' MIAN ALLAH NAWAZ, J.--The bone of contention of this litigation initiated by Mian Muhammad Jahangir and 17 others, is Flyover (Bridge) known as Cavalry Ground Railway Crossing Bridge, Lahore. It is being constructed over the Railway Crossing Cavalry Ground, Lahore and is designed to connect. Gulberg-Walton, Madina Colony-Walton, Gulberg Madina Colony and Seven-up Factory- Makka Colony and other residential colonies/commercial centers of Lahore. The traffic which flows from these localities to other localities and inter se had been being subjected to frequent jams and interruptions on account of Railway Lines Crossing. Number of solutions were worked out to meet the above problem and finally a report prepared by M/s. Halcrow Fox and Associates was approved by the Council of Economic Interest on 2-3-1998. Pursuant to that report, the tender of M/s. Gamman Pakistan Ltd. Was accepted on 20-3-1998 where after a formal agreement was executed between Lahore Development Authority as executing agency of Punjab Government and M/s. Gamman Pakistan Ltd./Contractor. In the above scenario, the construction of the aforesaid Flyover Bridge started.
2. Feeling aggrieved the appellants and others invoked Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court by filing W.Ps. Nos.6576 of 1998 and 6080 of 1998. The appellants (petitioners in the writ petition) asserted that each of them had obtained commercial plot (measuring 150 sq. Yards each) in the Bazar Area Officers Housing Scheme Cavalry Ground from Cantonment Board, Lahore. This happened by means of registered lease-deed dated 15-7-1986; that the said instrument recited that the plots so leased, to appellants---situated in Survey No,313/316-C in the Cantonment of Lahore; that the said lease deed described the leaseholds in following words:-- "Plot of land and/or any buildings thereon containing by admeasurement 150 sq. Yds. (Commercial Plot No,36) situated in the Bazar Area Officers Housing Scheme Cavalry Ground comprising Survey No,313/316-C in the Cantonment of Lahore which said plot of land is more particularly desired in the schedule hereunder written and with the boundaries thereof as delineated on the plan annexed to these presents and thereon coloured RED TOGETHER with all rights, easements and appurtenances whatsoever to the said plot of land, belonging or in any way appertaining EXCEPTING AND RESERVING unto the lessor all mines, minerals, mineral substance of every description in or under the premises hereby demised with full rights and liberty at all times for the purpose of searching or digging, working, obtaining, removing and enjoying the same, making the lessee reasonable compensation for all damage done. TO HOLD the premises hereby demised unto the lessees for the term of ninety years from the day of 22nd January, 1985 rendering therefor during the said term the yearly rent of Rs,38 (Rupees thirty eight only) clear of all deductions by yearly payments on the 22nd day of January in each year at the office of the Cantonment Board, Lahore or such other place as the Cantt. Board shall from time to time appoint in this behalf, the first of such payments be made on the 22nd day of next month."
' That deed was followed by map which showed that the leased out tenements had a strip of 30' x 45'/parking space in-between the tenements and road which was 80' wide. It was further alleged that the sanctioned Flyover was elevated dual-carriage bridge with 14.98 metres wide and approximately 979 metres in length with colossal supportive structure which practically divided frontage of road into two and reduced the parking strip on each side from 30' x 45' to 15' x 30'. On the strength of the above factual narrative, it was prayed that a declaration be granted that Provincial Government/L.D.A. Had no jurisdiction, whatsoever, to reduce the size of parking strip and that Provincial Government had no authority to divide the road into two parts by putting supportive structure in the middle of road in front of their shops. This prayer was declined by the learned Single Judge. Who dismissed petition on 30-4-1998. This is how this I.C.A. Has come to this Court.
Needless to note that the petitioners, who had lodged W.P.No,6080 of 1998 have not come to this Court in appeal.
3. Mr. A.K. Dogar, Advocate with Mr. M. Zakaria, Advocate opened the debate on behalf of the appellants. One Mrs. Sheerin Khalid Qureshi appeared in person and explained her view. The learned Advocate-General along with M/s. Azmat Saeed Advocate, for L.D.A. And Asif Hamid Khan, Addl. Chief Engineer, L.D.A. Represented the respondents. The learned counsel for the parties also submitted their written notes which were brought on record. Since the I.C.A. Was heard at length and sale learned counsel for the parties, participated in hearing fully, this I. Was agreed to be decided as Pakka case.
' Mr. A.K. Dogar, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants assailed impugned decision on the following grounds: ' Firstly; that the supportive structure/retaining walls was located on the road which was owned by the Cantonment Board, Lahore; that the Cantonments fall in the list reserved for Federation and so the Provincial Government had no authority to construct the part of bridge over the area owned by the Cantonment.
' Secondly; that no notification, with regard to Flyover Bridge was issued by the Central Government in the official Gazette within the terms of section 3(4) of the Cantonments Act, 1924. According to him, no authority can function in Cantonment area without the said notification. On the strength of above contention, it was canvassed that the construction of the Flyover was clearly without any lawful authority and void ab initio.
' Thirdly; the construction of the Flyover, was clearly violative of Article 4 of the Constitution which guarantees that no action detrimental to life, liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law. On the basis of above, it was submitted that each appellant had rights in the strip of parking space of 30' x 35' in length; that the appellants had right of frontage in a road which was metalled with 80 feet width; that the Flyover Bridge had divided the road into two parts and had virtually reduced the parking space from 30' x 35' to 15 x 35 feet. On basis of the above, it was submitted that the construction of the Flyover Bridge was in defiance of Article 4(2) of the Constitution; Reliance was placed on Bayley v. Great Western Railway Co. (26 Chancery Divn. 434), Narayan v. Vithoba AIR 1927 Nag.177, Ram Sarup v. Girdhari Lal AIR 1929 All. 371, Municipal Committee, Delhi v. Muhammad Ibrahim AIR 1935 Lah. 196, Firm Kasturi Lal v. Jagraon Municipality AIR 1939 Lah. 199, Parmar Gogi v. Parmar Ganesh AIR 1968 Gujarat 287, Kadarnath v.
Narendra Prasad AIR 1974 Pat. 359, Ghulam Hussain v. Khan Muhammad PLD 1954 Lah. 655, Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust PLD 1969 SC 223; Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood PLD 1970 SC 139, Abdul Mutaleb v. Razia Begum PLD 1970 SC 185, Muhammad Afzal v. Sindh Province PLJ 1975 Kar. 215, Salim Footwear v. Abdul Hakim 1982 SLC 1406, Sultan Ali v. Khushi Muhammad PLD 1983 SC 243, Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman PLD 1983 SC 457; National I.C.C. Corn. Ltd. v. Province of Punjab PLD 1992 Lah. 462, Zeshan Builders v. Karachi Building Control Authority 1992 MLD 2259, Government of Sindh v. Abbas Ahmad 1994 SCMR 923, Asif Iqhal v. Karachi Metropolitan PLD 1994 Kar. 60; Ali Shah v. Government of Pakistan 1994 CLC 369 and Regional Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shafi Muhammad Baloch 1988 SCMR 376.
' Fourthly; that subsequent consent given by Executive Officer of the Cantonment Board was devoid of any legal efficacy. Strength was sought from in section 3(4) and section 45 of the Cantonments Act, 1924.
' Fifthly; that without conducting acquisition proceedings, under Land Acquisition Act, the construction of the Flyover Bridge over the parking space and part of the road in front of the appellants' shops was not permissible under the law.
' Sixthly; that the learned Single Judge had not applied his judicious mind to the memo. Of grounds in the writ petition and was contented to hold that construction of Flyover was being challenged on the sole ground that it was unnecessarily long and unjustifiably high. According to him, the construction of Flyover Bridge had been assailed on constitutional as well as legal grounds.
' Seventhly; that the width of road was 80'; the span of the road was 150' but with the construction of the Flyover the road will be divided into two parts with supportive structure of the Bridge right in the Middle of the existing road, that this structure will extend up to 100 metres in length and will so curtail the frontage of the appellants and the shopkeepers of the other side. On this basis, it was suggested that this supportive structure will tantamount to nuisance to shopkeepers of both sides and would injure their rights of easement. According to the learned counsel, the Provincial Government or its agency was not competent to cause such nuisance or interfere with easement rights of the shopkeepers of this area.
' Eightly; and lastly that principle of promissory estoppel was attracted to the facts of the case in hand; that the appellants had obtained the plots with parking space frontage for 90 years lease from the Cantonment Board; had expended huge funds to construct the shops over there; that the Provincial Government or any its agency is precluded by rule of promissory estoppel to deprive the appellants from parking space and frontage of the road.
5. Mrs. Sheerin Khalid Qureshi, owner of House No,249-3-A Gulberg, entered appearance in person.
She supported the line of argument of the learned counsel for the appellant and added that about four feet area of her house was being utilized by the contractor; that the said area had not been acquired by means of any notification under the Land Acquisition Act; that the Flyover Bridge will cut down residential area of her house and would diminish its utility and value; that the proposed Flyover Bridge so was offensive to Article 4(2) of the Constitution. Continuing, she stated that earlier design submitted by M/s. NESPAK was highly reasonable and be adhered to be by the Punjab Government.
6. On the other hand learned Advocate-General defended Government action on the following grounds: ' Firstly; Reliance was placed on Article 156 of the Constitution to contend that this project was approved by the ECNEC on 2-2-1998; that the Provincial Government so decided to erect this Bridge which was welfare oriented Project. According to the learned Advocate General it was designed to ease traffic inconvenience upon Article 137 of the Constitution to say that the roads were mentioned in concurrent list and so the Provincial Government had full authority to proceed with the project.
' Secondly; no easement rights of the appellants were interfered with. According to the learned Advocate-General, the supportive structure of Flyover was located on a road which was in- between the shops of the appellants and shops of other shopkeepers who have not come to this Court; that the effected portion was almost 100 metres in length; that the supportive structure had divided the road into two parts and had provided parking space, space for footpath and also another strip to appellants as well as road users and that the rights of the appellants had been kept in mind while designing the structure of the Flyover Bridge, Reference was made to Abdul Hamid Shah v. Muhammad Yar PLD 1991 SC 815.
' Thirdly; that the appellants were lessees of plots. They had no rights to challenge the construction of Flyover. Help was sought from section 15 of Easements Act and Azizuddin v. Islamuddin PLD 1971 Kar. 701, A Razak Adamjee v. Datari Construction Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. 1991 MLD 1112 and Saleem v. Saeeda Begum 1987 MLD 461.
' Fourthly; and lastly it was submitted that it was a public welfare its object was to provide unhindered flow of traffic to users of road and more than a million residents of five localities of Lahore that the road users of that localities were suffering from immeasurable difficulties and this bridge will alleviate their sufferings. It was so represented that the project be allowed to be completed on the principle of the welfare of a million peoples.
7. From the foregoing narration, following questions arise for consideration:
(1) Whether the appellants are the transferees of leasehold rights in Parking strip, shown in red- colour, in Map (Mark 'A') along with frontage of road and the Provincial Government had no authority, whatsoever, to curtail/reduce these rights without making recourse to provisions of the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)?
(2) Whether the Provincial Government/L.D.A. Has no power to construct Flyover Bridge without the concurrence of Cantonment Board in accordance with the requirement of section 45 of the Cantonments Act, 1924?
(3) Whether the Cantonment Board/Provincial Government is precluded by rule of promissory estoppel to construct the retaining walls/supportive structure in the middle of road in front of the shops of the appellants resulting in interference with leasehold and easement rights of the appellants?
8. As regard to first point, necessarily it arises out of the claim of the appellants that they are owners of rights in the parking strip abutting their leased plots under the instrument of lease dated 15-7-1986. The question, which so arises is, what is the nature of these rights? Are the appellants absolute owners of these rights? Are they owners of some rights which are known as easement?
Conceptually, the doctrine of ownership is as enigmatic as human being. Jurisprudentially, this right is classified as right with complicated contents. The ownership, according to Salmond's Jurisprudence, denote the relationship between a person and object which is the subject-matter of ownership. So, the concept of ownership is not confined to proprietary rights but it embraces such various rights as leasehold rights, mortgagee rights, easement rights and so on and so forth. The claim of appellants is built upon expression 'appurtenances' employed in the 'grant'. This expression, according to Ballentine's Law Dictionary means: "Everything essential or reasonably necessary to the full beneficial use and enjoyment of property- --An incorporeal right attached to, and belonging with, some greater or superior right; something annexed to another more worthy thing with which it passes as an incident, being incapable of existence separate and apart from the particular property to which it is annexed and to which it bears a relationship connected with the use of such property."
' The famous Black's Law Dictionary defines this expression in following manner: "That which belongs to something else; and adjunct; an appendage. Something annexed to another thing more worthy as principal, and which passes as incident to it, as a right of way or other easement to land; an outhouse, barn, garden, or orchards o a house or message. An article adapted to the use of the property to which it is connected, and which was intended to be a permanent accession to the freehold. A thing is deemed to be incidental or appurtenant to land when it is by right used with the land for its benefit, as in the case of a way, or watercourse or of a passage for light, air, or heat from or across the land of another."
9. The appurtenant rights so necessarily fall within domain of law of easement. The right of way is the most conspicuous right of this nature. The concept of easement has been beautifully defined in Corpus Juris Scundum (Vol.28) in following words: ... a liberty, privilege, or advantage without profit, which the owner of one parcel of land may have in the lands of another; or, as conversely stated, it is a service which one estate owes to another, or a right or privileges in one man's estate for the advantage or convenience of the owner of another estate."
' The same Treatise also outlines the essential characteristics of these rights in following manner: ... ...The essential qualities of an easement generally are: that it is incorporeal; is imposed on corporeal property; confers no right to share in the profits from such property; and is imposed for the benefits of corporeal property; that there are two distinct tenements, the dominant to which the right belongs and the servant on which the obligation is imposed; and that the ownership of the easement is separate and distinct from the land to which it is attached. The dominant and servant tenements need not be contiguous".
From the above it clearly follows that right of easement relates to servant tenements and dominant tenements. It is curtailment over the rights of servient tenements by the owners of dominant tenements. In order to understand as to whether the parking right is an easement right, we find it useful to study the few cases from English jurisdiction.
(i) In Southern Nigeria v. Jhon Hotel & Co. (Liverpool) Ltd. (1915) AC 599 at 617 in relation to a claim to store goods on another's land, Lord Shaw said: "Their Lordships see no reason why upon the first point a right of easement should be exclusive of the storage claim. The law must adapt itself to the conditions of modern society and trade, and there is nothing in the purposes for which the easement is claimed inconsistent in principle with a right of easement as such. This principle is of general application and was so treated in the House of Lords in Dyce v. Hary (1852) 1 Macq. 305 at 312) by Lord St. Leonards L.C. Who observed 'The category of servitudes and easements must alter and expand with the changes that take place in the circumstances of mankind."
(ii) Copeland v. Green half (1952) 1 All ER 809), which directly concerned the parking of vehicles. In this case the alleged servant tenement was a strip of land about 150 feet long running from the road with a width varying between 15 feet and 35 feet. Speaking for the Bench Upjohn, J. Said: "... ... In my judgment the right claimed here goes wholly outside any normal idea of an easement, that is, a right of the occupier of a dominant tenement over a servant tenement. This claim really amounts to a claim to a joint use of the land by the defendant. Practically he is claiming the whole beneficial user of the strip of land on the south-east side of the track so that he can leave there as many or as few lorries as he likes for any time that he likes and enter on it by himself, his servants and agents, to do repair work. In my judgment that is not a claim which can be established as an easement."
(iii) Le Strange v. Pettefar (1939) 161 LT 300, Luxmoore IJ, sitting as a Judge of the Chancery Division said: "I find it impossible to hold on the evidence before me that any such right as is claimed by the defendant either appertained or was reputed to appertain to his bungalow. The defendant left his case on the metalled surface without any objection by the owner of the soil, not because he was the occupier of a bungalow, but because the owner of the soil did not object to anyone, whether a bungalow owner or a member of the public, so doing."
(iv) Newman v. Jones (22 March 1982). It is an unreported case of Megarry V.C. Wherein he said: "... ...I feel no hesitation in holding that a right for a landowner to park a car anywhere in a defined area nearby is capable of existing as an easement... ...An easement may take effect subject to the right of others with a like right, without any guarantee that there will be no competition. In any case, I cannot see why the mere risk of there being not enough space for all the park simultaneously should be a reason for denying that any rights at all exist, though doubtless the limited space available confirms the right to one car per flat (of course, referring to the particular flats in that case)" ...
(v) Bilkus v. Redbridge London Borough (1968) 207 EG 803. It is a decision of Buckley, J. The plaintiff in this case, who were owners of shops and land, sold part of their land to the defendant under the threat of compulsory purchase for development. In the conveyance there was a covenant--by the corporation to allow the free holders their successors, owners and leases and occupiers of the shops: It was "to have general car-parking facilities for the vehicles of persons using the brown land any building from time to time created thereon upon the land owned by the corporation at the rear of the land coloured green."
10. On the review of the above cases it was held in London and Blenheim Estates Ltd. v. Ladbroke Retail Parks Ltd. (1994 PSC 424) Paul Baker Q, C.J. Said: "So that is clear authority that in some circumstances the right to park cars can amount to an easement. The grant in the present case is more elaborate. It presupposes that there are and will continue to be retail shops and businesses conducted on the retained or servient land whose customers, clients and employees are provided with parking facilities. If that ceased to be so, either because the shops ceased to exist as such or because their parking facilities were closed down or transferred elsewhere, the right to park annexed to the shops and business on the transferred land and would also cease to exist. That circumstance indicates to my mind that the right claimed is dependent upon the continued existence of car parking facilities on the servient land. It would be open to the owner of that land to remove the car parking facilities of the shops and businesses on the retained land and thereupon the facilities provided for the transferred land would also cease.
The passage in Keefe v. Amor (1946) 2 All ER 517 at 521, (1965) QB 334 at 337 to which I was referred, deals with a different points, that the grantee of a right of way cannot complain of obstructions in some part of the way so long as his right is not substantially interfered with. In the present case the right on its true construction is dependent upon the continued existence of car parking facilities for other persons. That leaves the main point under this head whether the right to park cars can exist at all as an easement. I would not regard it as a valid objection that charges are made, whether for the parking itself or the general upkeeps of the park. The essential question is one of degree. If the right granted in relation to the owner without any reasonable use of his land whether for parking or anything else, it could not be an easement, though it might be some larger or different grant. The rights sought in the present case do not appear to approach anywhere near the degree of invasion of the servient land. If that is so...And emphasis that I have not gone into the facts. I would regard the right claimed as a valid easement. However for the reasons given earlier, the plaintiffs' claim fails. I shall make the declaration sought in para. 1 of the counterclaim."
11. From the above discussion, following rules, relating to law of easement, are clearly deducible:--
(i) There must be a dominant and servient tenements;
(ii) the easement right belongs to owners of dominant tenement; that dominant and servient tenements ownership vest in the different persons. The right of way over servient tenement is created under grant/by custom of necessity or by prescription. The above characteristics of easement to some extent are overlapping;
(iii) that rights so granted in parking strips are clearly easement rights by grant. Parking strip granted to lessee falls under this class of easement. So the rights in parking strip, is an easement right;
(iv) in the case of an express grant the contents of the instrument are to be referred to. It is for the Court to construe the conveyance-deed in the context of (1) the locus in quo over which the way is granted; (2) the nature of terminus ad quem and (3) the purpose for which the way is to be used.
(See Law of Easements by Gale, page 269. 4th Edn.).
The extent of the rights normally depends upon the extent of use of servient right. The owner of dominant tenement cannot impose more burden on the servient right. Such right is neither continuous, nor is perennial and depends upon the user of servient tenements. l2. Applying these rules to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand it is quite clear that the rights which were transferred to the appellants in the deed of lease dated 15-7-1986 were appurtenant rights/easement rights.
13. The conjunctive reading of the aforesaid deed and plan Mark 'A' makes it manifest that there was a parking strip measuring 30' x 45' before the leaseholds as appurtenant rights with a metalled road 80' wide. Mark 'A' also shows that there were leaseholds on the other side of the road with similar parking strip. Clearly, the rights of appellants in the parking strip were that of easement by way of 'grant'. These rights were not proprietary rights and rights annexed to leaseholds. The ownership, in this strip, belonged to Cantonment Board. On the above analysis we are further of view that these rights were not permanent or continuous in nature nor exclusively reserved for the leaseholders. Their existence depended upon the use of servient rights as road was publicly dedicated to the use of public at large. The Cantonment Board and the Provincial. Government had jointly decided to construct a Flyover in order to ease the traffic jam and interruption flowing from Railway crossing. Flyover Bridge was so designed to cater the traffic need of more than half million residents of Lahore. The question, which arises, in the context of abovementioned facts, is whether the Provincial Government/Cantonment Board has authority to reduce the parking strip and also decrease the frontage. Clearly the easement rights owned by the appellants were/are neither perpetual nor continuous. These were/are dependent upon the use of servient right which belonged to Cantonment Board. Manifestly the Flyover had been designed in such a manner not to extinguish this right of the appellants but to curtail them in the context of volume of traffic and convenience of more than half a million people. The Flyover had two levels, one elevated bridge over the Railway Crossing from where the traffic from localities noted above will pass and level No,2 with supportive structure put in the middle of the road. No doubt it will divide the road between two sections to the extent of one hundred metre and will provide a footpath and the parking strip 15' x 30' long along with supportive structure of the bridge. Eventually there will be diminution in parking strip and frontage of road. However, it will not amount of extinction of easement right. As already noted, the rights of the appellants are neither perennial nor continuous and therefore, are dependent upon use of servient rights. Curtailment of these rights has occurred in the changed ground realities of needs of road users. We are, therefore, of the view that the claim of appellants flows from totally illogical premises and cannot be accepted. Any other construction of these rights will tantamount to a permanent burden on the servient right of the Cantonment Board. A study of the easement law clearly leads to the above conclusion. The answer is clearly provided by section 28 read with section 37 of the Easements Act, 1882 which was promulgated on 1-7-1882 and the rules of easement discussed above, were embodied in this ,Statute. If any reference is needed see Ankerson v. Connelly (1907 Chancery Division 678), Copeland v. Green half (1952 Chancery Division 488), The Shannon Ltd. v. Venner Ltd. (1965 Chancery Division 682) and Blenheim Estates Ltd. v.
Ladbroke Retail Parks Ltd. (1994 PSC 424).
13-A. As a result of the foregoing discussion we have reached the conclusion that the rights of the appellants flowing from the deed of lease dated 15-7-1986 and Map Mark 'A' are easement fight's dependent upon the user of servant rights of the Cantonment Board. Neither these rights are permanent nor continuous and so this cannot be construed as perpetual burden upon the servient rights of Cantonment Board. We also hold that the appellants did not enjoy their rights exclusively.
14. In view of the above we, therefore, are of the view that the Cantonment Board has power to reduce/decrease the aforesaid rights. Add to it, we hold that the Cantonment Board and the Government of Punjab had the authority to construct the Flyover in exercise of their police powers.
Question No,1 so stands disposed of in above terms. The precedents, cited by the learned counsel for the parties proceeded on dissimilar facts and are hardly applicable to the facts of the case in hand.
15. Having disposed of first question and having concluded that the appellants are owners of easement rights in parking strip and frontage of road which belongs to Cantonment Board and that these rights are neither continuous nor perennial in nature and their extent depends upon the use of servient tenements, we find little merit in these two questions. Suffice it to say, that the Provincial Government is constructing Flyover Bridge with the concurrence of Cantonment Board; that the Executive Officer of the Cantonment Board before the learned Single Judge appeared and stated categorically to that effect. We find that the appellants have no right whatsoever to raise this question. Section 45 ibid pertains to procedure and no exception can be taken by any person other than the Board itself. Similarly the rule of promissory estoppel is inapplicable to the facts of the case in hand. His Lordship Mr. Justice Ajmal Mian (Now Chief Justice of Pakistan) in Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 1652) on the question of promissory estoppel observed as follows: "(i) the doctrine- of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against the Legislature or the laws framed by it because the Legislature cannot make a representation;
(ii) promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for directing the doing of the thing which was against the law when the representation, was made or the promise held out;
(iii) no Agency or Authority can be held bound by a promise or representation not lawfully extended or given;
(iv) the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel will not apply where no steps have been taken consequent to the representation or inducement so as to irrevocably commit the property or the reputation of the party invoking it; and
(v) the party which has indulged in fraud or collusion for obtaining some benefits under the representation cannot be rewarded by enforcement of the promise."
' Also see M/s. Gadoon Textile Mills and others v. WAPDA and Federation of Pakistan 1997 SCMR 641.
16. Seen from this angle it is quite clear that the appellants who are the owners of leasehold rights in plots in their possession, have no right to curtail the servient right of the Cantonment Board or Punjab Government and further: more cannot cause perpetual inconvenience to users of the road who are public at large. This being the position we are of considered view that the Provincial Government is empowered to construct the Flyover Bridge with the concurrence of the Cantonment Board, in the area belonging to the latter, and the principles of promissory estoppel are not applicable to the present case.
17. For the reasons stated above we do not find any merit in this I.C.A. And is accordingly dismissed/affirming the decision of the learned Single Judge although on a different pedestal, with no order as to costs.##TEE## ' While parting with this judgment, we would like to make it clear that this order will not preclude the appellants from availing of any other remedy and/or to claim compensation if awardable under the law for the curtailment of their easement rights in the parking strip. If the appellants initiate any such action, the concerned competent forum will determine the same strictly in accordance with law and not otherwise.