SHAIKH ABDUR RAZZAQ, J.~ Through this Constitutional petition Mahabat Khan and others seek quashment of FIR No. 293, dated 30.6.1996 under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 PPC registered at Police Station Satiana District Faisalabad.
2. Briefly stated the facts are that the parties are closely related and respondent No. 6 being paternal uncle of petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 executed an agreement to sell on 26.8.1994, in the presence of marginal witnesses, with petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 pertaining to agricultural land measuring 93 kanals 11 marlas situated in Chak No. 277 GB Tehsil Jaranwala District Faisalabad for a consideration of Rs. 4,75,000/- and received Rs. 4,50,000/- and delivered its possession. It was agreed that balance amount of Rs. 25,000/- shall be paid at the time of attestation of the mutation or registration of sale deed. Later on respondent No. 6 vide mutation No. 466, dated 31.10.1994 gifted land measuring 83 kanal 15 marlas out other above-mentioned land in favour of his sons Muhammad Amin and Muhammad Munir (respondents Nos. 4 and 5), after resiling from agreement to sell dated 26.8.1994. On coming to know about the mutation referred above the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 were constrained to file a suit for specific performance of agreement against respondents Nos. 4 and 5 on 8.2.1996. During the pendency of said suit respondent No. 6 Makhan also find a suit for declaration on 4.1.1997 against petitioners No. 1 to 3 and donees (respondents Nos. 4 and 5) wherein he challenged the vires of agreement dated 26.8.1994 being forged, based on fraud, fictitious, false and without consideration. Both the suits were consolidated and are pending adjudication before the Civil Judge, Jaranwala wherein petitioner have concluded their evidence and now matter is pending for recording evidence of respondents. During the evidence of petitioners, the agreement to sell dated 26.8.1994 has been exhibited as Ex.PL Drug the pendency of said suits Muhammad Amin respondent No. 4 son of Mokhan (respondent No. 6) with the connivance and support of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 has succeeded in lodging FIR No. 293, dated 30.6.1996 against the present petitioners.
3. The registration of said FIR has been challenged and its quashment has been sought through the instant Constitutional petition moved under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
4. Contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that since agreement to sell dated 26.8.1994 is sub judice before the Civil Court, so criminal prosecution regarding the same document cannot be launched. In support of his contention he has relied upon Muhammad Yaqub v. SHO and others (1997 M LD 2097).
5. Conversely the stand of learned counsel for respondents Nos. 4 to 6 is that criminal prosecution can be launched in respect of a document which is the result of fraud and forgery and which is subject-matter of a civil suit, provided the said forgery is alleged to have been committed prior to the institution of civil suit. He next argued that as agreement to sell dated 26.8.1994 has been fabricated prior to filing the instant suits, so a criminal prosecution can be launched. In support of his contention he has relied upon Abdul Jabbar v. The State and others (1998 P. Cr. L. J 1126) Lahore.
6. The only point which requires determination is, if a criminal prosecution can be launched in respect of a document which is the subject-matter of civil litigation. There is no doubt that on the basis of agreement dated 26.8.1994 a suit for specific performance has been find against respondents Nos. 4 and 6 and similarly a suit for declaration has also been find by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 against the present petitioner seeking a declaration to the effect that the said document is a forged one.
7. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that since agreement to sell Ex. P-1 has been produced in the Civil litigation before the learned civil litigation before the learned Civil Judge, the registration of case is in violation of Section 195(l)(c) of Cr.P.C.
8. Section 195 (1) (c) is reproduced as under:- ' Section 195(1). No Court shall take cognizance:--
(a) of any offence described in section 463 or punishable under section 47l, section 475 or section 476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceedings in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceedings, except on the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate."
9. It is apparent from a perusal of Section 195(l)(c) read with Sections 475 and 476 Cr.P.C, that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence committed in relation to document which was produced before a Court in the course of judicial proceedings. There is no cavil to this proposition. But the question is if the criminal prosecution can be launched only by the Court before whom a forged document is pending or it can be launched by a person who has been defrauded as a result thereof and that too much prior to the production of that document. In Muhammad Shafi's case (PLD 1992 Lah. 178) Full Bench of this Court discussed this point very extensively indeed. Their Lordships examined the view supporting the prosecution, despite the pendency of civil suit and so also the contrary, view in minute details and came to the conclusion that the bar only related to those cases which have close nexus between the offences and proceeding of the civil case. It would be instructive to refer to the exact wordings of their Lordships:- "Now can it be said that the offence of forgery was against the administration of justice in a case in which the offence was committed. Say, ten or twenty years before the suit in which the forged document was produced or given in evidence? The answer must obviously be in the negative. The forger must have, before the suit, used the forged document on a number of occasions in deceiving a number of persons and when his fraud and forgery came to light and the real owner or the persons defrauded were preparing to take criminal proceedings, he hit upon the clever device of instituting a civil suit and producing the forged document in the civil suit. He would, then, on the view contended for by the petitioner, be able to say; 'Well, I have produced the document in the Civil Court, you have to wait till that Court has finally decided the genuineness or otherwise of the document, for unless that is done that Court will not be in a position to say whether an offence of forger was committed or not and to lodge a complaint under section 195. 'Unfortunately civil suits usually take very long time to decide and in practical terms, it may amount to completely defeating the ends of justice. On this view, therefore, the Civil Courts will become a place for the protection of criminals. This obviously could not have been the intention of the law. The cause of action for proceedings against the forgery arose immediately when the offence of forgery as defined in section 463 of the PPC was committed. The commission of that offence was not only intended to deprive the real owner of his property but had also enabled the forger to deceive others and to deprive them money. No proceedings were pending in any Court at that time. There was, therefore, no question of the offence, at the ' date of its commission. Being against the Court or the administration of justice, nor did it, then, in any way sully the proceedings of the Court, for none were pending.
10. Following the dictum laid down in the afore-referred authority, it is held that there are no grounds for quashing the FIR in this case. The writ petition is hereby dismissed. However, the police is directed to proceed with the investigation fairly and properly.