' The petitioner was serving as Publicity Secretary in the Azad Kashmir Logging and Saw Mill Corporation when his services were taken on contract for appointment as Director, Kashmir Liberation Movement Cell. The order of his appointment in the Cell was issued by Secretary of the Cell on 3rd of August, 1987. It was mentioned therein that the petitioner's appointment was temporary and that he would be on contract which may be terminated on one month's notice. It was further laid down that his lien in Azad Kashmir Logging and Saw Mill Corporation shall be retained. He was to get a consolidated salary of Rs,3,500. In the Cell the petitioner was subsequently posted as Research Officer in B-17. Later on, 2nd of January 1993 he was promoted as Director Cultural in B-18.
2. On 5th of January, 1997 a notification was issued terminating the services of the petitioner with immediate effect. The order mentioned above was challenged by the petitioner by filing a writ petition in which various grounds were raised. Before filing the writ petition the petitioner had filed a representation with the Prime Minister who passed the following order on the revision petition:-- "Reconsider the orders as he is permanent employee."
' The order was marked to Secretary Services. In the writ petition the petitioner relied on the aforesaid order and sought its implementation.
3. The High Court has dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner on the ground that he was a temporary employee and no writ was maintainable at his instance. About the order of the Prime Minister mentioned above it has been held by the High Court that a photo copy had been produced but it was inadmissible.
4. Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the High Court fell in error in holding that a temporary employee could not file a writ petition. However, the learned counsel could not show any valid ground on which the writ petition should have been admitted for regular hearing. I have already reproduced the contents of the order by which the petitioner was appointed in the Kashmir Liberation Cell. It is specifically mentioned therein that the petitioner's service in the Cell was to be temporary and on contract which was terminable on one month's notice. In the first place the rule is well-settled that a writ does not lie to enforce a contract as is evident from the judgment of this Court in Azad Government and others v. Neelum Flour Mills, Muzaffarabad (1992 SCR 381). The relevant portion of that judgment runs as follows-- ' ...We find force in the argument of Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan, the learned counsel for the appellants, that the phraseology of section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 clearly indicates that jurisdiction conferred by that section is exercisable only if the petitioner before the High Court bases his grievance on violation of a law and, thus, any grievance which is based on violation of a contract is clearly excluded."
' Apart from that, as has been laid down in the passage extracted above, an order can only be set aside in exercise of writ jurisdiction if it violates any legal provision but no such situation exists in the present case as no violation of law or of any instrument having the force of law has been shown. The petitioner's service remained temporary till the end and could be terminated at any time. Even otherwise Kashmir Liberation Cell is not a Government department and its service carries no guarantees.
5. The order of the Prime Minister passed on the representation filed by the petitioner has not been considered by the High Court as it was a photo copy which was not admissible. However, it was contended by Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan that an affidavit had been given in support of the authenticity of the order of the Prime Minister and that it was a prima facie proof of its authenticity.
He submitted that questions of fact in a writ petition have to be decided on affidavits. The submission has force but, as will be presently seen, the order does not improve the petitioner's case.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the order passed by the Prime Minister in favour of the petitioner. I regret to point out that the observation made therein that the petitioner was a permanent employee runs counter to the record. I have already reproduced and discussed the nature of petitioner's incumbency in the Kashmir Liberation Cell. It was purely temporary and on contract. It is well-settled that while exercising writ jurisdiction the High Court C or this Court only enforces an order which is legal and valid and it also qualifies the test of being in consonance with justice and equity. After a close look at the representation on which the Prime Minister was pleased to pass the order under reference it becomes clear that the representation appears to have been presented n person and also that before passing the order neither any comments were obtained nor the relevant record was perused. Therefore, I am clear in my mind what a writ cannot be issued for implementation of such an order.
' For the reasons stated above I find no force in this petition and order its dismissal.