1. By this common judgment, I propose to dispose of the above two suits Inca these involve similar question of fact and law. The facts of the case as per readings of parties are that the plaintiffs in the above two suits are inter se errs who were employed by defendant Corporation as telephone operators in 5. Both were dismissed on 19-12-1978 on the ground of misconduct, which orders they challenged before the Labor Court through the applications under section 25-A of the I.R.O. 1969, which were allowed and the plaintiffs were reinstated. Appeals filed by the P.N.S.C. were dismissed on 19-1-1980 so also Constitutional Petitions Nos.D-161 and D-162 of 1980 by judgment, dated 25-2- 1982. The plaintiffs were taken back in service in consequence of the above judgments. However, the plaintiffs were again charge-sheeted on 17-7-1985. Enquiry Tribunal comprising three senior employees of P.N.S.C. namely S.K.M. Rizvi as the President of the Enquiry Committee, Mr. S. Iqbal Ahmed and Mrs. Zubaida T. Burhani as the Members of the Enquiry Committee conducted the enquiry. The records show that the plaintiffs by notice, dated 11-8-4985 were directed to appear before the Enquiry Committee on 12-8-1985 at 2-30 p.m. and they were also allowed to bring any workman of P.N.S.C. establishment of their own choice as per Regulation 97(3) of P.N.S.C. (Service)
2. Regulations, 1984 for their assistance. However, the plaintiffs by their letters dated 13-8-1985 asked the President of the Enquiry Committee to furnish to them the names of the witnesses to be produced copies of complaints, nature of evidence that would be led against them and the allegations that were likely to be made against them. They also stated that unless the aforesaid requirements were met any further proceedings by the Enquiry Committee would be prejudicial. In response to the above letters, the President of the Enquiry Committee through his letter, dated 21- 8-1985 informed the plaintiffs that they had failed to appear before the Board of Enquiry. At the time on 15-8-1985 they were asked to appear on 25-8-1985 at 2-30 p.m. and were also informed that if they failed to appear ex pane action would be taken. The above letter was replied to by the plaintiffs by letters, dated 24-8-1985 again pressing for the information's earlier requested by them.
3. The President of the Enquiry Committee again sent a letter dated 3-9-1985 stating therein that the plaintiffs were delaying the enquiry proceedings and avoiding to participate in the enquiry on one pretext or the other, The plaintiffs were assured that they would be given full opportunity of defense and to cross-examine the management's witnesses and bring any coworker for their assistance in the enquiry but not an outsider. The plaintiffs were again asked to appear on 8-9-1985 at 2 p.m.
4. In response to the above notice, the plaintiff sent their letters dated 8-9-1985 again requesting for the above information which was replied to by the President of the Enquiry Committee by letter dated 15-9-1985 wherein, inter alia it was stated that the statements of the management's witnesses would be recorded in presence of the plaintiffs, copies of all the papers documents produced by management during enquiry would be provided to them, the plaintiffs could bring any co-worker from P.N.S.C. for their assistance and they were again assured that they would be given full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. They were again called upon to take part in the enquiry on 22-9-1985 at 2-30 p.m. but the plaintiffs replied to this letter in similar vein as earlier.
5. The President of the Enquiry Committee by letter, dated 30-9-1985 forwarded copies of the complaints and asked the plaintiffs to appear on 8-10-1985, which was followed by the plaintiff's letter dated 1-10-1985 in which they had stated that they had not delayed the enquiry and they would furnish the names of their witnesses after the closing of the complaint's side. After that the President of the Enquiry Committee by his letter dated 15-10-1985 forwarded the statements of the witnesses and fixed 21-10-1985 for the cross-examination of the witnesses by the plaintiffs. In response to the above letter the plaintiffs sent their letters dated 17-10-1985 raising certain legal objections as to the legality of the enquiry. Thereafter the plaintiffs were served with the second show-cause notice, dated 12-12-1985 alongwith the report of the Enquiry Committee, dated 21-11- 1985 which was replied to by plaintiffs through their letter dated 17-12-1985. Later plaintiffs sought an interview with Chairman of the defendants but they were seen by one of the Directors of defendants and the meeting was inconsequential. Ultimately the plaintiffs were dismissed from service by defendant's letter dated 5-1-1986. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed Constitution Petition No,D- 678 of 1986 and 681 of 1981 challenging their dismissal but these petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court with the remarks that their remedy lay in filing a suit for damages for alleged wrongful dismissal.
6. Based on the pleading following issues were settled.
(1) Whether the plaintiff was removed from service illegally, mala finely and unjustly on the basis of vague charges, not recognized by law?
(2) Whether proper procedure was not followed while removing the plaintiff from service?
(3) Whether the termination of services, damaged the health and reputation of the plaintiff and also caused mental torture and marred the entire career of the plaintiff?
(4) What should the decree be?
7. The documents filed by parties were admitted documents and there was no controversy as to their authenticity. The plaintiff in Suit No,555 of 1989 examined herself but plaintiff in Suit No,556 of 1989 did not lead any evidence presumably because the plaintiffs' evidence in both suits is similar. The defendant led evidence of two of their officials namely Mr. Mohibur Rehman, Raw, Personnel Officer (D.W.1) and Mr. S.M. Sirajul Haq, Manager (D.W.2).
8. Issue No, 1: It is an admitted position that the service of plaintiffs in the defendant corporation was governed by the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation (Service) Regulation, 1984. Under Regulation 91, thereof the penalties provided for areas under:--
(a) Minor penalties:
(1) Censure;
(2) Withholding for a specific period, promotion or increment; and
(3) Recovery from pay of the whole or any part of pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by negligence or breach of an order.
(b) Major Penalties:
(1) Reduction to a lower post or Grade or to a lower stage in a time-scale;
(2) Compulsory retirement;
(3) Discharge or.removal from service;
(4) Dismissal from service.
9. Since in this case the dismissal of the plaintiffs from service was on the grounds of misconduct, it will be advantageous to reproduce Regulation 92 sub-titled "Misconduct":
(1) Misconduct means conduct prejudicial to good order or service discipline or contrary to the Discipline and General Conduct contained in Chapter VI of these Regulations.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of sub-Regulation (1) above, the following acts and omissions shall be deemed to constitute misconduct or breach of discipline:
(i) Riotous or disorderly behavior during working hours, or any conduct prejudicial to good order or service discipline or contrary to Corporation's rules or regulations or orders of a superior;
(ii) Acts of negligence or work or inordinate delay in performance of duty; (iii)Impertinence, insubordination, disobedience, or interference;
(iv) Theft, fraud, or dishonesty in connection with the Corporation's business or property;
(v) Causing willful damage to or loss of Corporation's business or goods or property;
(vi) Taking or giving bribes or any illegal gratification;
(vii) Absence without permission, and continuous absence without satisfactory cause for more than ten days;
(vii) Willful commission or omission of an act against the interests of the Corporation; resulting in a loss to the Corporation;
(ix) Willful tampering with, theft or destruction of any records documents or any other property of the Corporation;
(x) Favoritism, nepotism and willful abuse of power;
(xi) Striking work or inciting others to strike, in contravention of any law or rule having the force of law;
(xii) Engaging actively in smuggling, or in any commercial business or pursuit either on his own account or as agent for another;
(xiii) If an employee is corrupt or may reasonably be considered corrupt;
(xiv) When an employee is engaged or reasonably suspected of being engaged in subversive activities;
(xv) Drunkenness, fighting, gambling or indecent behavior within the Corporation's premises.
(xvi) If he is guilt of disclosure of official secrets to any unauthorized person;
(xvii) Habitual late 'attendance, malingering or go slow; (xviii) Any trade union or other activity during working hours which is likely to affect the normal functioning of the Corporation;
(xix) Improper and non-use of uniform on duty.
10. Of these grounds the plaintiffs were charged with insubordination, misbehavior, derogatory conduct, rude behavior, willful contravention of lawful orders by charge-sheet, dated 17-7-1985, all of which are reflected in Regulation 92 referred to above. Considering that a Division Bench of this Court has held in the case of Muhammad Aslam v. National Shipping Corporation reported in PLD 1979 Kar. 246 that the employer of a statutory corporation would be governed by general law of master and servant, it is obvious that service regulations made by the defendant corporation would govern the terms and conditions of such employers, and such regulations will be lawful.
11. Consequently this issue is answered in the affirmative.
12. Issue No, 2: There is no doubt that considerable acrimony existed between the plaintiffs and the management of defendants in view of previous litigations between parties and the reinstatement of the plaintiffs by the defendants by orders of Court. However, the fact remains that subsequent to the charge- sheet dated 17-7-1985, the defendants followed the procedure laid down, by their service regulations and by law. Indeed the plaintiffs themselves, have not alleged in their plaint that the laid down procedure was not followed. Their only plea is that the Enquiry Committee did not provide them sufficient opportunity to defend themselves inasmuch as the plaintiffs were not provided with statement of witnesses, copies of complaints and that they were not provided with the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses that appeared before the Enquiry Committee or those whose statements were taken to be complaints against the plaintiffs by the enquiry committee. So in fact the entire case of the plaintiffs is based on the alleged violation of principles of natural justice rather than the failure of the defendants to follow the procedure laid down for removal of the plaintiffs from the service.
13. While it is true that the witnesses and the complainants before the Enquiry Committee were not cross-examined, it was not due to any lack of opportunity provided in so far as the cross- examination of the witnesses produced before the Enquiry Committee was concerned. The facts of the case as narrated above would show that the plaintiffs from the very beginning had adopted an intransigent approach in so far as the Enquiry Committee was concerned. They deliberately stayed away from the proceeding of the Enquiry Committee and conciliatory gestures from the committee were spurned. On one hearing i,e, on 21-10-1985. when the plaintiffs appeared before the Enquiry Committee, according to the report, the plaintiffs refused to cross-examine the witnesses. The relevant passage from the Enquiry Committee report is reproduced below:-- "On 21-10-1985, the telephone operators appeared before the Enquiry Committee. The four witnesses mentioned above were present and the telephone operators were asked to cross- examine them; but they flatly refused to cross examine them on the ground that the condition imposed by them'earlier (that is, presence of Miss S. Maksood) be fulfilled in the first instance. On this, the members of the Enquiry Committee explained to them that the statements of all four witnesses were sent to them well in time in order to enable them to prepare their cross-questions and to produce their defence."
14. However, the above passage does reveal that the major complainant that is Mr. Maksood the Private Secretary to Chairman, Pharma Group of Companies, whose complaint in fact initiated the entire proceeding against the plaintiffs, was never examined in person by the Enquiry Committee.
15. Merely her statement was relied upon to substantiate the charges against the plaintiffs. This statement too, as admitted by defendants witness, was not recorded during the enquiry. Nor was Miss Maksood ever produced for cross-examination by the plaintiffs in spite of their insistence to this effect. It was all the more necessary for her statement to be subjected to cross-examination because the plaintiffs had persistently denied having been asked to connect a call by Miss Maksood. P.W.1, has denied that in her evidence as well. It would appear that the complaints by other witnesses were not of such gravity and even if it is held that the plaintiffs deliberately avoided cross-examining such other witnesses, even though opportunity for it was provided, their evidence could not have led to dismissal of the plaintiffs. It is the complaint of Miss Maksood which was the single most important piece of evidence to condemn the plaintiffs and yet it was not tested at the touchstone of cross-examination and in deed no opportunity for it was provide to the plaintiffs by the defendants. to that extent I hold that the statement of Miss Maksood relied upon by the defendants has no evidentiary value. Thus, I answer this issue in the affirmative and hold that the plaintiffs were wrongfully dismissed.
16. Issue No, 3: In their plaints in two suits the plaintiffs have claimed damages under the following heading:
(1) For damage to the health of plaintiff.
(2) For mental torture and mental shock.
(3) For loss of reputation, hence rendering them incapable of joining any other profession.
17. However, the plaintiffs apart from repeating the above breakdown in their affidavit-in-evidence have led no evidence to prove damage to their health and reputation. Nevertheless there is no doubt that the plaintiffs being single woman belonging to low income group in the society would have undergone considerable trauma due to wrongful dismissal from service. However, during the course of arguments there were considerable, hints at these unfortunate women having been subjected to sexual harassm ent. Though no evidence to this effect has been led for obvious reasons, the possibility of it cannot be obviated when two young women of their station in life work in an entirely male environment. Consequently, while there could be justification for claiming damages for mental torture and mental shock there is little justification or evidence for claiming damages to their health. As far as loss of reputation is concerned it is axiomatic that the job that they were employed in that is telephone operator, does not carry any particular reputation and dismissal does not render a telephone operator incapable of seeking similar job elsewhere.
18. Consequently, I answer this issue in the affirmative only with regard to the claim for mental torture and mental shock and in the negative with regard to claim under the other two headings.
19. Issue No, 4: Considering that I have already held that the plaintiffs' dismissal was wrongful inasmuch as the proceedings of the Enquiry Committee were violate of principles of natural justice and that the plaintiffs are entitled to damages for mental torture and mental shock, the question that remains to be decided is the extent of damages that is to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Damages for mental shock and torture fall in the category of general damages for assessment of which no definite method has been laid down. In such cases the primary consideration of the Court should be to compensate the plaintiff as far as possible for the injury caused. Here consideration should also be given to the station in life, age and the nature of persons to whom injury has been caused because people differ in their reaction and response to traumatic events. Somewhat similar views have been expressed very lucidly in the case of Sufi Muhammad Ishaque v. The Metropolitan Corporation reported in PLD 1996 SC 737 by which I am greatly fortified. In the instant case, these two women underwent veiled harassment and unlawful dismissal during the prime of their lives which could have unsettled them greatly particularly because they appeared to be highly strung.
20. The shock was certainly not acute enough to derange them but it was grievous enough to deliberate them for quite some time. In their plaints they claim Rs,30, 00,000 for mental shock and mental torture, which I find to be quite out of proportion to the injury caused. In my view 5, 00,000 to each of the plaintiffs would be an adequate compensation giving due regard to all the considerations enumerated hereinabove. I, therefore, decree both suits that is, Suit No,555 of 1989 and Suit No,556 of 1989 and award damages for Rs,5,00,000 to each of the plaintiffs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.