MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN (MEMBER).---The appellant joined service in WAPDA in 1963 and retired from service in 1989. In the meanwhile he was promoted from his original post of Accounts Clerk to the Divisional Accountant (Emergency Cadre) and finally to the regular Divisional Accountant. In 1996 one Allah Ditta filed an Appeal No. 3(L) of 1996 before this Tribunal which was decided on 18-2- 1996 and, based on the observations made in the said judgment, the appellant filed an appeal before the respondent-department asking for his placement in B-13 with effect from 1980 and BPS- 15 with effect from 1984. After waiting for the statutory period of ninety days for the disposal of his departmental appeal, the appellant has filed the present appeal.
2. We have listened to the learned counsel for the appellant at the preliminary stage of hearing on three aspects: Firstly, whether an appeal can be filed without the existence of any original or appellate order; Tribunals Act, 1973 can be based on another judgment of similar nature; and Thirdly, whether the appeal was within time.
3. Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 pre-supposes the existence of any original or appellate order. Since the term 'order' has not been defined, therefore, any written denial of a vested right affecting terms and conditions of a civil servant has been held by the Courts to be an order at least constructively if not actually. In the instant case there is neither such demand nor the denial, even of the constructive nature. The appellant had a long career in the respondent- department stretching over more than quarter of a century. He did not demand his placement in BPS-13 in 1980 nor in BPS-15 in 1984 and so there was no denial by the employer department of the claim. The delayed claim made on 7-5-1996 has not been decided as yet. A Therefore, we hold that there was neither any original nor appellate order and so the service appeal in these circumstances was incompetent.
4. With regard to second quarry of justification of a service appeal on the basis of a similar judgment in some other case, the learned counsel for the appellant referred us to a decision dated 30-4-1984 passed by the Law Division of WAPDA concerning the application of judgments of Courts and Tribunals in other cases of identical and similar nature and argued that it was the policy of WAPDA to follow the judgment in one case to extend benefits of similarly placed other employees of WAPDA. The perusal of the said letter shows that it was an advice of the Legal Branch of WAPDA to the Administration Branch that the Service Tribunal as well as Supreme Court have frequently observed that the judgment in earlier cases may be followed in later cases to avoid the repetition of similar litigation in future. The said advice certainly contains a healthy outlook to guide administrative agencies on the lines of honouring the verdict of judicial forum and its application in earlier other cases to avoid the multiplicity of litigation and wastage of time and energy of employer department, the employees and the judicial forum. However, this advice/circular does not convert a judgment in personam passed by this Tribunal into a judgment in rem. Therefore, the verbal request of the learned counsel for the appellant to convert the appeal into application for implementation of judgment also does not hold any ground. This Tribunal exercises jurisdiction in persona. Each individual civil servant aggrieved by any original or appellate order affecting his terms and conditions can file service appeal after exhausting departmental remedy. The observation made generally, while disposing of an individual appeal may appear to be in the nature of judgment in rem and the employer department should give serious consideration to apply such observations in similar cases but if the department does not apply such decision or observation in similar other cases, the judgment cannot be implemented by the Tribunal in respect of persons who were not parties to the decided cause. The judgment in Appeal No, 3(L) of 1996 can, therefore, neither give a cause of action to the appellant to revive his dead case after seven years after his retirement from service nor does it empower this Tribunal to implement such judgment in favour of all those potential beneficiaries who had not bothered to seek their legal remedy in time.
5. The original cause of action appears to have been accrued in 1980 which was renewed in 1984 but neither any departmental remedy was sought nor any service appeal was filed in time. The appellant was satisfied with what he was given by the respondent department till the time of his retirement and even for seven years thereafter. Now he could not reopen the case at this belated stage. The appeal is,, therefore, also held to be barred by time.
6. The result is that the appeal does not justify the regular hearing which is hereby dismissed in limine.