1. ' This revision petition is directed {{URDU TEXT}} against an order passed on May 29, 1998 by the Additional District Judge, Muzaffarabad.
2. ' Facts relevant for the disposal of this revision petition briefly stated are that the land in dispute was purchased by the vendee-petitioner for an ostensible sale price of Rs,1,55,000 vide registered sale-deed, dated July 20, 1994. Syed Yusuf Shah, plaintiff pre-empted this sale on November, 27, 1994. On February 7, 1998 issues were settled by the trial Court and the plaintiff-pre-emptor was directed to deposit 1/5th of the probable value of the suit land or in alternate file a security bond to this extent up to March 14, 1998, the next date of hearing. On March 14, 1998, it was brought to the notice of the Court that in the main suit, the service has not been effected on the defendants Nos.2 to 4. Therefore, the Court, once again, issued notices for the service of defendants Nos.2 to 4 and fixed the case for April 15, 1998. The Court also extended the time for furnishing security bond to the extent of 1/5th of the consideration amount. This appears to have been passed on the request of the plaintiff-pre-emptor. It being relevant is reproduced as under:-- ' On March 19, 1998 an application was moved by the vendee-petitioner seeking dismissal of the suit on the ground that the plaintiff-pre-emptor was ordered on February 7, 1998 to deposit 1/5th of the consideration amount up to March 14, 1998 or in alternate file a security bond to the extent of sale price but he has failed to do the needful, therefore, his suit be dismissed.
3. ' The trial Court, on May 29, 1998, after taking into consideration the respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, dismissed the said application. Hence the present revision petition.
4. ' Mr. Muhammad Yaqoob Mughal, Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in this case there was no justification for the Court to extend time because no sufficient cause was shown by the pre-emptor. According to him no doubt under subsection (4) of section 21 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act, powers were available to the Court to grant extension of time either on an application or even on oral request where justification of the cause shown in the application or oral request so demands but in the present case the discretion has not been exercised judicially because no sufficient cause was shown by the pre-emptor. According to the learned counsel, object of deposit of Zar-e-Panjam or in alternate demand of security bond to the extent of sale price is to protect the interest of vendee against frivolous proceedings on the part of a pre-emptor.
5. According to him, the powers given to the Court under subsection (4) of section 21 are required to be exercised judicially, if sufficient cause is shown to exceed for its exercise. In the present case the impugned order was not passed in proper exercise of the discretion. He in support of his contention has placed reliance upon the following cases:-
(1) Niger Muhammad v Matwali PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 55.
(2) Ferzand Ali v. Muhammad Hussain etc. 1998 M LD 1652.
6. In both these cases it has been laid down that provisions contained in section 21(4) are mandatory in nature, therefore, the Court in the absence of sufficient cause is bound to reject the plaint if order of the Court for the deposit of Zar-ePanjum or security bond in alternate is flouted.
7. ' Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, argued that the defendant-petitioner had friendly relations with the clerk of the Court who recorded all the orders of the trial Court, which were not made known to his client by the said clerk. According to him, his client has furnished personal security on April 30, 1998 which was accepted by the trial Court. The proceedings, therefore, suffer from no irregularity or illegality justifying the interference of this Court in its revisional jurisdiction.
8. ' I have considered the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and examined the material available on record.
9. Under law the pre-emptor can be ordered either to deposit 1/5th of the sale price in cash or in alternate file a security bond to the extent of sale consideration. In the present case, the plaintiff- pre-emptor was ordered to deposit 1/5th of the sale price or in alternate file security bond to the extent of "Zar-e-Panjum".
10. ' In the light of orders available on the record, it cannot be said that the Clerk of the Court on account of friendly relations with the vendee-petitioner, had shown lenient view for him. All the orders bear the signatures of the Presiding Officer of the trial Court. These, therefore, shall be presumed to have been passed by him. Even otherwise the contention of the respondent is without any substance because he was asked to file objections on the application, which was moved by the vendee-petitioner, seeking dismissal of the suit for disobeying the order of the Court. In his objections he has not pleaded that he failed to obey the orders of the Court as these were written by the Clerk without his knowledge, who had friendly relations with the petitioner. The argument beyond the scope of the pleadings cannot be entertained.
11. ' In the light of arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties, the decision of this revision petition depends on the interpretation of section 21 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act.
12. Therefore, it will be desirable to reproduce this provision of law in extenso:-- "21. Plaintiff may be called upon to make deposit or file security.---(1) In every such suit the Court shall at, or at any time before, the time of settlement of issues, require the plaintiff to deposit in the Court such sum as is in the opinion of the Court equal to one-fifth of the probable value of the land or property or require the plaintiff to give security to the satisfaction of the Court for the payment of a sum not exceeding such probable value within such time as the Court may fix in such order.
(2) In the case of an appeal, the Appellate Court may at any time exercise the powers conferred on a Court under subsection (1).
(3) Every sum deposited or secured under subsection (1) or (2) shall be available for the discharge of costs.
(4) If the plaintiff fails within the time fixed by the Court or within such further time as the Court may fix to make the deposit or furnish the security under subsection (1) or (2) his plaint shall be rejected or his appeal dismissed as the case may be.
(5) (a) If the plaintiff withdraws any amount deposited in the aforesaid manner, his suit or appeal shall be dismissed.
(b) If any security furnished for any cause becomes void or insufficient, the Court shall order the plaintiff to furnish fresh security or to increase the security, as the case may be, within a time to be fixed by the Court and if the plaintiff fails to comply with such order, the suit or appeal shall be dismissed.
(6) The estimate of the probable value made for the purpose of subsection (1) shall not affect any decision subsequently come to as the market value of the property."
(7) From the bare reading of subsections (1), (2) and (4) of section 21 it becomes clear that the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court does possess powers to extend time for the deposit of one- fifth of probable sale price or security bond. However, like other powers vested in the Courts, the discretionary powers allowed under subsection (4) of section 21 are expected to be exercised by the Courts on sound judicial principles. The pre-emptor therefore, is expected to explain his failure to comply with the orders of the Court justifying his prayer by disclosing sufficient cause for extension in time. The same view was expressed by the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir in "Ferzand Ali v. Muhammad Hussain etc." (1998 M LD 1652): "In our view these provisions embodied in section 21 (4) are mandatory in nature and the Court in absence of a sufficient cause is to pass an order in accordance therewith in rejecting the plaint if the order is flouted. The right of preemption being in the nature of a piratical right, the Courts have always leaned against it and while allowing such a right have consistently insisted upon the strict compliance of law applicable to preemption; and this is the reason that the provisions of pre- emption laws are necessarily to be construed conservatively and applied strictly. The Courts are not to act mechanically and are not required to take leniently the circumstances which led to an omission. It may also be observed that in the instant case when the time for deposit was extended by the Court up till January 21, 1997, afterwards the same was neither extended by the High Court during the pendency of the revision petition nor by the trial Court after the dismissal of the revision petition. In these circumstances the deposit thus made by the appellant after the lapse of period fixed could not be construed to be a valid deposit under any circumstances."
13. In the present case, the trial Court has extended time for the deposit of security bond to the extent of sale price in routine without ail)/ sufficient cause.
14. ' For the above stated reasons, this revision petition is allowed and the order of the trial Court is set aside. Consequently the suit of the plaintiff pre-emptor stands dismissed.