1. ' KAMAL MANSUR ALAM, C J.--By this judgment we propose to dispose of Constitutional Petitions Nos.
2. D-797 of 1998 and D-872 of 1998 as the facts and question of law involved in both are common, ' These petitions call into question the authority of the respondent No,2 to write the letter dated 6- 11-1997 to the "Switzerland's Federal Department of Justice and Police" in particular and generally his authority to approach the Swiss Authorities for legal proceedings against the petitioners arising out of the alleged charges of corruption. It may be stated that though in the petitions the authority of the respondents to approach other foreign countries for such proceedings has been assailed but at the hearing the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners confined themselves to challenge the authority of the Attorney-General to write the impugned letter and the proceedings initiated by the Swiss Courts and authorities allegedly on the basis of that letter.
3. ' When these petitions came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court on 29-7-1998 the Attorney-General for Pakistan being also respondent No,2 was not present and on his behalf adjournment was sought by the Deputy Attorney-General. The Court while granting adjournment restrained the respondents in Petition No,D-797/98 from, "directly and indirectly pursuing and corresponding with respect to indictment of the petitioner in the Court outside the country till next date," and in Petition No,D-872 of 1998 from, "corresponding further against the petitioner in respect of indictment proceedings initiated at the request of respondent No,3 through respondent No,2 till the next date." Against the ad interim orders, the respondents filed petitions in the Supreme Court for leave to appeal and in these petitions stay applications were also moved which were disposed of by a consent Order dated 7-8-1998, whereby hearing of the present petitions was to be taken up by this Court from 18-8-1998 and disposed of within seven days leaving the ad interim order impugned in the Supreme Court in effect till the disposal of these petitions by this Court. The petitions came up for hearing in the usual course on 11-8-1998 when a copy of the Supreme Court's said order was placed before us with a request that these may be taken up for hearing on 18-8- 1998. Accordingly, in terms of the Supreme Court order, the ad interim orders were extended till the disposal of the petitions and the petitions were adjourned for 18-8-1998. However, on 18-8-1998, the learned counsel for the petitioners sought two days' adjournment on the ground that the respondent No,3 had filed his counter-affidavit alongwith several additional documents and copy of these had not been supplied to the petitioners' counsel three clear days before the date of hearing, as directed by the Supreme Court. With a view to accommodate petitioners' counsel and to give them three clear days' time to examine the counter-affidavit and the additional documents and to file rejoinder, if any, the case was adjourned for 19-8-1998. On 19-8-1998, counsel for the petitioners filed rejoinder affidavit copy whereof was supplied to the learned Attorney-General. The arguments commenced on 19-8-1998 and continued from day to day till 1-9-1998 when these petitions were dismissed by a short order. These are the reasons for that order.
4. ' Before going to the merits of the case we propose to take up the two preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents, the first pertaining to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the other about the delay in the filing of the petitions, as, these go to the root of the case.
5. ' It was submitted by Mr. Chaudhry Muhammad Farooq, the learned Attorney-General for Pakistan, that the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was subject to the condition that the impugned act was done within the territorial limits of the High Court where it is challenged. Here, it was urged that, both, he and respondent No,3 have their offices at Islamabad and it is there that they perform their functions, except when he has to appear in Courts elsewhere. The impugned letter too, he said, was written at and dispatched from his office at Islamabad, and therefore, these petitions wherein in substance the authority of the Attorney-General to write that letter has been called into question are not maintainable in this Court. In support of the proposition, reference was made to the cases of The Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 1997 SC 334 and Abdul Ghaffar Lakhani v. Federal Government of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1986 Kar.
6. 525.
7. ' Opposing the objection, Mr. Abdul Hafeez Lakho and Mr. K.M. Nadeem, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the acts of persons performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation and exercising authority throughout Pakistan can be challenged under Article 199(1)
8. (a)(i) and (ii) of the Constitution of the Pakistan in any of the High Courts in Pakistan and it was only when such person was exercising authority for a limited area that the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over the area, could be approached. In any case, they said that the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction persons are affected by such acts will have jurisdiction to entertain petition under the Article. It was, therefore, argued that in any of the two situations this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition as the Attorney-General who wrote the impugned letter is performing function in connection with the affairs of the Federation for the whole of Pakistan and the petitioners who have been affected by that letter ordinarily reside at Karachi. The learned counsel placed reliance on the cases of Asghar Hussain v. Election Commission Pakistan and others PLD 1968 SC 387; Messrs Al-Iblagh Limited, Lahore v. The Copyright Board, Karachi and others 1985 SCMR 758.
9. ' In the first case, the election to a Provincial Assembly seat in the then East Pakistan was challenged by the appellant therein by a petition under the President's Order 13 of 1962, Settlement of Disputes (First Election) Order 1962 which was accepted by the Tribunal holding that the entire election was liable to be declared void and to be set aside but appellant's prayer for being declared successful was rejected. The two respondents in that case approached the Dacca High Court under Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan for the quashment of the order of Tribunal. Both the petitions were, however, dismissed and thereupon the appellant moved the Election Commission to disqualify the respondent No,3 from being or being elected member of National Assembly under Article 77 of the President's Order 4 of 1962 but when the Commission did not take any action for quite some time, the petitioner approached the Dacca High Court, inter alia, seeking disqualification of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 from participating in the election etc. At the hearing, objection was taken about the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue any writ to the Election Commission under Article 98(2)(a)(i) of the 1962 Constitution as it did not perform any function in the then Province of East Pakistan in connection with the affairs of the Central Government. The objection found favour with the High Court, which observed that We are, therefore, of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to ask for issuing the directions upon the Election Commission from this Court". The judgment of the High Court was challenged in the Supreme Court. On the point of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has observed that: "It was urged that the Election Commission does not perform its functions 'in the Province' of East Pakistan implying thereby territorial limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 98 of the Constitution. The relevant words are: 'performed in the Province'. The Central Ministries as well as many Departments of the Central Government are located in Islamabad or at Rawalpindi. Nevertheless they perform functions in both the Provinces in connection with the affairs of the Centre, such as, Defence of Pakistan, External Affairs, Insurance, Copyright, Patent, Design, Air Navigation, Mineral, Oil and Natural Gas, Metrology, National Libraries and Museums, election to the Office of President, National Assembly and to the Provincial Assemblies, etc. Many Central Government Departments have their regional offices in either Province, such as Election Commission and their personnels perform functions there in connection with the affairs of the Central Government. Could it be said that the orders made or proceedings taken by these departments are not subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court of that Province because the main offices of the Ministries and the Departments of the Central Government are not situated within the territories over which the High Court of East Pakistan exercised its jurisdiction. It will be useful in this connection to compare the provisions of Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution with section 223-A of the Government of India Act and Article 170 of the 1956 Constitution.
10. ' Section 223-A which for the first time conferred writ jurisdiction on the various High Courts in Pakistan provided that: 'Every High Court shall have power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases any Government within those territories writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them.'
11. ' Similarly Article 170 of the 1956 Constitution enacted that: 'Notwithstanding anything in Article 22, each High Court shall have the power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part II and for any other purpose.'
12. ' The words which limited the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 223-A were 'any person or authority... ... ..Within those territories' namely in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Under Article 170 the limits were imposed by the words: 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction'. On the contrary under Article 98 the governing words are: 'performed in Province in connection with the affairs of the Centre, the Province or a local authority'. Under section 223-A the person to whom a writ could be issued should have been a resident within those territories in relation to which the High Court exercised jurisdiction. These limitations were, however, done away with in the 1962 Constitution presumably for the reasons that while under the 1956 Constitution the Supreme Court had concurrent jurisdiction with the High Courts to issue writs, the 1962 Constitution took away that jurisdiction and but for this arrangement the citizens of East Pakistan would have been denied the remedy provided by Article 98 of the Constitution in respect of orders made and proceedings taken, etc., by persons performing in that Province function in connection with the affairs of the Centre."
13. ' The relevant facts of the second case, as can be gathered from the report, were, that the appellant, therein applied to the Registrar of Copyrights, Karachi, for registration of a series of cassettes entitled "Paigham-e-Qur'an Cassettes Series" which the appellant's Managing Director had prepared from pre-recorded tapes of the sermons of Maulana Maudoodi, respecting Tafseer of eleven Surahs of the Holy Qur'an. The application for registration was dismissed, whereupon the appellant preferred an appeal under section 76 of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962, before the Copyright Board, Karachi. The hearings of the appeal, on the request of the parties and for the convenience of the three Members of the Board who hailed from Lahore and Rawalpindi, took place at Lahore, but final order dismissing the appeal was announced at Karachi. The appellant company challenged the said order of the Board in a Constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court which was dismissed by a learned Judge on the ground that the Lahore High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition because the office of the Registrar and the Copyright Board was located at Karachi. The record of the case, which the appellant wanted to be examined was also in Karachi and, therefore, applying the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Deputy Managing Director, National Bank of Pakistan v. Attaul Haq PLD 1965 SC 201 held that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The appellant then filed an Intra-Court Appeal before a Division Bench of that High Court which too was dismissed and consequently, the appellant therein filed appeal in the Supreme Court, which was allowed. While recording the opinion for the Court Nasim Hasan Shah, J. (as he then was) made the following observation on the question of Constitutional jurisdiction:-- "A perusal of the provisions of the Copyright Act shows that the Copyright Board, as also the Registrar of the Copyrights, exercise jurisdiction throughout Pakistan. According to section 45 of the Copyrights Act the Central Government shall constitute a Copyright Board and its members shall be--
(i) a Chairman appointed by the Central Government;
(ii) not less than three and not more than five other members appointed by the Central Government after consultation with the representative bodies of authors, publishers, cinematography industry and any other interest relating to copyright: ' Provided that 'adequate representation on the Board shall, as far as possible, be given to the residents of each Province; and
(iii) the Registrar, ex officio'. (Underlining is ours).
14. ' The Board, according to section 46, shall have power to regulate its own procedure, including the fixing of place of its sittings. It can, thus sit in any part of the country and appeals against its decision, in cases not decided by it on appeal, under section 76 of the Ordinance can be preferred to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the appellant actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.
15. ' Thus, the Board is to be constituted by the Central Government which will exercise jurisdiction in all parts of the country. Its members will belong, as far as possible, to all the Provinces of the country and its sittings can be held in every part of the country. Again, its orders, except those passed by it in its appellate capacity, can be appealed to in the High Court where the appellant resides and carries on his business. Thus, if in this case the impugned order of the Board was not passed in its appellate capacity but in its original capacity, the appellant herein could undoubtedly have filed an appeal before the Lahore High Court, because he admittedly resides and carries on business at Lahore. But it has. Been found by the High Court that the same appellant cannot approach the Lahore High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction. Such an incongruous conclusion cannot easily be acceded to unless the words of the Constitutional provision yielded no other interpretation.
16. ' We do not think that this is so.
17. ' While dealing with a somewhat similar situation, this Court was called upon to examine the terms of Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution (which are similar in the relevant regard to those of Article 9 of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981 in Asghar Hussain v. Election Commissioner, Pakistan and others PLD 1988 SC 387. In this case, the East Pakistan High Court had held that the said High Court could not exercise jurisdiction with regard to the decisions of the Election Commission of Pakistan as the said body was not located in nor performed its function in the Province of the East Pakistan and, therefore, the East Pakistan High Court was precluded on account of territorial limitations, from exercising jurisdiction in connection with orders passed by it. While rejecting this contention it was observed by this Court that:- 'The plain meaning of the words 'a person performing in the Province functions in connection with the affairs of the Central excludes territorial limitations such as, that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue writs must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories.' (Underlining is ours).
18. ' It explained that:-- 'The Central Ministries as well as many Departments of the Central Government are located in Islamabad or at Rawalpindi. Nevertheless they perform functions in both the Province in connection with the affairs for the Centre, such as, Defence of Pakistan, External Affairs, Insurance, Copyright Patent Design.... ... " (Underlining is ours). ' and found that the orders made or proceedings taken by the said Departments in connection with the affairs of the Central Government but having effect on parties in East Pakistan would be subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court of that Province.
19. ' The rules laid down in the said case would, we think, be applicable also in the circumstances of this case. The Central Government has set up a Copyright Board for the whole of Pakistan and it performs functions in relation to the affairs of the Federation in all the Provinces. Hence, any order passed by it or proceedings taken by it in relation to any person in any of the four Provinces of Pakistan would give the High Court of the Province, in whose territory the order would affect such a person, jurisdiction to hear the case.
20. ' The learned Deputy Attorney-General, Mr. Munir A. Sheikh, who appeared on behalf of the respondent-Copyright Board, supported this interpretation of the Constitutional provision in question and submitted that the writ petition filed by the appellant before the Lahore High Court should not have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the said High Court, as it also had jurisdiction to entertain it, concurrently with the Sindh High Court.
21. ' We agree and are of the opinion that both the Lahore High Court as well as the Sindh High Court had concurrent jurisdiction in the matter and both the Courts could have entertained a writ petition against the impugned orders in the circumstances of this case. We, therefore, hold that the Lahore High Court has illegally refused to exercise jurisdiction in this case."
22. ' In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned Attorney-General and that of the learned counsel for the petitioners it will be useful to reproduce here Article 199(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Constitution of Pakistan: "199(1).--Subject to the Constitution, A High Court may, if it is satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law--
(a) on the application of any aggrieved party, make an order--
(i) directing a person performing, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority, to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do, or to do anything he is required by law to do; . Or
(ii) declaring that any act done or proceeding taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect, of............
23. ' In the above provision the words "within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court" evidently, on a plain reading, govern the preceding words "any act done or proceeding taken" and have obviously been incorporated with the intention of confining the scope of exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court thereunder to such acts or proceeding only as are done or taken within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. Such intention can also be gathered from the fact that in Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution, from where the language of Article 199 seems to have been lifted, did not have this restrictive condition. The effect of absence of such condition has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Asghar Hussain's case while comparing the provisions of Article 98 with those of section 223-A of the Government of India Act and Article 170 of the 1956 Constitution where somewhat similar restrictions found mention, in the following words, which for the sake of convenience may be reproduced again:-- "The words which limited the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 223-A were 'any person or authority... ... ..Within those territories' namely in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. Under Article 170 the limits were imposed by the words: 'throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction'. On the contrary under Article 98 the governing words are: 'performed in Province in connection with the affairs of the Centre, the Province or a local authority'. Under section 223-A the person to whom a writ could be issued should have been a resident within those territories in relation to which the High Court exercised jurisdiction. Under Article 170 no writ could be issued beyond the territories in relation to which the High Court exercised jurisdiction. These limitations were, however, done away with in the 1962 Constitution took away that jurisdiction and but for this arrangement the citizens of East Pakistan would have been denied the remedy provided by Article 98 of the Constitution in respect of orders made and proceedings taken, etc., by person performing in that Province function in connection with the affairs of the Centre."
24. ' The language employed in the above provisions of Article 199 is clear and unambiguous and should be construed according to the rule of grammar and the words given natural and ordinary meaning. Plainly the effect of the restriction found in the expression "any act done or proceeding taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court" is that the exercise of jurisdiction by a High Court under the said provision is subject to the condition that the impugned act or proceeding is done or taken within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court. On the language of the said provision of Article 199 we do not find it possible to subscribe to the views of the petitioners' counsel that the High Court in whose territorial jurisdiction a person is affected by the impugned act, done within the territorial limits of another High Court, can too exercise jurisdiction under those provisions.
25. ' In the case of Abdul Ghaffar Lakhani v. Federal Government of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1986 Karachi 525 the implication of Article 199(1)(a)(i) and (ii) came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court 'and Naimuddin, C.J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the majority observed:-- "It was, however, submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a person would come within the territorial jurisdiction, if he exercises powers or authority over the area within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court and as in the present case respondent No,3 exercises his authority by controlling all Military Officers and Cantonments in Pakistan including those within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, therefore he comes within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
26. As already stated that for issuance of a writ in the nature of quo warranto it is the place of residence, or the place of office of the person against whom such a writ is sought which is material and that should be within the territorial jurisdiction and not the area over which he exercises the authority or powers of the office held by him. In the present petition no action of respondent No,3 in relation to any officers or the Cantonment within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court is challenged. What is being questioned is the holding of office as Chief of Army Staff. Therefore, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction. It may be stated that where an action of a person who is not covered by clause (3) of Article 199 is questioned, the Court would have jurisdiction, if action was taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court as would be clear from the language used in clause (1)(a)(ii) of Article 199 of the Constitution. I am fortified in my view by a decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and several other decisions from foreign jurisdiction and a decision of Dacca High Court, namely Sabir Din and another v. Government of Pakistan (1979 SCMR 555), Abrar Hassan v. Government of Pakistan and another (PLD 1976 SC 315), Election Commissioner, India v.
27. Saka Venkatasubbarao (AIR 1953 SC 210), K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission and others (AIR 1954 SC 207), Lt.-Col. Khajoor Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1961 SC 532), Madan Gopal Rungta v. The Secretary to the Government of Orissa and others (AIR 1962 SC 1513) and A.K.M. Fazlul Quadir Chowdhury v. Government of Pakistan and another (PLD 1957 Dacca 345)."
28. ' Reference may also he made to the unreported decision of a Division Bench of Lahore High Court whereby several writ petitions including Writ Petition No,1851 of 1995 were disposed of. The petitioners in all those cases imported certain consignments which arrived at the Karachi Port where the Customs Authorities imposed regulatory duty on these under notification dated 29-10- 1995 which levy was assailed in several writ petitions filed in the Lahore High Court. In reply to the preliminary objection about the maintainability of those petitions in that Court it was argued that as the factories and other work place of the petitioners were located within the jurisdiction of that Bench and the notification under which the imposition of duty was made, had been issued by the concerned Ministry at Islamabad, the petitions were maintainable before that Court. Repelling the contention the Court concluded that:-- "Resultantly, keeping in view the filing of bills of entries and the location of goods as well as the authorities functioning beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, we hold that these Constitutional petitions are not maintainable before this Court."
29. ' Distinguishing those petitions with Asghar Hussain's case the learned Judges observed:-- "This judgment according to our humble view turned on the wordings of Article 98(2)(a)(i) wherein the constraint of 'within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court' was not required."
30. ' The above decision of the Lahore High Court was challenged in the Supreme Court in the case of Sandalbar Enterprises .(Pvt.) Limited v. Central Board of Revenue and others PLD 1997 Supreme Court 334. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while approving the Lahore High Court's view made the following pertinent observation about the scope of Article 199(1)(a)(i) and (ii):-- "The learned Judges of the Division Bench have pointed out the language originally employed in Article 98(2)(a)(i) of 1962 Constitution prior to the incorporation of clause (c) by the First Amendment Act, 1963, to distinguishing the case of Asghar Hussain v. Election Commission of Pakistan etc. PLD 1968 SC 387. The view found favour with the learned Judges of the Division Bench in the case in hand seems to be in consonance with Article 199(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution. A perusal of above sub-clause (a)(i) of the above Article indicates that a High Court has power to issue a direction to a person performing within its territorial jurisdiction functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, Province or a local authority to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do or to do anything he is required by law to do. Similarly, under sub-clause (a)
(ii) a declaration without lawful authority or of no legal effect can be given by a High Court in respect of any act done or proceeding taken within the territorial jurisdiction by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority."
31. ' The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are clearly distinguishable. In Asghar Hussain's case it was Article 98 of the 1962 Constitution which was under consideration of the Supreme Court, which had no provision, similar to that found in Article 199(1)(a)(ii) in the phrase "any act done or proceeding taken within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court" which limited the scope of exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court.
32. ' The case of Al-Iblagh Ltd. Was mainly based on Asghar Hussain's case and the effect and implication of the above-referred restrictive condition incorporated in Article 199(1)(a)(i) and (ii) was not considered. What seems to have weighted with the Hon'ble Judges were the facts that the hearings of the appeal were held by the Copyright Board at Lahore, the appellant resided at Lahore and under the Copyright Ordinance appeal from the orders of the Board if passed in original capacity would lie in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the appellant resided and as in that case the appellant resided in Lahore the appeal could be filed in that High Court.
33. Thus, we are of the view that as the main office of the Attorney-General is situated at Islamabad from where the impugned letter dated 6-11-1997 was written and dispatched, the petitions are not maintainable in this Court.
34. ' On the other objection about the delay in the filing of these petitions it was contended by the learned Attorney-General that the main cause of grievance of the petitioners is the letter dated 6- 11-1997 written by respondent No,2, whereby according to the petitioners, the respondent No,2 had approached the Swiss Authorities for taking action against the petitioners, but though the said letter was written as far back as 6-11-1997 the two petitions were filed on 8-6-1998 and 24-6-1998 when proceedings/actions against the petitioners had already been initiated by the Swiss Authorities in Courts. It was submitted that this long delay of almost eight months in the filing of the petitions, in the circumstances of the present case, when the matter had already progressed substantially disentitles the petitioners from approaching the Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction.
35. It was stated that the petitioners had knowledge of the proceedings against them in Switzerland, as, for quite sometime such reports were appearing in local and foreign newspapers and magazines, therefore, the delay in the filing of the petitions cannot be justified.
36. ' In reply, it was submitted by the petitioners' counsel that while it was true that the petitioners had learnt from magazines and newspapers about the Swiss Authorities, contemplating action against them, they were not at all aware that these actions were the result of the impugned letter by the respondent No,2 or in consequence of his approaches to the Swiss Authorities and that it was only from the "Press Briefing" by respondent No,3 on 2-6-1998 at Geneva, which later came to the knowledge of the petitioners in Pakistan, that they for the first time learnt of the impugned letter and the involvement of the respondent No,2 in the action initiated against the petitioners. Soon thereafter these petitions were filed without any loss of time. No material on record could be pointed out on behalf of the respondents to controvert the contention of the petitioners' counsel that the petitioners learnt of the impugned letter only from the 'Press Briefing' of the respondent No,3, as such we do not consider that any delay occurred in the filing of the petitions.
37. ' Having found that the petitions are not maintainable in this Court it was not necessary to examine the merits of the case, however, as we had heard the learned counsel on merits it would perhaps be appropriate to briefly record our opinion on merits too.
38. ' The counsel for the petitioners assailed the impugned letter on several grounds. It was submitted that the respondent No,2 could exercise powers only within the scope and ambit of Article 100 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and that neither under that Article nor any law the Attorney-General had authority to enter into correspondence with foreign countries with the object of embarking upon investigation in criminal cases. In the absence of such authority the action was not sustainable. Reference in this regard was made to the following passage from the judgment delivered in the case of Mumtaz Ali Bhutto and another v. The Deputy Martial Law Administrator, Sector I, Karachi and 2 others PLD 1979 Karachi 307 appearing at page 330 of the report:- "As the Executive he can only act in pursuance of the powers given to him by law. In accordance with British jurisprudence no member of the executive can interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except on the condition that he can support the legality of his action before a Court of Justice."
39. ' It was further contended that the allegations made in the impugned letter had the effect of tarnishing petitioners' reputation and dignity in the eyes of people in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 4 and 14 of the Constitution.
40. The impugned letter was neither a command nor an order nor was there any compulsion on the Swiss Authorities to comply therewith, it was merely in the nature of a request for mutual assistance in the alleged cases of corruption involving the petitioners and others. By that letter, which is claimed to be written on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, information about the various cases of alleged corruption had been provided to the Swiss Authorities with the request that action be taken in respect of such as were offence under their laws. Request was also made for providing to Pakistan information and evidence available in Switzerland pertaining to the referred cases of corruption, freezing of certain bank accounts and remittance of money to Pakistan illegally taken away. It was then for the Swiss Authorities to consider these requests and take appropriate action.
41. ' Now the question is as to whether in a case where there is a reasonable belief of an offence having been committed under the laws of Pakistan and that of another country, would it be within the competence of the Government of Pakistan to seek cooperation of that country for the exchange of information and available evidence about the crime, for the initiation of legal proceedings against the persons involved etc.? There appears to be no law and none was pointed out to us, placing any restriction on Government's authority to approach other countries in these circumstances. It would seem that in such situation the Government cannot be denied the right to approach foreign authorities and make efforts to procure evidence of crime available in their country or to seek prosecution of the offender or remittance of money rightfully belonging to Pakistan.
42. ' It still remains to be seen if these acts can lawfully be executed by the respondent No,2, Attorney- General on behalf'of the Government. In this regard, reference may be made to the functions of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Division set out in para. 21 of Schedule II to the Rules of Business, where while enumerating the various functions of the Division, item 4 provides "Dealings and agreements with other countries and international organization in judicial and legal matters", thus, it would appear that in so far as dealings and agreements with foreign countries in judicial and legal matters was concerned, it fell within the authority of the Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Division. The Attorney-General being a part of the said Division and Chief Law Officer of the Government can always be assigned the work of entering into such dealings. The fact that the Federation of Pakistan is a party in these proceedings and has not disputed respondent No,2's act of writing the impugned letter would show that the same had been written with the authority of the Federal Government. Reference may also be made to Article 100 of the Constitution of Pakistan which reads as under:-- "100.--(1) The President shall appoint a person, being a person qualified to be appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court, to be the Attorney-General for Pakistan.
(2) The Attorney-General shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.
(3) It shall be the duty of the Attorney-General to give advice to the Federal Government upon such legal matters, and to perform such other duties of a legal character as may be referred or assigned to him by the Federal Government, and in the performance of his duties he shall have the right of audience in all Courts and Tribunals in Pakistan.
(4) The Attorney-General may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office."
43. It is apparent from clause (3) of the Article, reproduced above, that apart from the functions vested in the Attorney-General by the Article, the Federal Government may assign to him other duties too.
44. As such, under the authority of the Federal Government, the respondent No,2 could have written the impugned letter. Since, there is no dispute on behalf of the Federal Government with regard to the authority of the Attorney-General to write the said letter, we are of the view that the act of writing the said letter was not without lawful authority. As to the various allegations in the letter suffice to say that these are relatable to the alleged offences and are to be read in that context.
45. ' For the reasons discussed above, both the said petitions are dismissed and, consequently, the ad 'interim orders dated 29-7-1998 passed in these petitions are recalled.