' SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, J.---Khawaj Muhammad son' of Khushal of village Gandhian Mansehra, through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, has called into question the order, dated 15-2-1997 of the learned District Judge, Mansehra whereby he had dismissed the appeal against the judgment and decree, dated 7-10-1996 of learned Judge Family Court, Mansehra; on the ground that he lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal due to the maintenance having been fixed by the Family Court at Rs,500 per month for each child of the petitioner.
2. Khawaj Muhammad petitioner and Mst. Chan Mehraj being husband and wife had given birth to two daughters and a son named Nadia, Sonia and Zubair. Their relationship broke apart due to divorce whereafter the three children aforesaid through their mother sued the father for maintenance at Rs,500 per month per child. Vide judgment, dated 7-10-1996 learned Judge Family Court decreed that suit in favour of the minor children at the rate of Rs,500 per month per child with effect from the institution of suit till the age of majority. Learned District Judge, Masehra in his impugned judgment was of the view that as the maintenance is fuxed at the rate of Rs,500 per month, he lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
3. For convenience of reference section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 is reproduced below:-- ' Section 14. "Appeal.--(1) Notwithstanding anything provided in any other law for the time being in force, a decision given or a decree passed by a Family Court shall be appealable--
(a) to the High Court, where the Family Court is presided over by a District Judge, an Additional District Judge, or a person notified by Government to be of the rank and status of a District Judge or an Additional District Judge; and
(b) to the District Court, in any other case.
(2) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by a Family Court---
(a) for dissolution of marriage, except in the case of dissolution for reasons specified in clause (d) of item (viii) of section (2) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.
(b) for dower not exceeding rupees fifteen thousand;
(c) for maintenance of rupees five hundred or less per month."
4. Saleh Bin Ahmed Sultan took the view that the learned first Appellate Court, in view of section 14(1)(b) of the Act was not a Family Court but was a District Court and hence the legal provision of civil law will be applicable to it. He further reiterated with reference to section 18 of West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 that the forum of appeal, so far as the District Court is concerned, is determined by original valuation as fixed in the plaint. Though, undisputedly the valuation in the plaint was fixed at Rs,2,500 and hence deriving jurisdiction from the original plaint, the learned District Court would have jurisdiction because the amount of Rs,2,500 decidedly exceeds the amount of Rs,500 per month mentioned in section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964.
Reliance was placed oh Gul Zaman v. Muhammad Shafique (PLD 1989 Pesh. 247).
5. The above view had long before been taken by Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Mst.
Khudaijatul Kubra v. Mst Amina Khatun (AIR 1924 Allahabad 388) and was reiterated by Azad Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Sain v. Said Muhammad (PLD 1967 Azad J&K 67). We in the light of section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance and the case-law on the subject affirm and hold the view that in civil matters, the jurisdiction of a District Court is determined by the jurisdiction fixed by the plaintiff in the plaint, regardless of what eventually happens to be the decretal amount.
6. So far as the Family Courts are concerned, we are faced with a little interesting intellectual exercise. Mr. Ejaz Afzal Khan, learned counsel for the respondents has taken the stance that the above view of the jurisdiction with reference to section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 may well be taken qua civil suits but it cannot be equated with a family case. He elaborated his point saying that in a civil suit the fixation of valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction in a plaint is necessary with reference to the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act, because different Presiding Officers of Civil Courts are vested with varying jurisdiction and hence the fixation of valuation in plaint considerably matters; whereas, in a Family Court this valuation is of least consideration' onsideration because a Family Court has unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction.
7. The argument of the learned counsel is not without force but let us try to solve the problem by keeping both the options in view i,e, one under section 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 and the other under section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. Under section 14 of the Act the first appellate authority, in case the original judgment is given by a Family Court presided over by a Civil Judge, is the District Court. The very designation of Court as District Court would mean that it would be a District Judge and hence would derive jurisdiction from that civil law which normally gives jurisdiction to a District Judge. In that case we would have to resort to the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, section 18 whereof precisely refers to the plaint wherefrom a District Judge would derive jurisdiction. Seen in the light of Civil Courts Ordinance, the District Judge in the present case would derive jurisdiction from the plaint where the valuation is fixed admittedly at Rs,2,500. The amount being beyond Rs,500 per month, the District Judge would certainly have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
8. The second option is under section 14 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. It is settled principle of the interpretation of statutes that an enactment shall always be interpreted in the simplest form which is possible from the plain terminology used in the enactment. The plain terminology used in section 14 of the Act is that a District Judge would have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal when a decree passed by a Family Court for maintenance remains at Rs,500 or less per month. In these circumstances, the decree in hand passed by the Family Court for maintenance is for Rs,1,500 per month which exceeds Rs,500 per month and hence is appealable. The District Judge has got the jurisdiction to entertain and hear the appeal.
9. The learned counsel for the respondents/decree-holders came up with the argument that if the respondents had considered the maintenance to be insufficient and had come in appeal, what would have been the fate of such appeal because the amount, decreed in their favour is Rs,500 per month. It is not difficult to answer the argument because Rs,500 per month seems to be relevant when taken in case of individual child whereas the decree is joint amounting to Rs,1,500 per month and hence the respondents also could have gone in appeal in view of the interpretation of section 14 made above. The interpretation is applicable to both the parties without creating any anomaly.
10. The last argument on behalf of the decree-holders was as to what would have been the situation if each child had filed a separate suit and had obtained a decree for maintenance of Rs,500 per month. We do agree with the learned counsel that had such been the situation and had three separate decrees been obtained by three separate children at the rate of Rs,500 per month, the decree would not have been appealable and the District Judge would have had no jurisdiction to hear each individual appeal. This being a pure assumption and a simple scenario, the case in hand is altogether different from the assumption taken. Had three different suits been filed and decrees obtained, no complication at all would have arisen. But, now when all the three children joined together and obtained a joint decree where the amount exceeds the one given in section 14 of the Family Courts Act, the appeal would certainly lie before the District Judge and the District Judge would have jurisdiction because the decree for maintenance is not for Rs,500 per month but is one for Rs,1,500 per month. This we say at the cost of repetition, that the plain words of section 14 demand so by not referring to a decree per head and by referring to a decree per month alone.
The amount would be construed for each month and not for each head.
11. Consequently, it is held that while refusing to hear the appeal, the learned District Judge has acted without jurisdiction. The writ petition is accepted, the impugned order, dated 15-2-1997 of the learned District Judge, Mansehra is set aside, Appeal No, ,15/FC instituted on 29-10-1996, "Khawaj Muhammad v. Mst. Nadia and others" is revived and the learned Judge is directed to hear and decide the appeal in accordance with law. Parties are directed to appear before the learned District Judge, Mansehra on 7-12-1998.