' Petitioners, instituted suit on 12-9-1995 in the Court of Illaqa Qazi in respect of suit property claiming their right of pre-emption over it.
2. The learned trial Judge on 14-7-1996 directed the plaintiffs-petitioners, who had not by then deposited 1/3rd of the sale price, to deposit the same before 22-9-1996. On the same date defendants-respondents filed an application for the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs-petitioners have failed to comply with the provisions of section 24(1) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre- emption Act.
3. On 22-9-1996, thepetitioners filed reply to the application 'b1 the respondents but did not *mit 1/3rd of the sale price. They challenged the, contents of the application and their stand was that the trial Court has not directed them to deposit I/3rd of the sale price: Arguments on the application were heard and the learned Illaqa Qazi vide order dated 26-9-1996 dismissed the suit on two grounds, firstly, on the ground of non-deposit of 1/3rd of sale price as required under section 24(1) of the Pre-emption Act and secondly, on the ground of limitation where it was held that the suit was not filed within 120 days as required under section 31(A) of the Act (ibid).
4. Aggrieved from the order, the petitioners filed an appeal which came up for hearing on 10-7-1997 when the Appellate Judge upheld the order of the learned trial Court to the extent of non-deposit of 1/3rd of the sale price but partially accepted the appeal by holding that the suit was filed within time.
' The finding of the Appellate Judge has now been challenged in revision by the plaintiffs- petitioners.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that it was the boundened duty of the trial Court to have specified/determined 1/3rd of the sale consideration and it was thereafter that the petitioner was to deposit the said amount. He has referred to order sheet dated 14-7-1996 and submitted that undetermined and vague direction about the deposit of 1/3rd "Zar-e-Soem" was not in accordance with section 24 of the Act. He further submitted that the application filed by the respondents for the dismissal of the suit on which the petitioners were non-suited was contested by filing a reply and it was, therefore, for the trial Court to have extended the time for the deposit of 1/3rd of the sale consideration instead of accepting the application. He also submitted that the time could have been extended even by the Appellate Judge. He was of the view that under section 24 of the Act there is no bar on the power of the Court to extend the time for such deposit.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand argued that the petitioners from day one have not deposited 1/3rd of the sale price and when the case was transferred from the hierarchy of PATA Regulation to the regular Court, the respondents have rightly made an application for the dismissal of the suit on the ground of failure of the plaintiffs-pre-emptors. He submitted that the trial Court in its own discretion gave more than two months' time to the plaintiff for deposit of 1/3rd of the amount which money was never deposited and, therefore, the suit has rightly been dismissed.
7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the record is clear on the point that till date the suit was dismissed not only that the petitioners have not deposited 1/3rd of the sale consideration but has never asked the trial stage to specify the amount as ordered on 11-7-1996. The ambiguity, if any, would have been, thus, resolved. The petitioners in their plaint have given the sale consideration as Rs,3,00,000 whereas deposited 6 of the plaint they challenged the sale consideration entered between the vendor and the vendee to be Rs,6,00,000. Even then the petitioners were bound to have deposited 1/3rd of Rs,3,00,000 as admitted by them.
' As to the extension of time by the trial Court or by the Appellate Judge, the petitioners have never applied to the trial Judge for such extension.
' Otherwise too, in view of a judgment of Division Bench of this Court reported as Wahid Bakhsh v.
Abdul Qayum 1997 M LD 2945, the trial Court can fix a time keeping in view circumstances of the case but would not be competent to allow extension.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners had also argued that if power of extension of time is not available under section 24 of the Pre-emption Act, but by virtue of section 34 of the Act, C.P.C. Has been made mutatis mutandi applicable to the proceedings under Pre-emption Act, therefore, under section 148 of the C.P.C. The time could have been extended.
' Answer to the above submission is again given in the case of Wahid Bakhsh (supra) where it was held that Pre-emption Act being special law would prevail over the provisions of C.P.C. Which is the general law.
' Keeping in view the legal provision as enumerated above and the conduct of the plaintiffs- petitioners, who wanted to enforce their pre-emption right but have utterly failed to discharge their liability, therefore, suit was rightly dismissed and so was appeal. This revision having no merits is, therefore, dismissed.