' The petitioner-Company is owner of land measuring 64 Kanals and 6 Marlas in village Buddukee Sani, Tehsil and District Lahore, which was purchased for the stated purpose of construction of houses.
2. The District Collector, Lahore, issued impugned notification dated 28-1-1998 published in the official gazette of Punjab on 6-2-1998 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It was stated therein that the land of the petitioners was likely to be acquired by the Government at the expense of "Sharif Trust" for the construction of School/Hospital.
The petitioner-Company filed the present petition through its Chief Executive to call in question the validity of the impugned notification dated 28-1-1998.
3. Mr. Shahzad Jehangir, Senior Advocate, the learned counsel for the petitioners assisted by Ch. Mushtaq Hussain, Advocate, argued that "Sharif Trust" was not a Company within the meaning of clause (e) of section 3 of the Act. Therefore, the impugned notification could not have been issued/published for acquiring the land for an individual person. The learned counsel further submitted that the land of the petitioner-Company was being acquired for the benefit of a private trust without there being any public purpose. It was further argued that Mian Sharif family was owning 40 Squares of land in the other villages of the area which were adjacent to the village in question. "Sharif Trust" was already owning 553 Kanals of land in the village in question and there was no necessity for acquiring the land of the petitioners. Reliance was placed on the cases of Muhammad Akbar (through Legal Representatives) and 7 others v. The Commissioner. Rawalpindi Division and 2 others (PLD 1976 Lahore 747) and Muhammad Akbar and another v. Additional Commissioner (Revenue) and 3 others (1989 CLC 1724).
3-A. It was next submitted that the impugned notification was required to be personally served on the petitioner-Company as required by section 45 of the Act. A reference was made to the case of Mst. Asma Begum, etc. v. Commissioner Karachi, etc. (PLD 1997 Kar. 13). It was lastly submitted that in the absence of a written statement by the respondent, the averments made in the writ petition were required to be accepted. The case of Ghani-ur-Rehman v. Pir Haider Ali Shah and 4 others (1997 CLC 1092) Peshawar) was referred to.
4. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab, argued that "Sharif Trust" having been registered, under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, was a Company within the meaning of section 3(e) of the Act. He submitted that there was no substance in the assertions of the petitioner that any other land of the family of Mian Sharif was situated contiguous/adjacent to the land owned by "Sharif Trust" or the land in question. The learned Law Officer contended that the land in question was being acquired for a public purpose for which the gazette notifications dated 4-3-1998, 4-4-1998 and 6-4-1998 under the provisions of section 5, Agreement under sections 41/42, and 6 of the Act respectively had already been duly published.
The learned Law Officer placed on record the aforesaid documents. It was further submitted that there was no mala fide on the part of the authorities in the issuance/publication of the impugned notification of the acquisition of land for public purpose. Reliance was placed on the cases of Shamim-ur-Rehman v. Fauji Foundation (PLD 1983 SC 457) (673), Faqir Muhammad and 10 others v.
Government of West Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Department, Lahore and 3 others (PLD '
1973 Lahore 665) and Makhdoom Ahmad Ghauns v. Chairman, Town/municipal Committee, Qadirpur Rawn, Multan and 3 others (1993 MLD 1987) (Lahore).
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. I find that the Assistant Registrar, Joint Stock Companies, Punjab, Lahore, issued a certificate dated 18-12-1995 whereby "Sharif Trust" had been duly registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. I have no doubt that the respondent-Trust is fully covered by the definition of a "Company" as given in section 3(e) of the Act. The impugned notification is, therefore, not liable to be struck down on the ground that "Sharif Trust" was not a Company.
6. It is true that the impugned notification could be issued only if the acquisition of the land was likely to be made for a public purpose. The expression "public purpose" as defined in clause (f) of section 3 of the Act is of not definitive or exhaustive but enlarging in nature as the word "includes" has been used. In Don Bosco High School v. The Assistant Director. E.O.B.I. And others (PLD 1989 SC 128) it was held that the word "include" is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statutes. In the case of Lt. Col. Muhammad Amin Khan and 3 others v. Government of West Pakistan and others (PLD 1966 (W.P.) Lahore 11(117), it is laid down:-- "Include" is not used in a sort of a conjunctive sense so as to make only such things correspond to the word 'defined' as answer to the meaning given to the word in the ordinary language as well as the scope assigned to it by the definition. Since the purpose is to extend the scope of the word it will cover not only cases which are covered by the dictionary meaning plus the meaning given in the interpretation clause but also by either of them individually. To hold otherwise is to defeat the very purpose for which the word 'include' is used in the interpretation clause."
The "public purpose" may vary from time to time in the context of a particular situation. The definition does not assist very much in ascertaining the ambit of the expression "public purpose".
Broadly speaking, the expression "public purpose" would include a purpose in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and vitally concerned. See the cases of Dr. Muhammad Nasim Javed v. Lahore Cantonment Housing Society Ltd. Through the Secretary Fortress Stadium Lahore Cantt. And 2 others (PLD 1983 Lahore 552), Raja Muhammad Amir and 14 others v. Province of the Punjab and 2 others (PLD 1983 Lahore 355), Muhammad Mansur Rahman and others v. Province of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1963 Dacca 736), Muhammad Ashraf Khan v. Revenue E.A.C. And 7 others (1980 CLC 1304) (Peshawar), Government of Haryana and others v. Hakam Singh and another (A.I.R. 1979 Punjab and Haryana 122), Bajiro T. Kote v. State of Maharashtra (1995) 2 SCC 442), Kanhaiyalal Manek Lal Chinal v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1970 SC 1188) and Abdul Ghaffaar and another v. Province of Baluchistan through Secretary, Revenue Department, Quetta and 4 others (PLD 1984) Quetta 24).
' In State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan (AIR 1955 SC 810) and Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay (AIR 1960 SC 1203), it was specifically held that the acquisition of land for the purpose of building a Hospital or an educational institution by a private benefactor would be a public purpose even though it was not directly State or Union purpose. In the case of Messrs Haji Khadem Ali & Sons v.
District Magistrate, Dacca and 2 others (PLD 1959 Dacca 154) (D.B.), the scope of "public purpose" was examined with reference to section 3 of the East Bengal (Emergency) Requisition of Property Act, 1948. In the precedent case, the Government requisitioned land for establishing a private Textile Mill in order to meet the acute shortage of cloth in the Province. It was held as under:- ' "On the face of the order, it was difficult to say that the requisition was not for a public purpose.
' The requisition was for the benefit of the people in general as distinguished from a particular individual .
' From the mere fact that the Mill would make profit, it could not be urged that the purpose of requisition was not a public purpose. What the Court has to see in such a case is : if the requisition was made with reference to the needs or convenience of the public. If so, the mere fact that some individual will derive greater benefit will not make the requisition bad.
' Where Government had applied their mind to the question of the requirement of the Mill and to the necessity of that requirement the Court will not be justified to investigate the reasonableness of such decision of the Government. If the Court starts to investigate into the reasonableness of the decision of the Government as to the exact requirement of the Mill, it would mean that the Court would be made responsible for carrying out the work of the Government in important matters.
Such investigation is not always desirable."
8. Ordinarily, it is not for this Court to substitute the opinion of the Government as to the existence of public purpose particularly when in the meantime notifications have also been published on 4-3- 1998 and 6-4-1998 under sections 5 and 6 of the Act respectively. By the notification dated 4-3- 1998 under section 5 of the Act,.The objections to the acquisition of the land had been invited to be filed before the Land Acquisition Collector. In the cases of a 'Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P. (AIR 1967 SC 108) and The Land Acquisition Collector and others v. Durga Pada Mukhurjee and others (AIR 1980 SC 1678), it was observed that once a notification under section 6 had been issued, it was normally not open to a Court to go behind and try to satisfy whether, in fact, the acquisition was for a public purpose unless it was a case of colourable exercise of power. Nothing was brought on record to show that the impugned notification had been issued by the authorities mala fides or for any oblique purpose. Even otherwise, the question of mala fides is a question of the fact which has to be proved and not to be assumed. Onus to prove is on the person who alleges mala fides.
As held in the case of Lt.-Col. Muhammad Amin Khan (supra) for the acquisition of land, the actions of the Government must be regarded as having been taken bona fode unless contrary view is established and the decision of administrative authority cannot be excluded on ground of the power having been abused. Similar observations were made in the case of Makhdoom Ahmad Ghauns (supra), The petitioners have not placed on record any material to show that the other 40 Squares of land owned by the family of Mian Sharif was contiguous to the land of "Sharif Trust" or to the land of the petitioners.
9. Now the question of the personal service of the impugned notification upon the petitioners remain to be examined. Subsection (1) of section 4 of the Act under which the impugned notification was issued reads as under:--- ' "Whenever it appears to the Provincial Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be need for any public purpose, a notification to effect shall be published in the official Gazette, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality."
' The said provision of law does not require that there should be personal service of the notification on the individual landowners. The importance of a notification under section 4 of the Act is that on the issue of such a notification, the land to which the notification applies is, in a sense, freezed for the purposes of the determination of market value of the land. The question of notice arises only when a further action as contemplated by subsection (2) of section 4 is sought to be taken. The petitioners themselves approached this Court immediately by filing the present writ petition against the impugned notification. In the circumstances, the question of personal service of the same is hardly of any significance. This question was examined by the superior Courts and it was held that the provisions of section 4(1) of the Act did not require personal notice to be served on the individual landowners for the publication of -the gazette notification. Reliance can be placed on the cases of Abdul Rahim and 4 others v. Province of Sindh and 3 others (1983 CLC 1478), State of Gujarat v. Panch of Nani Hamam's Pole (AIR 1986 SC 803), Abdul Ghaffar and Makhdoom Ahmad Ghauns (supra), In the presence of public documents, the other objection of the non-filing of written statement is not very important as legal points were raised in the petition.
10. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in this writ petition which is hereby dismissed.
There shall, however, be no order as to costs.