' MUHAMMAD BASHIR JEHANGIRI, J.---We propose to dispose of the two titled appeals by this common judgment as not only factual background is common but the questions of law involved are also identical.
2. The facts forming the background of these two appeals are that in the year 1958. Ch. Ghulam Rasool Tarar was allotted 25 acres of land in Chak No, 94-P, Tehsil and District Rahimyar Khan. On 7-5-1974 he exchanged his land with an equivalent area of State land situated in Chak No,20, Tehsil Phalia now in District Mandi Bahauddin. Out of the 25 acres of land left by Ch. Ghulam Rasul Tarar in exchange, 12-1/2 acres situate in Tehsil Sadiqabad was allotted to each of the appellants under the Sadiqabad Oustees Scheme by virtue of registered agreements dated 5-11-1977 and allotment orders dated 16-11-1977. Accordingly each of the appellants not only deposited the stipulated 1/10th price as the first instalment but were also delivered the possession of the land on 15-1-1977. In the meantime, in the wake of Martial Law of 5th July, 1977, M.L.O. No, l4 (Zone A) was promulgated whereunder Ch. Ghulam Rasul was served with a notice by the. Board of Revenue, Punjab, as to why exchange deed dated 7-5-1974, whereby he was allowed to take 25 acres of land in Tehsil Phalia, be not cancelled on the allegation that it had been obtained on exerting political influence. In response to the aforementioned notice, Ch. Ghulam Rasool Tarar appeared before the Board of Revenue and offered to relinquish the land in Tehsil Phalia and revert to his own land in Sadiqabad Tehsil. In consequence, the Board of Revenue by its order dated 17-8-1978 cancelled the exchanged transaction dated 7-5-1974 and directed him to resume his proprietary land in Sadiqabad. This order was, however, without any notice or intimation to the appellant Aggrieved by these orders the appellants challenged them in the Constitutional jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench seeking annulment of the impugned orders of cancellation of the exchange of land in their possession. A learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court who was seized of the matters by the orders dated 22-5-1979 dismissed them, in limine, on the ground that the appellants could not satisfy him that- "the communication dated 15-11-1978 impugned before him is not in the nature of a prejudicial order. The order is not a warrant of dispossession and there is nothing to prevent him from approaching the respondent No,2 that he has a right to retain possession of the land and to have the order dated 15-11-1978 modified or reversed if he can establish a superior right. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that the petitioner has any superior right."
' To the comment, the learned counsel conceded that the petitioner was not a necessary party to the proceedings under M.L.O.No,14 and that the order annulling exchange in favour of Ch. Ghulam Rasool Tarar was valid, it is difficult to imagine how it could be open to him to support any claim to land. Such a plea is contradiction in terms."
"10. The learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to satisfy him that in issuing the impugned order dated 15-11-1978 the Board of Revenue condemned the petitioner unheard or even the fact that the order is prejudicial to him in. The sense that it has put him in a worse position than he would have been had the impugned order not been passed."
3. These orders were challenged in the two I.C.A.s. The learned Division Bench who was seized of the I.C.As. Almost, reiterated word by word the reasoning reproduced above in the impugned orders and dismissed the two I.C.As.
4. Leave to appeal was granted to consider whether the appellants under Colonization of Government Lands. (Punjab) Act, 1912, who had been delivered possession after payment of the required portion of sale price and who were not alleged to have committed any breach of the condition of allotment, were not vested with any right of being heard before cancellation of their allotment and further whether the allothees were necessary party to the proceedings before the Board of Revenue and were entitled to be given an opportunity of being heard.
5. Ch. Muhammad Ashraf, Advocate Supreme Court in support of these appeals contended, firstly, that allottee under the Colonization of Government Lands (Punjab) Act. 1912, who had been delivered possession after payment of the required instalments of sale price and who is not alleged to have committed any breach of the conditions was vested with a right to be afforded an opportunity of hearing before cancellation of his allotment and secondly, that the appellants as allottees and successors in interest of the Provincial Government were necessary party in the proceedings before the Board of Revenue and, that in any case, were at least entitled to an opportunity of hearing as affected persons under the principle of natural justice "audi alteram partem".
6. Conversely Ch. Muhammad Akram, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for respondents Nos.4 to 9 while opposing these appeals has adopted the reasoning reproduced in para.2 ante which weighted with the learned Single Judge as also the learned Division Bench in the High Court in dismissing the writ petitions and the I.C.As. Giving rise to the titled appeals.
7. The learned Single Judge while disposing of the writ petitions and the learned Division Bench seized of the I.C.As. There against, to say the least, have absolutely gone astray in holding that the orders impugned in the writ petitions before them are "not in the nature of prejudicial orders" and further "that the orders are not a warrant of dispossession". It is very strange that the appellants have been deprived of their allotted land measuring 12-1/2 acres each still the learned Judges, have termed them in the impugned orders, "to be not in the nature of prejudicial orders" We wonder what other prejudicial orders could have been passed against the appellants if the impugned orders were not.So. The next ground that the impugned orders are not tantamount to "Warrant of dispossession" would not disentitle the appellants from the right to show cause as to why the land allotted to them is not resumed after cancellation. As the appellants had already approached the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction there was no palpable justification or legal requirement to approach respondent No,2 who had passed the impugned orders against the appellants and which had been challenged before the High Court. Conceding for a while that there was nothing to prevent the appellants from approaching respondent No,2 to assert that they had a right to retain possession of the land and to have the impugned order dated 15-11-1978 modified or reversed if they could establish their superior right is not enough of a reason to deprive the appellants from showing cause against the cancellation of the impugned allotment orders. The so-called concession allegedly made by the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants were not necessary party to the proceedings under M.L.O. No, 14 and that the order of annulment of exchange made that Ghulam Rasool Tarar was valid still it is difficult to imagine how it could deprive the appellants from showing cause against the cancellation. This plea was, therefore, not at all contradictory in terms. It appears that the learned Single Judge and the learned Division Bench to say the least were bent upon passing the impugned orders, and therefore, the principle of natural justice was conveniently trampled while passing the impugned order by the learned Single Judge and the affirmance thereof by the learned Division Bench in the I.C.As. Giving rise to these appeals.
8. The legal proposition is by now well-settled that wherever any person or body of person is empowered to take decision particularly disposing of the controversy like the one herein by the Board of Revenue which had definitely affected prejudicially the person, property or other right of another person, then in the absence of any express words in the enactment giving such powers even excluding the application of the principle of natural justice, the Courts of law are inclined generally to imply that the powers so given coupled with the duty to act in accordance with such principle of natural justice as may be applicable in the facts and circumstances of given case are available. (See The University of Dacca through its Vice-Chancellor and another v. Zakir Ahmed (PLD 1965 SC 90).
9. On merits, the point raised in the writ petitions, thus, falls within the principle laid down by this Court in the case of Dina Sohrab Katrak (PLD 1959 SC 45) and the case of University of Dacca v.
Zakir Ahmed (Supra). The impugned orders of the Board of Revenue and those of the High Court maintaining the impugned orders cancelling allotment of land to the appellants without either impleading them as a party or hearing them cannot, therefore, be upheld.
10. In the result the appeals are allowed, the judgments of the High Court are set aside and it is declared that the impugned orders dated 22-5-1979 passed by the learned Single Judge; those dated 17-9-1997 passed by the I.C.A. Bench and those passed by the Board of Revenue dated 17-8- 1978 were without lawful authority, and were of no legal effect. The cases are remanded to respondent No,2 (Board of Revenue) with the direction to implead the appellants as party to the proceedings giving rise to these appeals and after hearing the parties give the decision afresh in accordance with law. The costs to follow the event.