Inayat Ali respondent an employee of Pakistan Engineering Co. Ltd., Kotlakhpat, Lahore. The appellant, was dismissed from service on the charges of misconduct on 7th November 1973. He challenged the order of his dis--missal and sought re-instatement by filing an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 against the appellant before Junior Court No. 2. Lahore. His petition was dismissed for default on 19th July, 1974. He filed a restoration application on 25th November 1774 wherein he pleaded that he could not appear on '9th July 1974 on account of his illness.
2. This application was opposed by the appellant who pleaded that in the absence of the excuse for the restoration application which was otherwise hopelessly barred by time.
3. The learned Court below however by its order, dated 14-1-1975 restored the respondents case accepting his restoration application. This order, dated 14-1-1975 of the learned Court below has been impugned, through the present appeal, by the appellant.
4. I have carefully gone through the records of the case and the parties have been heard at a considerable length. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the impugned order being an interim order was not appealable. It is provided in section 36-D (1) of the I. R. O. that any party aggrieved by a decision of a Junior Labour Court under section 36-B may prefer an appeal to Labour Court within the 15 days of the delivery thereof and that decision of Labour Court on such appeal shall be final. 'This shows that any decision by a Junior Labour Court under section 36-B is appealable under section 36-D. It is not stated is section 316-D (1) that appeal to Labour Court would be in respect of a final decision of a Junior Labour Court. This omission on the part of the Legislature appears to be intentional and it would thus follow that any decision by a Junior Labour Court under section 36-B whether interim or final is appealable. In M. O. Bhasha v. Sind Labour Court No. 3 (1) it has been held by the Sind & Baluchistan High Court that the expression "a decision" is not qualified by any word of limita--tion to give to it restricted meanings as one on merits. It is well accepted principle of interpretation that the word should be given its ordinary meaning unless the contents so restricts. It was therefore concluded that an order passed by Junior Labour Court dismissing an application under section 2S-A for non-appearance falls within the meaning of a decision and was appealable under section 36-D (1).
5. In the light of what has been said above, it is concluded that the impugned order whereby the learned Junior Labour Court has restored the respondent's case which was dismissed for default is appealable being a decision within the meaning of section 36-D (PLD 1975 Kar. 57).
6. As regards the merits of the appeal the respondent's case was dis--missed for default on 19th July, 1974. He filed an application for the restora--tion of the same on 25th November, 1974.
Alongwith restoration application the respondent enclosed 2 photostat copies of Medical certificates date 21st August, 1974 and 23rd November 1974, contents whereof indicate that the Doctor who issued the original of these photostat certified that the respon--dent bad been getting treatment from 2nd June, 1974 to 21st August, 1974 and from 26th August, 1974 to 23rd November, 1974. The Doctor who issued the certificates has not been produced to formally prove the certificates. The originals have also not been produced. The learned Court below has erred in relying on these certificates without the originals having been formally proved by the Doctor, who issued the certificates. Needless to add that Medical Certificates are not legally admissible in evidence without formal proof. The production of the Doctor was all the more necessary in view of the fact that the appellant had contended that the certificates were subsequen--tly fabricated to support the plea of sickness and were not genuine it is also noteworthy that in this case the respondent had filed an application under section 25-A of the I. R. O. before the Junior Labour Court through his counsel Capt. Habibullah, Advocate. There is nothing on records to suggest as to why the said learned counsel was not present on 19th July, 1974 when the cash was dismissed for default and under what circumstances the said counsel was debarred from filing an application for restoration within then prescribed period of limitation, even if his client wag ill. The photostat copies of the A-Medical Certificates on which the lower Court has placed reliance do not indicate that the respondent remained confined to the bed throughout from 2nd June, 1974 to 23rd November 1974, and was not able to file the restoration application.
7. In the light of what has been said above, we conclude that the learned lower Court was not justified in restoring the respondent's case. We would accordingly accept the appeal, set aside the impugned order and dismiss the respondent's application for the restoration of his case.