ABDUL RAZZAQ A. THAHIM (CHAIRMAN).---This Review Petition under Order 41, C.P.C., read with Rule 22 of the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974, has been filed by Mr. Riazul Haq, Advocate, in Appeal No, 528(R) of 1996.
2. The relevant facts are that Mr. Muhammad Azim Bhatti, filed Appeal No, 528(R) of 1996 in this Tribunal on 16-10-1996. The same was heard by a Bench of Mr. Muhammad Ismail, now retired, and Mr. Aftab Ahmed, Members. The appeal was dismissed as being time-barred, vide judgment dated 30-1-1997. On getting the judgment, the petitioner has filed this Review Petition on the ground that the judgment was announced after 49 days of the regular hearing of the appeal which is violative of the provisions as contained in Order XLI, Rule 30, C.P.C. and the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case reported as 1996 SCM R 669.
3. It was argued that the representation of the petitioner was rejected by the Department on merits and not on the ground of limitation and, therefore, the dismissal of the appeal by the Tribunal, on limitation, was contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court. It has, however, been prayed that the judgment dated 30-1-1997 may be reviewed and the appeal be decided on merits after rehearing, in the interest of justice. This Review Petition was heard by a Bench of Chairman and Mr. Aftab Ahmed, Member, who was the author of the judgment. Since Mr. Muhammad Ismail has retired, therefore, he could not sit on the Bench.
4. The contentions of Sheikh Riazul Haq, Advocate, are that the very order is void and contrary to the provisions of Order 41, Rule 30, C.PC., and argued that the judgment is to be announced in the open Court.
Therefore, this judgment is not a judgment in the eye of law. He has referred us to the case reported as 1996 SCM R 669.
5. Mr. Khalid Abbas, Federal Counsel, has resisted this application and submitted that this Tribunal cannot review its own judgment except the correction of clerical errors and all these points which are now being argued, the petitioner could challenge them before the Supreme Court. He further argued that in rule 21 of the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974, it has been laid down that as soon as the judgment '3 signed by the members, certified copies thereof be sent to the parties concerned under registered cover, which has been complied with.
6. The petitioner seeks review of the judgment dated 30-1-1997 under rule 22 of the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974, which is as follows: "22. Clerical or arithmetical mistakes arising in an order of final adjudication from any accidental slip or omission may at any time, be corrected by a Tribunal either on its own motion or on an application made by any of the parties:"
This review, in view of rule 22, is not competent and the Supreme Court has also held in several cases that the Tribunal has no power to review its own A order.
7. Now we come to the other grievance of the petitioner that the judgment has been issued after 49 days of the hearing of the appeal. We are constrained to say that the appeals were used to be decided after years and years where the grievances were not brought explicitly and recently this Tribunal has been able to take the responsibility to dispose of the appeals in a regular manner within a span of 60 to 90 days, but in spite of that sometimes delay is occurred beyond the circumstances of the Members. Therefore, this cannot be a ground to rehear the appeal specially when it was open to the petitioner to have challenged the judgment in the Supreme Court. The learned counsel has relied on a case of Syed Iftikhar-ud-Din Haider Gardezi and others v. Central Bank of India Ltd. and reported in 1996 SCM R 669. In this case Their Lordships have said that the delay of over eight months was considered to be objectionable. In the instant case, the delay, as clearly specified in the Review Petition is 49 days which, in our view, is very reasonable. The observations made by Their Lordships in Muhammad Bakhsh's case and reproduced at page 675 of 1996 SCMR are as under:-- "No doubt the judgment was announced one year after it had been reserved but we find that the learned Judge adverted to all the points as mentioned above. Nevertheless it is proper that once the arguments concluded and the judgment reserved, it has to be announced within reasonable period. We are sure that in future no unnecessary delay will take place in announcement of judgments."
8. The learned counsel has mainly relied on Order XLI, Rule 30, C.P.C., whereby the mode of announcement of judgment is stated but the Tribunal, irrespective of having been considered as a Civil Court, has also its own rules for disposal of the appeals and the mode of entertainment of appeals. In this context we refer to rule 21 of the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974, which is as follows:-- "21(1) The Tribunal shall, after the order is signed cause certified copies thereof to be sent under registered cover to the parties concerned and shall deliver a copy to the Secretary, Establishment Division, and the Solicitor, Law Division.
(2) Any party to the appeal may obtain additional copies of the order on payment of such legal fees as the Tribunal may from time to time fix."
9. In our view, when there is no provision in the rules then the procedure as laid down in the C.P.C. is to be followed. Rule 21 of the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974, provides a specific procedure and this rule is being followed continuously and the judgments are being sent under registered cover to the parties concerned as also to the Establishment Division, therefore, we feel that there is no illegality in the procedure and the said provisions of C.P.C. are not strictly applicable. Even otherwise a procedural infirmity cannot converse the judgment as void.
10.The learned counsel has also referred us to the judgment of the Supreme Court with regard to the point of limitation. There is no second thought and it is clear that, under the Constitution, all the judgments of the Supreme Court are binding upon the Courts and the Tribunal, nevertheless, in the instant case no deviation has been made when the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation. There is a unanimous view of the learned Bench that the appeal was time-barred and if the petitioner was aggrieved by the judgment of the Tribunal then it was open to him to have gone in appeal before the Supreme Court which he perhaps evaded just to avoid from the limitation.
11.For the reasons stated hereinabove we are of the view that this Review Petition is not competent and as such it is dismissed.