' The petitioner is a former member of the National Assembly, Provincial Assembly Punjab and has been senior Minister till November, 1996. Immediately after the dismissed of Federal and Provincial Governments in November, 1996 his name was placed on the Exit Control List by the Federal Government on 7-11-1996. Through this Constitutional petition he has challenged the vires of the fore-referred order on the ground that the same has been done with ulterior motives, that it is violative of Articles 4, 9 and 18 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and that even his Review Application has been dismissed without affording him an opportunity of being heard.
2. In the comments submitted by the Ministry of Interior it has been averred that on the receipt of Letter No, DG(AC Cell) H(48)/97, dated 22-1-1997 from the Anti-Corruption Department, Government of the Punjab, to the effect that the petitioner during his tenure as Senior Minister Punjab used his political influence and got his son Malik Kashif Awan appointed as Assistant Director in the Lahore Development Authority from Chief Minister Punjab in relaxation of qualification/recruitment policy and procedural formalities a reference was sent to the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner. This is the only ground furnished by the Ministry of Interior to pass the impugned order.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order has been passed without any tenable ground; that petitioner's Review Application against the order was dismissed without hearing him which is a mandatory requirement under section 3(2) of the Exit From Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981; that the pendency of Reference before the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner alone is not sufficient ground to pass the impugned order and that petitioner's son Malik Kashif Awan whose illegal appointment has been made basis for the Reference, has neither been suspended nor any notice has been issued to him so far. In the fore-referred background. It was contended that the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. In support of his submissions learned counsel relied on Wajid Shamsul Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad (PLD 1997 Lahore 617), Government of Pakistan and others v. Dada Amir Haider Khan (PLD 1987 Supreme Court 504) and Syed Abul A'la Maududi v. The State Bank of Pakistan (PLD 1969 Lahore 908).
4. The learned Deputy Attorney-General was not in a position to deny that Malik Kashif Awan petitioner's son is still working as Assistant Director in the Lahore Development Authority and that so far no Reference has been sent by the Ehtesab Commissioner to the Ehtesab Bench in this regard.
However; while defending the impugned order he submitted that the order has been passed under section 2 of the Exit From Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981, that there is no jurisdictional defect in the order passed and that since the Reference to the Ehtesab Bench is likely to be sent there was ample justification to pass the impugned order. In support of the suppressions he relied on the judgments, reported in Miss Naheed Khan v. Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 1997 Karachi 513) and Anwar Saifullah Khan v. The Passport and Immigration Officer, Government of Pakistan, University Town, Peshawar and 3 others (PLD 1998 Peshawar 82).
5. Hearr'. Record perused.
6. The questions which crop up for consideration in the instant petition are as follows:--
(i) Whether the right to go abroad is a fundamental right, if so, is the power vested in Government under the Exit From Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 ?
(ii> Whether the impugned order was passed by the authority coin Peten pass it ?
(iii) Whether there was any tenable ground to pass the impugned order
(iv) Whether the Review Application filed by the petitioner against the impugned order was decided in terms of the Exit From Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 ?
7. The fundamental rights of life, liberty, property and the right to be dealt with in accordance with law have been guaranteed in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. A reference to Articles 4 and 9 would be relevant which read as under-- "4. Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law, .Etc,---(1) To enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law is the inalienable right of every citizen, wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time being within Pakistan.
' In particular no action detrimental to the life, liberty. Body, reputation or property of ' any person shall be taken except in accordance with law;
(h) no person shall be prevented from or be hindered in doing that which is not prohibited by law; and
(c) no person shall be compelled do that which the law does not allure him to do."
"9 Security of person.--No person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law."
8. The question whether the right to travel abroad is part of the fundamental right of liberty has engaged the attention of Courts not only within but also beyond the frontiers. In Government of Pakistan and another v. Dada Amu- Haider Khan (PLD 1987 Supreme Court 504), at page 509, it was held as under:- 'Moreover, a citizen's right to travel abroad is an important aspect of the citizen's liberty and is closely related to the rights of free speech and association. As nations in the world become politically and commercially more dependent upon one and another and foreign policy decisions have come to have greater impact upon the lives of the citizens, the right to travel has become correspondingly more important. Through travel, by private citizens as well as by journalists and governmental officials, information necessary to the making of informed decisions can be obtained. And, under our Constitutional system ultimate responsibility for the making of informed decisions rests in the hands of the people."
' In Wajid Shamsul Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad (PLD 1997 Lahore 617), at page 630, it was held as under:-- "In view of the above discussion, I have no doubt in my mind that the right of a citizen to travel abroad is a fundamental right guaranteed by Articles 2A,_ 4, 9, 15 and 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Abridgement of this fundamental right by the State through the legislative or an executive measure has to be tested on the touchstone of the Constitutional provisions. The life, liberty or property of a citizen cannot be taken away or adversely affected except in accordance with law."
' The Supreme Court of United States in the following cases held the right to travel abroad as part of personal freedom:--
(i) RA Williams v. Edgar Fears (1900) 45 La Ed 186;
(ii) Leonand B. Bourdin v. John Foster Dulles /36 Fed. SUP 218;
(iii) 1858-2 Law Fd 2d 1204;
(iv) In Harbert Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 12 Law Ed 992 (by Douglas, J.) observed that "Freedom of movement at home and abroad, is important for job and business opportunities--for cultural, political and social activities--for all the commingling which a gregarious man enjoys. 'Later on the learned Judge emphasised the importance of the said freedom and described it graphically thus: 'America is woven in an international web that makes her one of the family nations. The ties with all the continents are close commercially as well as culturally. Our concerns are planetary, beyond sunrises and sunsets. Citizenship implicates us in the problems and perplexities, as well as in domestic ones. We cannot exercise and enjoy citizenship in world perspective without, the right to travel abroad; and I see no constitutional way to curb it unless, as I said, there in the power to detain "
(v) The Indian Supreme Court in two celebrated judgments reported in Satwant Singh v. A P.O., New Delhi (Subba Rao C.J.) (AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1836 (V' 54 C 359) and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 Supreme Court 597) have held that rights to go abroad s part of the fundamental right to personal liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The right to go abroad has also been recognized by the Comity of Nations and Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights mandates as under:-- "(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his county."
9. Thus, the right to travel and go abroad is indeed a fundamental right. However, its exercise can be regulated by law. The Passports Act, 1974 and the Exit From Pakistan) Control) Ordinance, 1981 are laws which in our context regulate it. Sections 2 and 3 of the Exit From Pakistan (Control)
Ordinance, 1981 mandate as under:-- "2 Power to prohibit exit from Pakistan.---(1) The Federal Government may, by order, prohibit any person or class of persons from proceeding from Pakistan to a destination outside Pakistan, notwithstanding the fact that such person is in possession of valid travel documents.
(2) Before, making an order under subsection (1), it shall not be necessary to afford an opportunity of showing cause against the order.
(3) If, while making an order under subsection (1) it appears to the Federal Government that it will not be in the public interest to specify the grounds on which the order is proposed to be made, it shall not be necessary for the Federal Government to specify such grounds.
"3. Review.---(1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Federal Government under subsection (1) of section 2 may within fifteen days of the making of the order, make a representation to the Federal Government for a review of the order, setting out in the representation the grounds on which he seeks the review.
(2) The Federal Government may, after giving the person making a representation an opportunity of being heard. Make such order as it may deem fit.
(3) Subject to the order of the Federal Government in review, an order under subsection (1) of section 2 shall be final and shall not be called in question before any Court or authority."
10. Besides, the fore-referred Ordinance, the Federal Government has the power to regulate the exit and entry of its citizens under the Passports Act, 1974, the Preamble of which reads as under:- "Whereas it is expedient to regulate departure from the entry into Pakistan and visit to foreign countries of citizens of Pakistan and to provide for matters ancillary there to."
' Section 8 of the Act provided as follow,
8. Power to cancel, impound or confiscate passion.--(1) A passport issued by or on behalf of the Federal Government shall be the property of the Federal Government and may, by an order under the hand of a Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, be required to be returned and shall also be liable to be cancelled, impounded or confiscated by like order.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), before making an order under subsection (1) in respect of the passport issued to any person, the Federal Government shall give such person notice in writing calling upon him to show cause why the order should hot be made: ' Provided that no such notice need be given in the case of an order impounding a passport for a period not exceeding four months and such order which shall take effect as soon as it is made.
(3). If the Federal Government has reason to believe that the person in respect of whose passport it is proposed to make an order under subsection (1) is, or has been engaged in subversive activities or in activities which are prejudicial to the interest of Pakistan or Pakistan's relations with any foreign power, it shall not be necessary to give to such 'person the notice provided for in: subsection (2) or to afford him an opportunity of being heard.
(4) Any person, in respect of whose passport an order under subsection (1) has been made in the circumstances referred to in subsection (3) may, within thirty 'days of the date of the order, apply to the Federal Government for a review of the order, and the decision of the Federal Government in review shall be final."
Under section 8 of the Passports Act a prior notice is imperative. However, there are exceptions to it.
Those exceptions are provided in proviso to section 8(2) and (3). Section 2 of the Exit From Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 which neither stipulates a prior notice nor lays down grounds on the basis of which the order could be passed under subsection (2) of section 2 of the Ordinance. "in public interest, the Federal Government may not even specify such grounds" for passing the order in question. Such an unguided, unrestricted and omnibus power vested in an authority is likely to be misused, persons are likely to he discriminated against and it may lead to arbitrary orders. The existence of such a power in an executive authority, prima facie, is not only violative of Articles 2A, 4, 19 and 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 but is also against the principles of natural justice which primarily mandate as under. ' nemo debet essejudex in propria causa': No one shall be a judge in his own case, and
(ii) "audi alteram partem": No decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing.
11. These age-old principles of equity are, now couched in the concept of procedural fairness. In a modern State, this concept is recognized as a guiding principle not only in judicial but also in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings which affect Fundamental Rights. The Rt. Hon. The Lord Woolf and Jeffrey Jowell in Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th Edition--London Sweet & Maxwell 1995), at page 410, highlight the importance of this concept as under:- "8-021. There is a presumption that procedural fairness is required whenever the exercise of a power adversely affects an individual's rights protected by common law or created by statute.
These include rights in property, personal liberty, status and immunity from penalties or other fiscal impositions. The right or immunity may be enjoyed by either a private person (including a corporation) or a public body.
8-022. The duty to afford procedural fairness is not however limited to the protection of legal rights in the strict sense; it also applies to more general interests, of which the interest in pursuing a livelihood and in personal reputation have received particular recognition. The interests also extend, however, to personal freedom (of a prisoner seeking parole) and other benefits and advantages the conferral of which are in the discretion of the decision-maker (and were formerly regarded as 'privileges', and, thus. Not meriting procedural protection).
8-023. Because the interest of the applicant, rather than the discretionary power of the decision- maker, now founds a right to a fair hearing, a hearing is required in most situations where licences or other similar benefits are revoked, varied, suspended or refused; even where the decision-maker power affords wide discretion to the decision-maker. Thus, a strong presumption exists that a person whose licence is threatened with revocation should receive prior notice of that fact and an opportunity to be heard. The presumption should be especially strong where revocation causes deprivation of livelihood or serious pecuniary loss, or carries an implication of misconduct. For example, in a recent case the applicants, a United States Company, had been encouraged by the Department of Trade and Industry to set up a factory in the United Kingdom manufacturing oral snuff. After an inquiry into its possible carcinogenic effects the Secretary of State for Health made regulations banning the product without providing the company with an opportunity to confront the evidence provided by external Witnesses. It was held that although the applicants had no legitimate expectation of a continuation in Government policy, the adverse effects of the ban on their business interests required a fair hearing the absence of which rendered the regulations void. .8-024. Variation of the terms of an existing licence to the livensee's detriment will also prima facie attract the duty to act fairly. A decision to increase the number of licences, with the effect of diminishing the value of existing licences, may in Some situations also attract the duty. .8-025. Whether a suspension of a licence should be proceeded by notice and opportunity to be heaftl may depend on various factors, for example, the degree of urgency involved the duration of the suspension, whether suspension implies a finding of guilt, whether it entails material financial loss and whether it is a purely temporary measure pending full review."
' It was to emphasise the foregoing principle that in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1969) 2 Ch.D 149 Lord Denning observed as under:-- "Where a public officer has power to deprive a person of his liberty or his property, the general principle is that it has not to be done without his being given an opportunity of being heard and of making representation on his own behalf."
' However, in the contemporary age of fast communications and modes of travel, the State has to take certain preventive measures, pass appropriate orders and issue necessary directions in national interest to ensure that certain individual apprehended from persons accused of crime do not flee abroad. The possible liaison of a citizen with foreign nationals for purposes detrimental to the national interest or the apprehended or possible activities of an individual going abroad may have to be checked through the power vested in the authority to restrict the movement of an individual to go abroad. The vesting of such a discretion in the executive authority, therefore, is in accord with the broad national interest.
' There may be situation when an authority has to act swiftly and it may not be possible to give him prior hearing as in the short time available the sought to be going abroad, may flee. Quoting Lord Reid in Wiseman v. Sorneman (1971 AC 297) and Lord Hailsharn in Berg v. Varty (1971) 1 WLR 728 Justice Bhawati, J. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 Supreme Court 597, at page 630, observed as under:-- "The audi alteram partem rule is sufficiently flexible to permit modifications and variations to suit the exigencies of myriad kinds situations which may arise."
12. The discretion vested in the executive authority has to be exercised in the national interest. To ensure that this authority is exercised for said national/public interest, we have to look for safeguards. External vigilance by the Courts and purposive construction of statutes, therefore, is called for. A closer look at both the enactments (Passports Act and Exit From Pakistan (Control)
Ordinance, 1981) would show that if construed together, the requirements of procedural fairness can be ensured without compromising with compulsions of public or national interest. We noted in paras. 9 and 10 above that the main objective of both the enactments is to regulate the exit of persons from Pakistan. The former enactment (Passports Act) is confined to citizens holding passports, whereas in the latter enactment the canvass appears to be wider and the expression used is "such person". The former is an act of the Parliament and there is a provision of prior notice whereas the latter is an Ordinance promulgated by the Chief Martial Law Administrator at a time when the Constitution of the country was: "held in abeyance". It neither provides right of hearing nor lays down parameters for the exercise of the authority vested in the Federal Government.
Notwithstanding the divergent elements which permeate the two statutes i,e, procedural fairness in the former and arbitrariness in the latter, both the laws are in "part materia" to each other. Both the laws have to be read and construed together. Earl T. Crawford in "The Construction of Statutes" explains the concept of "pan materia" in section 231 at page 431 as under:-- "231. Statutes in part materia.--Statutes in pan material that is, those which relate to the same matter or subject although some may be special and some general, in the event one of them is ambiguous or uncertain, are to be construed together, even if the various statutes have not been enacted simultaneously, and do not refer to each other expressly. And although some of them have been repealed or have expired, or held unconstitutional, or invalid. In this connection however, the legislative intention must not he confounded with the power of the Legislature to carry that intention into effect. To refuse to give force and validity to a law is one thing, and to refuse to read it is a very different thing. It is by a mere figure of speech that we say an unconstitutional statute is stricken out.
' The rule which, thus, allows the Court to resort to statutes relating to the same subject-matter were enacted in accord with the same legislative policy, that together they constitute a harmonious or uniform system of law, and that therefore, in order to maintain this harmony, every statute treating the same subject-matter should not only be considered but also construed to be in harmony with each other in order that each may be fully effective."
While construing the Ordinance (Ordinance XLVI of 1981) we have to realize that the objective conditions have changed since 1981. Today the Constitution, elected Government and Fundamental Rights stand 'restored. Having come to the conclusion that the two statutes are in 'pari materia', cognizant of Articles 2A, 4 and 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and mindful of our commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights this Court is persuaded to hold that all the safeguards of procedural fairness provided in the Passports Act, 1974 shall have to be read into the Exit From Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981. A person whose name is sought to be placed on Exit Control List shall have the same rights including the rights of prior notice as provided in section 8(2) of the Passports Act and notice could only be dispensed with in exceptional circumstances provided in the said Act.
13. Coming to the question whether the order impugned was passed by the authority competent to do, the learned Deputy Attorney--General frankly conceded that there is no specific order by the Secretary Interior on the file. Even in the comments submitted by a Section Officer of the Ministry of Interior no reference has been made as to who passed the order. About the grounds which found favour with the Ministry, the comments merely refer to a letter received from the Anti-Corruption Cell of the Government of the Punjab No, DG(AC Cell) H (48)/97, dated 22-1-1997 to the effect that "Malik Mushtaq Ahmad Awan, during his tenure as Senior Minister Punjab, used, his political influence and got his son Malik Kashif Awan appointed as Assistant Director L.D.A. From Chief Minister Punjab, in relaxation of qualification recruitment policy and procedural formalities through illegal and improper means. As reference accordingly made to the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner on these grounds" Interestingly on Court query the learned Deputy Attorney-General did not deny that petitioner's son is still in service and no action has been taken against him.
14. In the fore-referred circumstances this Court was obliged to requisition the record to find out the factual position. Since no privilege was claimed by the respondents some of the noting in the relevant file are being reproduced as these have an important bearing on the point in issue. The first order on the relevant file is dated 12-11-1996 and the endorsement is by Rao Liaqat Ali, Section Officer, Ministry of Interior, which reads as under:-- "As verbally desired by Joint Secretary (II), a list of 192 persons was circulated by this Division to the F.I.A. On prominent political figures, bureaucrats and other notables affiliated with the previous Government. Another person Mr. Omer son of Mr. Ahmad Sadik was also included in the ECL on 9th November, 1996 as desired by the Joint Secretary (II).
2. An individual can be placed on the ECL only with the prior approval of the Minister/Secretary Interior.
3. In view of the emergency nature of this case no written orders were solicited for placing the 192 persons on the ECL. Secretary Interior may, therefore, kindly give formal ex post facto approval to the inclusion of 193 person on the ECL. It is further submitted that our action is likely to be challenged in the superior Courts and, therefore, it is essential that we may have some material relating to the illegal activities of 113 persons in our record which would justify their inclusion in the SCL in case we have to defend our action in the judiciary. Presently we do not have any such material in our record."
15. The noting indicates that the names of 193 persons which included names of those who hold important positions today were placed on Exit Control List on a verbal direction by the Joint Secretary II, Ministry of Interior, that the Section Officer had sent a summary to the Secretary Interior to the effect that the Ministry did not have sufficient material relating to the illegal activities of those persons and that it would be a difficult task to defend the order in Court. The Secretary Interior in his endorsement dated 12-11-1996 agreed with Part "B" of the noting referred to above which was to the effect, "therefore, it is essential that we may have some material relating to the illegal activities of 193 persons in our record which would justify their inclusion in the ECL". A perusal of the file would show that there is no material against the petitioner in the entire file except the letter from the Anti-Corruption Cell, Government of the Punjab, reference to which has been made in the comments which admittedly was received by the Ministry of Interior after one year and two months of the issuance of list whereby petitioner was brought on the Exit Control List. The petitioner filed representation before Secretary Interior, a report was called for and the concerned Section Officer on 14-7-1997 reported as under:-- "Malik Mushtaq Ahmad (Awan) has submitted an application to review the case of his placement on the ECL on the following grounds:--
(i) He is a patient of Dr. H.D. Rowvotham, London and has taken time from him for 26-7-1997.
(ii) No Criminal/Ehtesab case is pending against him.
(iii) He will come back within a period of one month.
2. Malik Mushtaq Awan was placed on the ECL on 7-11-1996 during the Caretaker Government. No material against him is available with us so far."
The foregoing note reveals that even till 14-7-1997, there was nothing against the petitioner for passing the order in question.
16. One of the most striking feature of the whole exercise under challenge is the fact that the names of most of the persons brought on the Exit Control List were deleted on various dates without any speaking order. It appears that the Government in their "avemgelistic spirit" decided to place the names of 193 persons on the Exit Control List at random and thereafter, chose to retain some and delete others at their sweet discretion. There was no objective criterion. At the asking of the Court as to whether the Ehtesab Commissioner has sent by Reference to the Ehtesab Bench in terms of the letter received from the Punjab Anti-Corruption Cell, the learned Deputy Attorney-General for Pakistan, in all fairness, replied that so far the Ehtesab Commissioner has neither held any inquiry in this regard nor any Reference has been sent to the Ehtesab Bench. The supposedly illegal appointment of petitioner's son has admittedly not been annulled. No Reference has been filed against the then Chief Executive on this ground either. How could appointee's father be proceeded against one wonders. Perhaps that is why the Ehtesab Commissioner has not sent any Reference against the petitioner to the Ehtesab Bench.
17. Notwithstanding the lack of justifiable material and the report of the Section Officer, the Secretary Interior on 16-7-1997 dismissed petitioner's representation without even hearing him which is mandatory in section 3 of the Exit From Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981.
18. The reading of the file of the Ministry of Interior was a painful study of how matters are being managed, handled and decided by an important Department of the State. The list of 193 persons was prepared on verbal instructions by a Joint Secretary and the Secretary Interior merely acted like a rubber stamp on notes sent by the F.I.A. The Review application of the petitioner was dismissed by the Secretary Interior not only in utter derogation to the relevant law but also in disregard to the principles of natural justice. The order reflects a callous attitude as it did not even heed to petitioner's prayer that he was sick and had an appointment with an English doctor in London. The subordinate official did recommend his case on compassionate grounds as also because there was no material against the petitioner. Instead of applying his independent mind the "mighty" servant of the State summarily dismissed the application only because, "F.I.A. Wing say, they have filed a case against him with the Chief Ehtesab Commissioner" whereas the learned Deputy Attorney-General for Pakistan submitted on 28-4-1999 that till that day the Ehtesab Commissioner had not confirmed about pendency of any Reference against the petitioner, despite his best efforts. The manner in which the orders were passed on account of which petitioner was prevented from going abroad despite his medical need is symptomatic of a certain culture i,e, culture of arbitrariness, of partism perception and of expediency. It reminds me of Mark Antony's lament in Shakespear's Julius Caesar, when he said, "0 Judgment! Thou hast fled to brutish beasts and men have lost their reason".
19. It is well-settled now that if an administrative authority has power to determine an issue to the prejudice of another a duty is cast upon him to decide the matter judiciously. One of the strongest institutions that this country inherited was the institution of civil service. The civil servants were trained to serve as guides and administrators in a body politic where socio-political institutions had yet to mature. A civil servant is mandated to assist and advise the political executive with a view to ensure that the affairs of the Government are run in accord with the law and the rules applicable. They are under Oath of their office to uphold the Constitution and laws of the land. They ought to realize that the Governments come and go. They are servants of the State and not of a particular individual. They must remain true to their conscience and to their calling. This is the only way the institution can survive otherwise the general institutional erosion will become worst confounded. As guards of people's rights, they should not compromise. A certain courage is expected of them. They must know that the rights of the people cannot be bartered away at the altar of expediency and compulsions of a passing phase.
20. For what has been discussed above, I hold that the Secretary Interior ho was competent to pass the order did not pass the initial order, there was no arterial existing at the relevant time to pass the impugned order, the ground hitch has been pressed into service by the respondent through submission of comments is not tenable and that the Review Application filed by the petitioner as dismissed by the Secretary Interior without application of mind and in isolation of the mandatory provisions of relevant law. This petition is, therefore, allowed and the act/order dated 7-11-1996 regarding placing petitioner's name n the Exit Control List, which is impugned herein is held to have been passed without lawful authority and the same, to the extent of the petitioner, is set) aside.
Respondent No,5 (Director Passports, Regional Office, Lahore) is directed to issue passport to the petitioner forthwith.