' The petitioner, an Engineering Institution, is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It owns a building bearing Property No,SXXA-07-BD/1 near Liberty Market, Gulberg-III, Lahore. The petitioner filed a petition before respondent No,2 for exemption from payment of the property tax under clause (d) of section 4 of the West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, on the ground that the petitioner was an educational institution and was, therefore, exempt from the levy of the property tax. By impugned order dated 2-7-1979, respondent No,2 rejected the petitioner's application. The petitioner filed another application for reconsideration which was dismissed, vide order dated 23-8-1979, by respondent No,2. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a revision petition which was dismissed by respondent No,1 vide order dated 1-6-1980.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner's society was an educational institution as provided by Article 4(1) of its Constitution read with clause (10) of Chapter 3. The diplomas awarded by the petitioner's institution were recognised by the Government of the Punjab.
The mere fact that the petitioner had rented out the portions of the building would not make any difference as the case would still be covered for exemption available in terms of clause (d) of section 4 of the West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958. It was further argued that the status of the petitioner's institution was akin to any university or educational institution in the country.
3. The learned Additional Advocate-General, Punjab, repelled the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It was submitted that the petitioner had agitated its grievance before the Government of the Punjab through the Chief Minister. The matter had been examined by the Government of the Punjab, Excise and Taxation Department, which rejected the case of the petitioner vide letter dated 3-2-1999. It was further submitted that in another W.P. No,1580 of 1990, a learned Single Judge of this Court had allowed the realisation of the property tax in respect of the portions of the building in question under section 14 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958. It was lastly submitted that the property of the petitioner was rented out to different persons for purposes which had nothing to do with any activity of an educational institution. No exemption could, therefore, be claimed by the petitioner. The same was not permissible under the Act of 1958.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. There is no doubt that the petitioner- institution was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. From the Constitution and the bye-laws of the institution, it would clearly appear that the buildings and lands of the petitioner could not be said to be used exclusively for educational purposes. The premises had been rented out to persons/companies whose activities had no nexus with the education, clause (d) of section 4 of the West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, provides that the tax shall not be leviable in respect of the buildings and lands or portions thereof used exclusively for educational purposes including schools, boarding houses, hostels and libraries.
The Legislature has purposely granted exemption under clause (d) only to the buildings and lands used exclusively for educational purposes. As such, no exemption can be claimed on the strength of the said provision unless the building is used exclusively for educational purposes.
5. The word "exclusively" has been defined in the Oxford English Dictionary, Volume III, 1961 Edition as under:--
(i) In an exclusive sense, by an exclusive mode of computation, with exclusion of the extreme points of series.
(ii) To the exclusion of without the participation of the persons or things designated.
(iii) So as to exclude all except some particular object, subject etc., solely.
(iv) In a spirit of exclusive.
' In Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 1983, the word "exclusively" was used in the sense of "Apart from all others; only; solely; substantially all or for the greater part to the exclusion of all others without admission of others to participation; in manner to exclude." In the Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition), Volume 14 at pages 138 to 143, it was opined that "a corporation, whose object in part, was for mutual welfare, protection, and improvement of business methods among merchants and for protecting the interests of certain classes of businesses to enable them to profitably conduct their business, was not organised exclusively for "educational or scientific purposes". It was further laid down that "where non-profit organization whose members were business and professional men, and whose fund was derived exclusively from membership fees and contributions, was formed for educational and scientific advancement of business methods, the organization was not exempt from social security taxes as a corporation organized and operated exclusively for "educational or scientific purposes." Similarly a corporation which coincident with its incorporation accepted securities for scholarships for students from its, president in consideration for corporation's agreement to pay to the president all net income of the donation was considered to be not exempted from taxation as the corporation was not organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes. In the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v.
Prem Misthan Bhander (1979 All.LJ 1354), the word "exclusively" was used as "solely." A dealer carrying on business in goods mentioned in the notification (under U.P. Sales Tax Act) and (also) other goods, whether exempted or not, could not be said to be carrying on business exclusively in notified goods. Since the petitioner failed to demonstrate that its building was used exclusively for educational purposes, no exemption could be claimed by it under the law. The question of exemption is to be examined with reference to the actual use of building or portion thereof regardless of the character of institution owning such rented building.
6. The learned Additional Advocate-General, Punjab has rightly pointed out that the petitioner did not call in question the validity of letter dated 3-2-1999 issued by the Government of the Punjab, Excise and Taxation Department. No exception can, therefore, be taken to the impugned orders passed by the respondents.
7." For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in this writ petition which is dismissed but with no order as to costs.