' Muhammad Iqbal petitioner has questioned the order, dated 13-2-1996 passed by the learned Civil Judge, III-Haripur by extending the time to deposit the pre-emption money in respect of the suit property and also the order of the learned Additional District Judge, Haripur who upheld the same vide his order, dated 28-7-1996. The facts of the case briefly stated are that Jehanzeb Khan (hereinafter referred as respondent) had filed a pre-emption suit in respect of the suit property, against Muhammad Iqbal (hereinafter referred as petitioner).
2. During the pendency of the suit, the trial Judge vide his order, dated 21-12-1995 directed Jehanzeb Khan respondent to deposit 1/3rd Of the preemption money before 13-2-1996. The respondent could not deposit the said amount on the aforesaid date and instead moved an application that on account of his sickness, he could not deposit the amount, therefore, some time may be given to him to deposit the same.
3. This application is, dated 13-2-1996 and on its corner the endorsement by the Court is as such "plaintiff is directed to deposit the pre-emption money within two days". However, this order was to signed by the Presiding Officer but the same has been mentioned in the order sheet of the said date. Feeling aggrieved Muhammad Iqbal petitioner filed an appeal against the said order before the Additional District Judge, Haripur which also failed vide the impugned order dated 28-7-1996.
4. Dissatisfied with the aforesaid two orders of the lower forums the petitioner has preferred the present revision petition.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The contentions of the petitioner are that the impugned order passed by the two Courts below are wrong, against facts, law and equity and were, therefore, not maintainable and are liable to be set aside. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that once the trial Court directs the deposit of 1/3rd pre-emption amount by a prescribed date, then such Court is bound to abide the time and cannot extend the same on its own without giving proper notice to the opposite party. In the instant case, no such notice was given to the petitioner. According to the learned counsel, the learned Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order as by failure to deposit the pre-emption amount the petitioner has accrued a valuable right.
6. According to the learned counsel, the lower Court had no jurisdiction to extend the time for the deposit of the pre-emption amount under section 24 df the Pre-emption Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred as the Act as amended in 1992). Perusal of section 24 gives discretion to the Court in fixing times but limits the jurisdiction to the extent of extending the time for depositing the pre-emption amount. The learned counsel for the respondent in reply referred to the provisions of the old Pre- emption Act, 1950 and also to section 24 of the New Act. According to him, under the old concept no extension was allowed for the deposit of the pre-emption amount whereas in the new law as amended up to date the intention of the Legislation was not so rigid and that the Court was within its jurisdiction and discretion to extend time.
7. A bare reading of section 24(1) of the new Pre-emption Act is reproduced here as under:-- ' "In every suit for pre-emption, the Court shall require the plaintiff to deposit in such Court 1/3rd of the sale price of the property in cash within such period as the Court may fix."
' Proviso 2 of the above quoted section provides that where the plaintiff fails to pay the 1/3rd price within the period fixed by the Court, his suit shall be dismissed.
8. The above quoted concept of law is not so liberal, it has prohibitive force. Besides, it is not only mandatory but also obligatory. The learned counsel for the petitioner had relied upon the following case-law: 1994 SCMR 8492; 1987 MLD Peshawar page 2945; 1995 SCMR page 135 and 1997 SCMR page 1267.
9. Seeking guidance from the case-law quoted above and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the firm view that the non-deposit of 1/3rd pre-emption amount by the pre-emptor at the first instance under the orders of the Court would be detrimental and fatal and the Court has no option or power to extend time for such deposit. In the circumstances, this revision petition is accepted and both the impugned judgments of the lower Courts are set aside and the suit of the respondent is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.