1. ' BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J.--- A learned Magistrate at Rawalakot passed final order in proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and ordered that possession of the disputed land may be made over to the respondents. Mst. Begum Jan and others, by the Superdai who had been appointed on 13th of April, 1986 when the proceedings were initiated. This order was challenged by the appellant, Muhammad Gulzar, by filing a revision petition before the High Court which was dismissed on 6th of October, 1996. The petitioner was granted leave to appeal.
2. ' Sh. Abdul Aziz, the learned counsel for the appellant, made two submissions in support of appeal.
3. He firstly contended that a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is maintainable only if a dispute likely to cause breach of peace exists but there was no such situation in the present case. He submitted that in the evidence produced by the respondents there was nothing to prove that there was Fay apprehension of breach of peace. The second point raised by the learned confab is that it is not proved from the record that the rest dents were in possession of the disputed land at the time when the application was made or at any time during sixty previous days. He contended that no specific finding was recorded by the trial Court on the point of possession.
4. ' Controverting these arguments the learned counsel for the respondents, Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan, submitted that when the appellant party filed their objections to the application under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure they did not deny the specific allegation that there was apprehension of breach of peace. On the point of possession the learned counsel submitted that the finding on the question of possession was passed on documentary and oral evidence which proved the possession of the respondents at the relevant time.
5. ' The contention that there was no evidence on the record that there existed a dispute likely to cause breach of peace was urged before the High Court but it was rejected. The High Court has observed that in the objections filed by the respondents before the trial Court the assertion made in the application for initiating proceedings under section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure that there was apprehension of breach of peace was not denied and, therefore, the magistrate was not required to decide the question about apprehension of breach of peace. On this point, the learned Judge in the High Court has relied on a judgment from Indian jurisdiction reported as Hanmantha v. Hanifa Bi AIR 1953 Hyd.
6. 185.
7. ' Facts of the case are that the original file on which the proceedings were initiated is not available because it was destroyed due to fire which engulfed the Court building. After the destruction of the record fresh proceedings were initiated on re-constructed record. According to the available re- constructed record attorney of the respondent Shabbir son of Lal Din got a statement recorded before the Magistrate 1st Class on 30th of April, 1986 in which he stated that on the same day Zulfiqar and some other persons forcibly entered into the land allotted to the respondents which was in their cultivation and they tried to plough the land. They were armed with guns and Lathis.
8. Shabbir stated that when he tried to stop them they attacked him and he escaped with great difficulty there wise he would have been done to death. He stated that there was a grave apprehension of breach of peace which might lead to loss of human life. Two other witnesses were also examined by the Magistrate. Both of them made the same statement about apprehension of breach of peace as was done by Zulfiqar. Thereupon, cognizance was taken by the Magistrate and a Supercar was appointed for the land in dispute' An application was moved by the respondents on 4th of October, 1990 in which it was stated that proceedings under section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure were pending when the record as destroyed. It was stated that still there was a grave apprehension of breach of peace and the respondents were still trying to forcibly take over the possession from the Supercar. Thereupon, proceedings were recommended by the Magistrate's Court and a notice was issued to the Supercar apart from the appellant. When the appellant, Muhammad Gulzar, and others appeared before the Court they filed objections on 10th of October, 1992 but did not deny the existence of apprehension of breach of peace. They resisted the application on the ground that the Revenue Record showing Begum Jan and others, the respondents herein, to be in possession of the land in dispute were against the factual position on the ground. They alleged the Revenue Record showing that Mst. Begum Jan and others were put in possession of the disputed land was fake. They stated that in this connection action had taken against the Patwari for recording fake entries. Since the existence of apprehension of breach of peace was not denied, the High Court has held that it was not necessary to prove apprehension of breach of peace through evidence. I have gone through the evidence and find that it is factually incorrect to state that there is no evidence about breach of peace on the record. Lal Din son of Mir Muhammad a witness produced by the present respondents, stated in his examination-in-chief that Mst. Begum Jan and others had been put in possession of the land in dispute but subsequently Muhammad Gulzar and others started interference in their possession. In cross- examination he was not challenged on the point of interference. Similarly when Mst. Begum Jan appeared as a witness she specifically stated that the other party stated interference in their possession and that she apprehended breach of peace due to which she moved an application for attachment. She also was not challenged on this point in the cross-examination. It follows from the above that the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that there was no evidence about apprehension of breach of peace has no force. .
9. ' We may now advert to the factual side of the case. The record shows that it was a case which was fully contested by both the parties. Both the parties led evidence. The history of the case is that there was dispute about allotment of the disputed land. The litigation between the parties culminated in judgment of this Court which was in favor of the respondents. It is an admitted fact that subsequently proprietary rights in respect of the land in dispute were granted to Mst. Bi Jan and Mst. Begum Jan, the respondents before this Court. The case of the respondents is that they were put in possession of the land by the concerned authorities. In support of this claim they produced oral as well as documentary evidence. The oral evidence included the statements of Sardar Muhammad Ayub Khan, Tehsildar, and Muhammad Ishaque Khan, Girdawar, who stated that they put the respondents in possession. Copies of the relevant proceedings under which the possession was given and copies of necessary entries were produced in Court and were duly exhibited as "P. A . " , " P. B. " , " P. C . " , "P. D. " , " P. F " , "P.G." and "P.H.". The appellant also produced oral evidence. The trial Court in its order considered the evidence, as is duly stated in the order, and believed the version of the respondents on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence. It was the case of the appellants before the Magistrate's Court that the proceedings under which possession was shown to have been handed over to the respondents were fake. This version was rejected by the learned Magistrate. This finding of fact has been upheld by the High Court. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show that this factual conclusion is unsustainable. In my view the finding of fact is based on cogent evidence and which has been appreciated without any defect of misreading or non-reading. It follows that the finding is sacrosanct and could not be disturbed by the High Court. Therefore, the High Court was right in rejecting the revision petition filed by the present appellant.
10. ' In these circumstances, no justification for interference of this Court has been made out. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.