' Instant appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 16-7-1995 passed by the learned Additional District Judge Multan, whereby he accepted the appeal filed by the Plaintiffs/respondents against dismissal of their suit and remanded the suit to the trial Court for deciding the same afresh in accordance with law.
2. Briefly stated the facts are that appellant/defendant purchased suit land vide sale-deed, dated 29-11-1998 for a sum of Rs,30,000 from Mst. Mureed Fatima. The plaintiffs/respondents pre-empted the said sale by filing a suit for possession through preemption on 4-4-1989. The suit was resisted by the appellant/defendant on various counts giving rise to the following issues:--
(1) Whether the suit has been wrongly valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdictions? O.P.D.
(2) Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their words and conduct to file suit? O.P.D.
(3) Whether the plaintiffs have waived their right to pre-empt? O.P.D.
(4) Whether the suit property has been incorrectly described? O.P.D.
(5) Whether the defendants have effected improvements over the suit property worth Rs,30,000?
O.P.D.
(6) Whether the defendant is entitled to recover the charges, incurred on the transaction in dispute? O.P.D.
(7) Whether the plaintiffs have got superior right of pre-emption over the suit property qua the defendants? 0.P. P.
(8) Whether the ostensible sale price of the suit land Rs,3,00,000 was fixed in good faith and actually paid? O. P D
(9) If issue No,8 is not proved, then what was the market value of the suit property at the time of the impugned sale? O.P.P.
(9-A) Whether the pre-requirements of Talbs have been fulfilled by the plaintiffs. If so, its effect?
O.P.P.
(10) Relief.
3. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their respective stand. The learned Civil Judge dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree, dated 1-2-1993 on the basis of finding recorded under issue No,9-A as well as on the point of limitation. The plaintiffs/respondents challenged the said judgment and decree by filing an appeal which was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge on 16-7-1995 and remanded the suit for deciding afresh. The appellant/ defendant has felt dissatisfied and filed the instant F .A.O.
4. Although neither the appellant/ defendant is present nor his counsel, yet the appeal is not being dismissed for non-prosecution and the same is being disposed of after hearing the learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents.
5. Contention of learned counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs is that they had been non-suited on the basis of findings on issue No,9-A, as the trial Court came to the conclusion that they failed to prove Talb-iIshhad, that the trial Court also non-suited them on the point of limitation, though no specific issue on that score had been framed.' He argued that both these grounds have been adequately dealt with by the learned Additional District Judge who accepted their appeal and remanded the suit for deciding the same afresh. He, canvassed that they were non-suited by the trial Court on the basis of judgment reported in Muhammad Shabbir Ahmad Khan, v. Government of Punjab Province PLD 1994 SC 1, wherein both sections 6(2) and 35(2) of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1991 have been declared repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam with effect from 31-12-1993, that prior to, specific date given by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, existing law would apply to the decision of cases, that in the instant case, sale took place on 29-11-1988 and suit was filed on 4-4- 1989, that the periods stand covered by the interregnum period from 1-8-1986 to 28-3-1990, that period of limitation for preemption suit shall be one year and not four months as held by the trial Court, that as such the suit was within time, and placed reliance upon Mst. Bashiran Bibi v.
Muhammad Kashif Khan and others PLD 1995 Lah. 200 and Jamal Din and another v. Allah Baldish and another 1994 CLC 1957 (Lahore), that trial Court was not right in extending the operation of judgment of the apex Court on suit involving the sale which took place during the interregnuth period, as the same is to take effect from, 31-12-1993 and not retrospectively. He, thus, submitted that appellate Court has passed the impugned judgment and decree in accordance with law and appeal merits dismissal.
6. Admittedly; sale in question took place on 29-11-1988 and suit was filed A on 4-4-1989. Thus, the transaction relates to interregnum period ranging from 1-8-1986 up to 28-3-1990. There is no doubt that according to section 30 of the Punjab Preemption Act, 1991, the period of limitation has been prescribed as four months. But, this provision of section 30 (ibid) is not applicable to suits relating to the interregnum period as provided under section 35(2) of the Act as well as on the basis of authorities referred above. Thus, the suit having been filed on 4-4-1989 in respect of sale taking place on 29-11-1988 was within time. It is also pertinent to point out that trial Court could not non- suit the respondents/plaintiffs on the point of limitation, where neither any such issue was framed nor parties were called upon to adduce evidence. The appellate Court has rightly directed the trial Court to frame said issue and decide the same after giving an opportunity to the parties. So far as the question of point of Talb-i-Ishhad is concerned, suffice is to say, that the same was also not applicable, as the same came into force on the basis of Ordinance V of 1990, which came into force on 29-3-1990.
7. The upshot of above discussion is that impugned judgment and decree, dated 16-7-1995 has been passed in accordance with law. There is no force in the appeal and the same is hereby dismissed with cost.