sanctioned by the Government were challenged were:
(I) That the notice under section 36 was published only in 'Rehbar-e Dehat' which was a weekly newspaper unknown among the public and having limited sale.
(ii) That the said notice was neither pasted on any Notice Board in the Trusts Office at Bagh Langey Khan, Multan nor was it published for consecutive three weeks in a Gazette nor again its copy was sent to the President, Municipal Committee, or the Medical Officer of Health, Multan.
(iii) That on receipt of notices under section 38 of the Act on the 16th April 1962, the plaintiffs sent their objections by post but without consideration of the objections the scheme was sent to the Government for sanction and was actually sanctioned on the 20th December 1963 ; and
(iv) That no compensation in the form of land was granted to the plaintiffs nor was such a scheme ever framed as required by section 27 of the Act.
' In paragraph No, 7 of the plaint it was further stated that fresh objections were filed on the 15th June 1964, on the demand made by the Land Acquisition Collector but without any effect.
2. The suit was contested by the respondent. The jurisdiction of the civil Court was challenged. The suit was pleaded to be barred by time. Reliance was placed on section 42 of the Act and it was urged that the notification of sanction by the Government is conclusive evidence that the same had been duly framed and sanctioned. Paragraph No, 3 of the plaint which pertained to Objections Nos. 1 and 2 was specifically denied and it was stated that the provisions of the Act had been duly complied with. Similarly paragraph No, 4 of the plaint which pertained to violation of section 38 was denied. It was further urged that no objection could be filed after the sanction of the scheme. The Collector's award was also justified.
3. The learned trial Court framed the following issues
(1) Whether this Court is not competent to try this suit?
(2) Whether section 97 of Improvement Trust Act and section 56 of the Specific Relief Act and section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act bar this suit?
(3) Whether the suit is time-barred?
(4) Whether the scheme In question being sanctioned by the Government is unassailable?
(5) What is the value of the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction?
(6) Whether the acquisition of the disputed property suffers from legal defect and the defendant cannot take possession of the disputed property?
(7) Relief,
4. Issues Nos. 1 and 2 were decided against the defendant. The Court was held to have jurisdiction to go into the question whether the acquisition was not in order. Issue No, 3 was found against the plaintiffs appellants. It was found that the scheme 'laving been sanctioncd by the Government on the 20th December 1963, the suit as instituted on the 26th September 1964, was barred by six months' limitation under section 98 (3) of the Punjab Town Improvements Act. Similarly, issue No, 4 was also decided in favour of the defendant. In view of the provisions of section 42 which provide that a notification under subsection (1) in respect of any scheme shall be conclusive evidence that the scheme had been duly framed and sanctioned, the valuation of the suit was found to be correct and issue No, 5 was answered accordingly. Issue No, 6 was decided against the plaintiffs- appellants on two grounds Firstly, it was held that they had failed to prove that the acquisition of the property in dispute suffered from any legal defect. Secondly, reliance was placed upon section 42 (2) and a conclusive presumption was drawn in favour of the scheme being intra vires. Having held that in view of the findings the acquisition proceedings were not illegal the learned Judge proceeded to find that in view of this the jurisdiction of the civil Court was barred. But since there was no other forum where the plaint could be presented the plaintiff's suit was dismissed with costs, on the 21st October 1965.
5. The appellants' appeal was dismissed by Mr. Sadiq Ali G. Khoja, Additional District Judge, Multan on the 21st November 1966. Tne learned Additional District Judge also found the suit to be barred by time and on merits relied upon the conclusive presumption of section 42 (2) of the Act.
6. Hence this appeal.
7. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that section 42 (2) did not apply to a case where the provisions of section 36 or 38 had not been complied with On merits he submitted that the defendant ought to have proved to the satisfaction of the Court that legal provisions were duly satisfied even though the burden of proof of issue No, 6 was not discharged by the appellants since the entire record to prove this was in possession of the respondent. He further argued that the suit was liable to be decreed in favour of the appellants simply on the ground that though submitted within the period of 60 days from the service of the notice under section 38 the scheme was confirmed by the Improvement Trust without considering those objections and in fact on a misreading of the record that no objections had been filed. It was also argued though half heartedly that "Rehbar-e-Dehate was not a newspaper at all and as such the publication of the notice under section 36 in it was not compliance of the provisions of that section. On the other hand it was suggested as pleaded in the plaint that a newspaper of a limited sale and limited repute was chosen with a view to keep the appellants in dark about the notice under section 36.
Lastly, it was urged that no effect was given to the provisions of section 27 to compensate the appellants by the allotment of property.
8. I agree with the arguments of the learned counsel that if it is proved that the provisions of sections 36 and 38 were not complied with, no conclusive presumption can be drawn under section 42 (2) in favour of the validity of the scheme. One of the established principles of law is that an act must be done in the manner provided by the law or not at all. Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor (1). It is also established that if there is any violation of a specific mandatory provision of law about notice and not merely a violation of the principle of audi alteram partem, the order passed or action taken is a nullity. Alta Muhammad Qureshi v. The Settlement Commissioner (2), Mansab
(1) AIR 1936 P C 253 (2) P 13 1971 SC 6; ' Ali v. Amir (1) and Allah Mita v. Member, Board of Revenue (Consolidation) (2). Sections 36 and 38 are mandatory in character and non-compliance with these provisions would render the scheme even if it is sanctioned by the Government as a nullity. Section 42 makes the sanctioned scheme to be conclusive evidence of its having been duly framed and sanctioned but cannot be treated as providing for a conclusive presumption in favour of a scheme which is a nullity. Section 42 provides for a conclusive presumption in favour of something which is not a nullity. In Lahore Improvement Trust v. Custodian of Evacuee Property (3), it was held that: "Under the Schedule to the Town Improvement Act notices under sections 36 and 42 have the same effect as notices under sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is well established that a material defect in a notice issued under either section renders the entire acquisition proceedings illegal."
In view of this I agree with the interpretation placed by the learned counsel on the words of subsection (2) of section 42 of the Act. The emphasis of the learned Additional District Judge on this provision was not, therefore, correct. The learned Judge should have considered the evidence also and given a finding on merits.
9. I have gore through the evidence in order to find out whether the appellants had been able to prove issue No, 6 but I find that the burden of this issue was not discharged by them although the onus was, and correctly so, placed upon them. No documentary evidence on this question was produced by the plaintiffs-appellants. In support of the issue, only one witnesses Lal Muhammad, Mukhtar-e-Khan of the appellants appeared as P. W.
2. In examination-in-chief he stated that no notice under section 36 was pasted on the board of the respondent's office nor was it published for three consecutive weeks in the newspaper, nor were its copies sent to the Chairman, Municipal Committee or Health Officer. On receipt of notices under section 38 the appellants filed objections which were sent Dasti as well as by registered post.
In cross-examination he stated that he had seen the board of the office of the respondent in April 1962, in the fourth or fifth month of 1963 but had not found the notice. This did not prove that the notice was not posted on 10-2-1962 when it was issued. When he was questioned about the manner he received information about the fact that the copies were not sent to the Chairman of the Committee or to the Health ' Officer, he stated that (URDU TEXT) Clearly, therefore ' this is no evidence. The appellants should have summoned the respondent's record to discharge this onus but this was not done. The witness could also not prove legally the objections filed by him.
He admitted that the appellants had not obtained certified copies of these objections as Exh. P.
7. He could not prove that it was sent by registered post or that it was the true copy of the objections so sent. On the other hand, according to him Exh. P. 7 was the copy of the copy maintained by the counsel. Clearly this is not primary evidence. I am, therefore, in full agreement with the finding of the learned trial Court that the appellants had failed to prove issue No, 6.
10. It was not disputed by the learned counsel also that the appellants; .Did not adduce any legal proof of their objections against the scheme. He,
(1) PLD 1971 SC 124 (2 PLD 1976 Lah. 897
(3) PLD 1971 SC 811 ' however, argued that notwithstanding the onus of issue No, 6 being upon the appellants, the issue should have been proved by the respondent who and all the record in their possession. This argument is without force since it was not necessary for the respondent to produce any evidence unless there was evidence to shift the onus which there was none.
11. In order to establish that objections had been filed by the appellants within 60 days from the service of notice under section 38 of the Act the learned counsel relied upon paragraph No, 4 of the plaint in which it is stated that on receipt of the notice under section 38 on the 16th April 1962, the appellants sent their objections by registered post. He then referred to corresponding paragraph of written statement and argued that the allegation, made in the above paragraph about the date when the notices were sent has not been specifically denied in the written-statement and as such should be taken to have been admitted. Once it is so admitted, he argued, the inference will be clear that the resolution passed on the 6th June 1962 (Exh. P. 13) approving the scheme for sending it to the Government under section 40 of the Act was passed prior to the expiry of 60 days from the date of service of notice and as such the non-compliance with the provisions of section 38 was duly proved. This objection overlooks the language of the corresponding, paragraph of the written- statement by which paragraph No, 4 of the plaint was specifically denied. It was, therefore, necessary for the plaintiffs to prove that any objections were filed within the period of limitation as required by section 38. I have already held that there is no such proof. Oa the other hand, it appears from the copy Exh. P. 7 that notice dated 15th June 1962, which means that if at all it was sent, it was sent after the of the resolution. The date in paragraph No, 4 about the date-on which the notice was alleged to have been sent is contradicted by Exh. P.
7.
13. In view of this finding it is unnecessary to consider the question, whether the suit was barred by time. I am, however, of the opinion that this, question was rightly decided against the appellants.
Section 98 (3) of the Act provides that: ' No action such as is described in subsection (1) shall unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declarations of the title thereto, be commenced otherwise than within six months-next after the accrual of the cause of action."
' In order to escape the applicability of this period of limitation the learned counsel argued that the suit envisages declaration of title to the property. He also relied upon Muhammad Sharif v. Lahore Improvement Trust (1). The facts of that case are, however, distinguishable. In that case the plaintiff asked for a direction to the Improvement Trust to specifically perform the: contract of sale and to do all acts necessary to put him in full possession of the plots in suit. It was, therefore, held that this was not only a suit for specific performance but also a suit for recovery of compensation of the suit plots on the basis of title flowing from the performance of the contract of sale and as such was governed by the general law of limitation and not by the limitation provided by section 98 (3). In the present case, however, the suit is only to challenge the legality and effectiveness against the appellants of the , scheme as sanctioned under section 42 by the Provincial Government. Although on the face of it the suit is not suit for a declaration of title but I weuld be prepared to stretch it to that extent, if it is proved that by the sanction
(1) PLD 1971 SC 460 ' of the scheme the appellant's title was lost and the property stood vested in the Improvement Trust, But on this point the answer should clearly be in the negative. There is no specific provision in the Punjab Town Improvement, Act mentioning the point of time when actually the title of the property in dispute stands vested in the respondent. Such a provision has been added to the Land Acquisition Act and extended to the Town Improvement Act. Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that "when the Collecto has made an award under section 11, he may take possession or the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances".
Under that provision, therefore, the vesting of the land in the Government would be after the possession is taken and not before. Section 59 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act applies to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 subject to the modification enacted in the Schedule. Paragraph No, 6 of the Schedule provides that after section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act the following section 17-A shall be deemed to be inserted "In every case referred to in section 16 or section 17, the Collector shall. Upon payment of the cost of acquisition, make over charge of the land to the trust ; and the land shall thereupon vest in the trust subject to the liability of the trust to pay any further costs which may be incurred on account of its acquisition."
The property, therefore, would vest in the Trust only after its possession is delivered to it. Now in the present case it is admitted that the possession of the area in dispute was taken by the Trust after the dismissal of the appellants' appeal. Clearly, therefore, on the date of filing of the suit the appellants were still vested with this property and no occasion arose for declaration of their title to it.
13. I have considered in this connection the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Association Hotels of India Ltd. Etc. v. Jodha Mal Kothalia to the effect that once a notice under section 36 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act was issued that cast a cloud on title. But it was held in Lahore Improvement Trust v. Custodian of Evacuee Property that a notice under section 36 did not create a defect in the title of owners. Its intention is only to notify to the owners of the land that their land is proposed to be included in a scheme and if so advised they may file objections to the proposed scheme. On no account, therefore, can it be said that any need for a declaration of title could arise before the taking over of possession by the respondent. The suit cannot, therefore, be considered to be a suit for such a declaration and is not within the exception created by subsection (3) of section 98. The cause of action having arisen on the 20th December 1963, it was clearly barred by time since it was filed more than nine months later.
14. In support of the argument that weekly 'Rehbar-e-Dehat' is not a newspaper, the learned counsel relied upon the meaning of the 'news' as a report of a recent event and 'newspaper' meaning a periodical publication for circulating news. Ha referred to the definition of 'newspaper' in the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963, as a periodical work for publishing news or comments from published news. Referring to 'Rehbar-eDebat' dated the 8th February 1967, the learned counsel argued that it does not publish any news and as such is not a newspaper. This argument is without force for several reasons. Firstly, this point was not taken or urged at any stage. Secondly, the newspaper in which the notice under section 36 was published has not been placed on the record. There is no evidence on the point raised by the learned counsel. Even the issue dated the 8th February 1967, contains certain news. It cannot, therefore, be said that it is a document which does not contain such material or comments on news. This objection is, therefore, repelled.
15. I find no merit in this appeal and dismiss it with costs.