' MUNAWAR AHMED MIRZA, J.---This appeal, by leave of the Court, is directed against judgment dated 24th January, 1994, passed by Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Criminal Appeal No,134 of 1990.
2. Occurrence had taken place on 7-2-1989 in Deh-91 near Tubewell of Nazir Ahmed, Mauza Muhammadpurwala, Tehsil Lodhran, District Multan about ten kilometres on northern side of Police Station Saddar, Kehror Pacca.
' It is the case of prosecution that on the date of occurrence complainant Noor Muhammad injured, P.W.13 Amir, deceased Ramzan, deceased Imam Bakhsh, deceased Nazeer and deceased Kabir had assembled in the morning hours at the Dera of Nazir Ahmad for weighing the cotton. Around 8.00 a.m. When they were busy in their work that all of a sudden both appellants Majeed and Manzoor alongwith four companions namely Sadiq Hussain, Amir son of Makhana, Talib and Muhammad Yar armed with deadly weapons arrived raising Lalkara holding out that none from the family should be spared. As a result of their firing deceased Imam Bakhsh, deceased Ramzan, deceased Nazeer and deceased Kabir received fatal injuries and expired on the spot, whereas P.W.13 Amir also suffered four injuries on his person. The accused left the scene firing indiscriminately and while decamping also damaged by firing Honda Motorcycle (Exh.P.31), which was parked nearby. Appellants Majeed and Manzoor besides three co-accused namely Sadiq Hussain, Amir son of Makhana and Talib were sent up for trial under section 302/307/427/148/149/109, P.P.C. Before Judge, Punjab Special Court No, VII (Suppression of Terrorist Activities) Multan Division. Whereas Sixth accused Muhammad Yar was shown as absconder and necessary steps as contemplated by law were drawn against him.
3. It may be seen that after recording proceedings and appreciation of evidence brought on record, learned Judge, Special Court No, VII for Suppression of Terrorist Activities, Multan Division, by means of judgment dated 30-5-1990 found both the appellants guilty for committing murder of deceased Iman Bakhsh, Ramzan, Nazcer and Kabir and launching murderous attack on P.W.13 Amir.
Appellants were convicted by the trial Court under section 302/34, P.P.C. And sentenced to death, besides fine of Rs,20,000 each or in default to undergo R.I for three years each on four counts. They were also convicted under section 307/34 P.P.C. And sentenced to R.I. For ten years besides fine of Rs,10,000 each or in default further R.I. For two months. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. Whereas remaining three co-accused namely, Sadiq Hussain, Amir son of Makhana and Talib were acquitted of the charges by extending benefit of doubt.
4. The appellants filed Criminal Appeal No, 134 of 1990 before Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which was eventually decided vide judgment dated 24-1-1994. On considering entire facts and circumstances, while maintaining conviction against both the appellants, sentence of death awarded to them by trial Court was modified and converted into imprisonment for life. Remaining sentences pertaining to offence under section 307/34, P.P.C. And fine as well as compensation recorded against them by trial Court were maintained.
5. Jail Petition No,56 of 1994 was filed by the appellants assailing above judgment of the High Court.
This Court granted leave on 18-10-1994 for considering whether ocular testimony of injured witness Amir was sufficient to sustain conviction and sentences of the appellants in view of enmity between the parties.
6. Mr. Javaid Aziz Sandhu, Advocate Supreme Court, appearing for appellants, emphatically urged that injured P.W.13 Amir was real brother of two deceased and inimical towards accused party.
Therefore, despite undisputed presence on the spot on account of injuries, his version being deeply interested and partisan cannot be deemed sufficient for recording conviction against appellants without independent corroboration, which, according to him, was lacking in the instant case.
Learned counsel, thus, stressed that conviction and sentences awarded to appellants were not sustainable.
7. Mr. Dil Muhammad Tarar, Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the State, vehemently controverted the contentions raised by learned counsel for appellants and maintained that all aspects of the case have been duly taken into consideration in the impugned judgment. Learned counsel contended that testimony of P.W. Amir was confidence inspiring and apparently truthful which is supported by medical evidence and motive.
8. We have given our anxious thoughts to all aspects of the case and perused the record. There is no dispute that P.W.13 Amir, who has been seriously injured is closely related to deceased persons and there is also basis of hostility existing against the appellants. Record manifests that P.W. 13 Amir had received four fire-arm injuries on his person. He was admitted in hospital for treatment.
His presence at the time of occurrence has not been challenged, because none of the injuries can be deemed self-inflicted. P.W.13 Amir in his deposition before the Court has given detailed account of incident wherein he has attributed direct responsibility of appellants with regard to fie-arm injuries caused to abovenamed four deceased persons. His testimony could not be shaken despite scarching cross-examination. Factually ocular account furnished by P.W.13 Amir is supported by medical evidence. Question which particularly requires examination revolves around the fact whether statement of P.W. 13 Amir, which apparently inspires confidence, can be discarded merely because he is related to deceased persons or that he has some hostility against the accused party. There is no gainsaying the fact that enmity is a double edged weapon and it can equally constitute a motive for launching attack upon complainant party as expressly set up by the prosecution in the present case. Factum of interested injured witnesses has been considered by this Court in various judgments, some of which are reproduced below:-
(i) 1994 SCM R 1 (Iqbal alias Bhala v. The State)
"5. The fact that P.W.10 was an injured witness is a very important factor in appraising his testimony.
Mere friendship or relationship does not make a witness an interested one and testimony of such a witness who otherwise seems to be a truthful witness cannot be rejected on such ground. An interested witness is one who has a motive for falsely implicating an accused, is a partisan and is involved in the matter against the accused. Friendship or relationship with the deceased will not be sufficient to discredit a witness particularly when there is no motive to falsely involve the accused.
The principles for accepting the testimony of even an interested witness are set out in Nazir v. The State, PLD 1962 SC 269. In the present case P.W.10 is not an interested witness as nothing has been brought on record to show that he had motive for falsely implicating the appellants or was personally involved in any act of enmity between the parties. In Khalil Ahmad v. The State (1976 SCM R 161) the testimony of deceased's son aged 15 years was accepted as he was not personally involved in any act of enmity and his statement was consistent, corroborated by the presence of injuries on his person. Human blood-stained articles recovered from the accused and supported by two other witnesses. In Allah Ditta and others v. The State (1970 SCM R 734) the testimony of four P.Ws. Out of which two had sustained injuries was accepted although they were related to the deceased because they were natural witnesses, injuries sustained by two P.Ws. Proved their presence and involvement in the occurrence and there was motive on the part of the accused to attack the deceased. Further, their evidence found support from the medical evidence. Reference can also be made to Muhammad Akbar v. Muhammad Khan and others (PLD 1988 SC 274) and Shehruddin v. Allah Rakhia (1989 SCM R 1461 at 1465) where testimony of injured witness was accepted. In assessing the value of evidence of eye- witnesses it is necessary to examine whether in the facts and circumstances of the case their presence at the scene of occurrence in such a situation as would make it possible for them to witness it should be believed and further that whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence."
(ii) 1998 SCM R 1814 (Muhammad Ali v. Muhammad Yaqoob): "7. Before considering the above contentions on merit, it would be appropriate to state here first, some of the broad legal principles enunciated by this Court which should be kept in mind while deciding a case involving capital punishment. One such principle is that, if an interested witness claiming to be an eye-witness charges a person with the commission of an offence, the first thing which the Court has to determine is, whether he saw the occurrence and was in a position to identify the accused and secondly, whether he should be believed for convicting the offender without corroboration. If the interested witness has charged only one person with the commission of offence or has charged more than one person and the number of persons charged by him appear to be reasonable from the circumstances of the case, then in the absence of anything in the evidence which rendered it unsafe to rely on his evidence, his evidence is to be accepted without corroboration as substitution is a thing of rare occurrence and cannot be assumed readily and he who asserts substitution must lay foundation for it. But if the Court finds that the interested witness has exaggerated the number of accused, the Court will insist for corroboration of his testimony from some additional circumstances in the case. (see Niaz v. State PLD 1960 SC 387)
9. Thus, fortified by the dictum laid in aforequoted judgments and thorough analysis of circumstances pertaining to instant case we are satisfied that testimony of P.W.13 Amir is truthful and confidence inspiring. Besides it is supported by medical evidence and motive. Both the. Courts below by assigning sound reasons have drawn conclusions regarding involvement of appellants for commission of offence whereby four innocent persons were done to death besides injuries to P.W. Amir. Thus, on independent reappraisal we are satisfied that impugned judgment is not open to any exception.
' For the foregoing reasons appeal has no merits, which is accordingly dismissed.