This order will dispose of the writ petitions mentioned above as all of them have arisen out of the common grounds which require consolidated decision.
2. The brief facts leading to the above Constitutional petitions are that three recovery suits were filed by the plaintiff/respondent No.1 against the petitioner/defendant and others. Suit No.257/1 of 1991 for the recovery of Rs.50,000 was decreed on 17-1-1993. A petition for review was filed by the petitioner/defendant and his eo-defendants `under section 114, C.P.C. For the review of the impugned decree,: The aforesaid petition for review was dismissed on 5-6-1995. A revision was filed against the impugned judgment and decree and against the order dismissing the review petition which too was dismissed on 12-6-1998 by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore.
Likewise, Writ Petition No.25771 of 1998 was filed against the decree of the suit in Civil Suit No.258 of 1991 for the recovery of Rs.40,000 and Writ Petition No.25777 of 1998 dealt with the suit in which the decree was granted for the recovery of Rs.60,000 against the petitioner/defendant and his co- defendants. All the three suits though decided and decreed through separate judgments by the learned trial Court but contained common questions of law and facts for decision. The review petitions filed against the impugned decrees of the suits were also dismissed on the same date i.e. 5-6-1995, whereas the revision petitions against such dismissal of the review petition and against the impugned judgment and. Decrees were dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge vide his order, dated 12-6-1998.
3. The brief facts are that all the three suits are based upon separate agreements entered into between the respondent No.1/plaintiff and the petitioner/defendant and his co-defendants representing Fair Houses (Pvt.) Ltd. Through its Managing Director Major (R) Muhammad Saeed Tiwana i.e. One of the respondents/defendants and the other defendants who were the Directors of the said company. The respondent/plaintiff invested the aforesaid amounts and the petitioner/defendant obtained the aforesaid money as short term loan at rate of 36 % to 48 % per annum for the actual period for which the amount would remain invested with them vide separate agreements specifying the aforesaid rates of profit., The suits for recovery were contested primarily on the ground that the advancing of money at the exorbitant rate of profit would amount to "money lending" and as such, the same was allegedly barred by West Pakistan Money-Lenders'
Ordinance (XXIV of 1960). In this respect, reference was made to section 10 saying that no suit would be competent if the money lender was not in possession of a valid licence issued under the Ordinance. Secondly, it was contended that suit was barred by time and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter as its jurisdiction was barred by the provisions of Company Ordinance. Lastly, it was contended that the money taken as loan had already been paid back and as such, there was no cause of action left with the plaintiff/ respondent. The learned trial Court came to the conclusion on the aforesaid controversial points that there was nothing on record to establish that the respondent/plaintiff was a money lender, nor the same was so alleged by the Managing Director of Messrs Fair Houses (Pvt.) Ltd. Which had entered into an agreement for obtaining the loan to run its business. The suit was also held to be within time as the agreement initially executed was later on extended which also enlarged the limitation period. It was further found that the amount in question was yet due which the petitioner/defendants and co- defendants were bound to pay. The suits were accordingly decreed. Instead of filing the appeal against the aforesaid order, a review petition was filed which too was dismissed as pointed out above on the ground that there was nothing which may call for reconsideration of the judgments already pronounced in the connected suits. A revision petition was filed to challenge the order decreeing the suit as well as the order whereby, the review petition was dismissed. As already said, the aforesaid revision against the decrees and dismissal of the review petition was also dismissed.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that all the Courts below acted illegally by ignoring the provisions contained in West Pakistan Money Lenders' Ordinance, 1960 which expressly excluded the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any suit without a valid licence under the Ordinance ibid. Secondly, it was contended that there was no limitation for the review petition if the order in question was nullity and without jurisdiction in the eyes of law. It was further contended that not only the order of the trial Court was bad in the eyes of law but that of the revisional Court was without jurisdiction in upholding the decree passed by the learned trial Court. Reliance was placed on Naim Muhammad Khan v. Barkatullah PLJ 1993 Lah. 149, 1992 SCM R 1898; (Supreme Court of Pakistan), Roshan Din v. Fateh Din and another 1993 CLC 228, Naseem Ahmad and another v. Air Botswa na (Pvt.) Ltd. And others 1993 SCM R 647, Syed Arif Shah v. Abdul Hakeem Qureshi PLD 1991 SC 905, Siraj Din v. Sultan and others PLD 1990 SC 95, Sikandar Abdul Karim v. The State 1998 SCM R 908 (Supreme Court of Pakistan), Suba through Legal Heirs v. Fatima Bibi through legal heirs and others 1996 SCM R 158 (Supreme Court of Pakistan) and Samar Gul v. Central Government and others PLJ 1986 SC 1.
5. The authorities cited above were relied upon to show that the impugned judgments and decree passed by the learned trial Court were without jurisdiction and that the dismissal of the review petition on merit viz-a-viz limitation was also bad in the eyes of law and as such, both the Courts below had committed gross illegality which ought to be undone in these Constitutional petitions.
6. 1 have considered the foregoing contentions raised at the Bar and have also gone through the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is an admitted fact that the parties had entered into an agreement whereby the respondent/plaintiff had agreed to invest the money which was required and demanded by the petitioner/defendant who had been running a registered company known as Messrs Fair Houses (Pvt.) Ltd. The agreement was entered into by the Managing Director of the aforesaid company and the remaining respondents/defendants in these petitions were the Directors of that concern. It is, thus, obvious that the agreement aforementioned was entered into between the parties. According to it, one party had agreed to advance money for the promotion of business of the company of the petitioner/defendant and his co--defendants who were carrying on the business of construction of houses. The petitioner/defendant agreed to pay specified and fixed rate of profit on annual basis out of the money, they would earn from the business. It is thus, obvious that it was a trade agreement between the two parties which contained stipulations in respect of receipt of money, its investment and the actual return of profit to the investor. There is nothing in the agreement itself that the amount was advanced for any money laundering or that the creditor was dealing in money lending. The agreement is totally silent on this point. Even the Managing Director of the Company who had appeared as his sole witness as D. W.1 in the Court below did not say a single word that in fact the respondent/plaintiff was a money lender. In such a situation, the learned trial Court had rightly held that it was not money laundering or money lending by a person dealing in money lending. The license under the Money Lending Ordinance was only required if a person was lending money to different persons and was carrying on business as such. However, whenever two parties enter into a business contract for the A benefit of both the sides, it cannot be said.That it was a money lending. The petitioner/defendant and his co-defendants were also party to the aforesaid agreement and if it was money lending transaction, they were themselves pari delicto and could not turn around to say that they were dealing with some money lender. They had entered in a contract with a private person in a private capacity to promote their trade. The question of limitation was also adequately dealt with by the Courts below as the agreements were duly renewed on 10-5-1988 and from that date, the limitation period stood extended as it would restart from the date of renewal. The suits were filed in the Court below on 9-5-1991 which were well within time i.e. Within three years and as such were not time-barred. It was rightly so held by the Courts below.
7.In view of the above discussion, it follows that the money was advanced under a free and legal agreement entered into between the parties and the suits for recovery were based on the original agreement which were later on renewed as stated above. The suits having been filed within. Time and the money having been found due from the petitioner/defendant and his co-defendants, the Courts below rightly granted the decrees in favour of the respondent/plaintiff in all the three suits.
8. Instead of availing appeal as a normal remedy, the petitioner/defendant filed a review petition.
The perusal of the review petition would show that the same points were raised which were raised before the trial Court and for which the issues had already been framed and answered in impugned judgments. There was no fresh or new ground so as to call for the review of the impugned judgments passed by the trial Court. Nothing was brought on record to show that in fact, there was some latent or patent defect either in the impugned judgments and decrees or that some fresh evidence or material had come to light which was not available at the time when the decrees were passed. In such a situation, the petitioner/defendant and his codefendants could not take advantage by filing the review petition which h a very limited scope for interference and that too to rectify and mistake apparent on its face or if some C material evidence has not been taken into consideration or has been totally ignored while passing the judgments. There was no such lacuna in the impugned judgments of the trial Court, therefore, the review petition was right".
Dismissed. The revisional Court also by affirming the judgments of the trial Court did not commit any illegality to dismiss the review petitions.
9.In view of my above discussion, I am of the firm view that the trial Court had rightly exercised the jurisdiction vested in it in dismissing all the three suits, the review petition being misconceived was also rightly dismissed and the revisional Court by maintaining the impugned judgmetus did not commit any illegality, therefore, the petitioner/defendant and his co-defendants have no case p for interference in these Constitutional petitions which are accordingly dismissed in limine.