' MAMOON KAZI, J.---Leave is sought against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court Sindh, dated 23-10-1998. Whereby F.R.A. No, 191 of 1993 filed by the respondent against the petitioner was allowed and the order passed by the Rent Controller. Dated 28-2-1993, granting ejectment application of the petitioner was set aside.
2. The facts forming the background of this petition are that, the petitioner who is the landlord, instituted ejectment proceedings against the respondent on the ground of default in payment of rent and additions and alterations in the demised premises. The premises in occupation of the .Respondent had been purchased by the petitioner from the original landlord and a notice under section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 had been served on the respondent.
Nookithstanding the same. The respondent failed to pay or tender rent to the petitioner which had become due from January.
1987. As such ejectment proceedings were instituted against the respondent.
3. Before the Rent Controller; the attorney of the petitioner, Usman Ahmed. Tiled his affidavit-in- evidence and so did the respondent. The respondent also filed affidavits by the previous owner of the demised premises and one Shabbir Ahmed Khalid. But they were not cross-examined by the petitioner. The learned Controller on their evidence decided that the rent was Rs,140 per month. He further held that the respondent had committed willful default in payment of rent and he had also made some additions and alterations in the premises which had impaired their material value and utility, Consequently, he directed the respondent to vacate the premises in question within sixty days from passing of the said order.
4. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the respondent filed appeal before the High Court which Was heard by the learned Single Judge, who set aside the order of the Rent Controller on the ground of default. The learned Judge found that rent for the months of January, February and March, 1987 had been sent by the respondent through money order, dated 26-2-1987 to the previous owner of the said premises, Abdul Razzaque, but the money order was returned.
Thereafter, the respondent deposited such rent in the Court, although in the name of the previous landlord, on 21-3-1987. No doubt, notice under section 18 of the Rent Ordinance, dated 16-3-1987 had been served on the respondent which was also replied to by the respondent on 25-3-1987, but the petitioner was required by :he respondent to establish his ownership. However, admittedly, no reply was received from the petitioner, therefore, the latter started depositing rent in the Court in the name of the petitioner. A money order was also sent by the respondent to the petitioner, dated 9-6-1987, but admittedly, the same was not accepted by the petitioner with the result that the respondent promptly deposited rent in the Court on 14-7-1987. Consequently, in view of the said circumstances, the learned Judge in the High Court came to the conclusion that no wilful default had been committed by the respondent as alleged by the petitioner. The learned Judge in the High Court further noticed that, even the tentative rent order passed by the Rent Controller had been complied with by the respondent, and therefore, the claim of the petitioner that the respondent had committed default was not correct.
5. The learned Judge in the High Court was also not convinced by the evidence of the alleged unauthorised additions or alterations made by the respondent as, according to her, there was no direct evidence adduced in this regard by the petitioner but the learned Controller acted on the report of the Commissioner appointed by him who inspected the site and gave his report. However, according to the learned Judge, the learned Controller had no authority to appoint such Commissioner under section 20 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, therefore, findings of the Controller in this regard were also set aside by the learned Judge.
6. Mr. Rehanul Hassan Farooqi, learned counsel for the petitioner. While assailing the findings of the learned Judge in the High Court on the question of default, has argued that if notice under section 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance was acknowledged to have been received by the respondent, his further demand requiring the petitioner to establish his ownership was not consistent with the provisions of the said section which places no such obligation on the landlord.
Consequently, failure of the respondent to pay or tender rent directly to the petitioner within the time as required by law clearly constituted default. Reliance was placed by him upon two judgments of the High Court of Sindh in Mst. Suriya Khanum Agha Khan v. Muhammad Nawab (1989 CLC 620) and Syed Hamid Hussain v. Mst. Humaira Ghias (1986 CLC 1873) which, no doubt, lend support to the said contention. However, the said judgments do not appear to be in consonance with the view taken by this Court in this regard. In our view, demand by the respondent requiring proof of transfer 9f ownership under the circumstances did not appear to be unjustified.
The object behind section 18 clearly appears to be to inform the tenant about transfer of ownership and to intimate to the tenant particulars of the new landlord who is entitled to receive rent.
However, if the tenant requires the new owner to establish his claim of ownership to the satisfaction of the tenant so that rent may be paid to him or to supply further particulars as to the time from which the new owner has become entitled to receive rent, such demand, in our view, would not be unjustified. The bona fides of the respondent are clearly established by the fact that rent was deposited by him in the Court when he failed to get satisfactory response from the petitioner to establish his ownership. We, therefore, find no force. In the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. On the other hand, the view taken by the learned Judge in the High Court does not appear to be unreasonable.
6. As no further contention has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and we find the judgment of the learned Judge in the High Court not open to exception, the petition is dismissed and leave is refused.