DECISION ' The present suo motu Revision pertains to an order passed by the learned Presiding Officer (Muhammad Ehtashamuddin Kazmi) Labour Court No. VI, Hyderabad, whereby he dismissed a petition filed under section 11-A of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 filed by the present Informant Messrs Amin Fabrics Limited on the ground that the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.II, Karachi who was holding the Additional Charge of Labour Court No. VI, Hyderabad at that time, was not competent to pass an order of admission, as there had been no Notification by the Government of Sindh under section 35 of I.R.O., 1969 whereby jurisdiction is conferred on various Labour Courts. The relevant paragraph of the impugned order runs as under:--
(5) In exercise of the powers conferred by the said section the Sindh Government issued Notification, dated 28-1-1976, whereby territorial limits of Labour Courts in the province were notified. The Sindh Labour Court at Hyderabad has been assigned the areas Hyderabad, Dadu, Thata, Badin, Mirpurkhas and Sanghar Districts, whereas Labour Court No.2 at Karachi was assigned the areas of other than these Districts.
(6) It is an admitted position on record that the notification as required to be issued under section 35 of I.R.O., 1969 has not been issued by the Sindh Government nor published in the official Gazette.
The Presiding Officer of Sindh Labour Court No.2 at the relevant time merely holding charge of Labour Court No. VI, Hyderabad, holding of charge does not ipso facto confer jurisdiction of Labour Court No.VI, Hyderabad to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.2, Karachi.
' It is now quite clear that the order of admission of above application is without jurisdiction. The above application is dismissed accordingly."
2. I have heard Mr. Muhammad Humayun for the Informant and Rana Mehmood Ali Khan for the other side.
3. After hearing both the learned counsel, I have come to the conclusion that the crucial point to be decided in the present Revision Application is as to what is the status of "Admission Order". Either it is a Judicial Order or is only an Administrative Order. Obviously a Judicial Order cannot be passed unless and until the relevant Court who passes such order has got the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter subjudice before it. On the other hand an Administrative Order does not go through the Judicial Process, and can only be passed on administrative grounds for which conferment of jurisdiction and Judicial Powers is not necessary. I have consulted Black's Law Dictionary which defines the various terms as under: Addition: ' Implies physical contact, something added to another. Structure physically attached to or connected with building itself, Mack v. Eyssell, 332 No. 671, 59 S.W. 2d 1049, Extention; increase; augmentation, Meyering v. Miller, 330 Mo. 885, 51 S.W. 2d 65,
66. That which has become united with or a part of; Additional: ' This term embraces the idea of joining or uniting one thing to another, so as thereby to form one aggregate. Ex parte Boddie, 200 S.C. 379, 21 S.E. 2d 4.8; Charge: ' v. To impose a burden, duty, obligation, or lien; to create a claim against property; to assess; to demand; to accuse; to instruct a jury on matters of law. To impose a tax, duty, or trust. In commercial transactions to bill or invoice; to purchase on credit. In criminal law, to indict or formally accuse; Judicial Order: ' One which involves exercise of judicial discretion and affects final result of litigation. Happy Coal Co. v. Brashear, 263 Ky.257, 92 S.W. 2d 23,27. See also Decision; Decree; Judgment; Order; Judicial Power: ' The authority exercised by that department of Government which is charged with declaration of what law is and its construction. ' The authority vested in Courts and judges, as distinguished from the executive and legislative power. Courts have general powers to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between two persons and parties who bring a case before it for decision; and also such specific powers as contempt powers, power to control admission and disbarment of attorneys, power to adopt rules of Court etc. ' A power involving exercise of judgment and discretion in determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting interests of person or property, as distinguished from ministerial power involving no discretion. Inherent authority not only to decide, but to make binding orders or judgments. Powel v. Femel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d, 592, 594. Power to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before Court for decision. Power that adjudicates upon and protects the rights and interests of persons or property, and to that end declares, construes and applies the law; Jurisdiction: The word is a term of large and comprehensive import, and embraces every kind of judicial action.
Federal Land Bank of Louisville, Ky., v. Crombie, 258 Ky, 383, 80 S.W. 2d 39,
40. It is the authority by which Courts and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund of City of Marietta v. Brooks, 179 Okl, 600, 67 P.2d 4.6; State v. True, Me 330 A.2d 787. The legal right by which judges exercise their authority, Max Ams. Inc. v. Barker, 293 Ky. 698, 170 S.W. 2d 45,
48. It exists when Court has cognizance of class of cases involved, proper parties are present, and point to be decided is within powers of Court. United Cemeteries Co. v.
Strother, 342 Mo. 1155, 119 S.W. 2d 762, 765; Harder v. Johnson, 147 Kan, 440, 76 P.2d 763, 764. Power and authority of a Court to hear and determine a judicial proceeding. In re De Cambllis' Estate, 66 Misc. 2d 882, 322 N.Y.S. 2d 551, 556. The right and power of a Court to adjudicate concerning the subject-matter in a given case. Biddinger v. Fletcher, 224 Ga. 501, 162 S.E. 2d 414, 416.
Areas of authority; the geographic area in which a Court has power or types of cases it has power to hear.
Jurisdictional limits
4. I intend to examine the facts of the present litigation in perspective of the above mentioned definitions as given in the Black's Law Dictionary. The facts indicate that the relevant Application under Standing Order 11-A of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 bearing No.7 of 1996 was presented before the concerned Officer on 10-12- 1996, who recorded his note thereon. There was no Judge and the Additional Charge was with the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. II at Karachi, hence the concerned Officer brought that Application to Karachi on 14-12-1996 and presented it before the learned Presiding Officer, Court No. II. at Karachi who was also holding the Additional Charge of Court No.VI at Hyderabad. The learned Presiding Officer, Court No. II admitted the aforesaid Application for regular hearing by recording the following words:-- "Admit and register. Issue notice to respondent."
5. In my view the Admission Orders are generally of two kinds. The one which are recorded by Lower Courts at the time of presentation of civil suits, applications etc; while the other kind is that which are passed by the Superior Courts at the time of Katcha Peshi. I am of the humble view that the Admission Orders passed by the Lower Courts are of Administrative nature and do not require judicial consideration while the Admission Orders at the stage of Katcha Peshi require judicial consideration by the Superior Courts. So far as the present order is concerned it appears to be an Administrative Order which did not require any judicial consideration. The matter was presented before the. Labour Court No.VI as well. Since the Application was within time and had no other legal defect, hence the learned Presiding Officer Labour Court No.II passed the above mentioned Administrative Order. As such I am of the opinion that the Admission Order passed by learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.II whereby the main petition was admitted, was an administrative order and is not hit by the plea that it was without jurisdiction. The result is that the present suo motu Revision Application is allowed and the impugned order dated 1-11-1997 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.VI, Hyderabad is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Labour Court No.VI, Hyderabad for proceeding further on merits.