This order shall dispose of the above-mentioned seven petitions as in all these petitions common questions of law and fact are involved and the respon--dent is the same, viz. The Qaddafi Stadium Lahore. Muhammad Siddique, petitioner in Petition No. 268/76 was employed in the Qaddafi Stadium as mason. Abdul Jabbar, petitioner in Petition No. 266/76 was also employed as mason in the said Stadium. Wazir Ali, petitioner in the Petition No. 264/76 was employed as Baildar: Muhammad Aslam, petitioner in Petition No. 265/76 was also employed as Bailder. Murid Hussain, petitioner in Petition No. 263/76 was employed as Baildar. Murad Khan, petitioner in Petition No. 262 of 1976 was ----- employed as painter, Chiragh Din, petitioner in petition No. 266/76 was employed as Baildar. The services of these petitioners were terminated on 17th March 1975 on the ground that their services were no longer required. They were however allowed one month's salary in lieu of one month's notice. The authority which passed the order of termination is Mr. Gul Muhammad Officer Incharge Qaddafi Stadium Lahore. It is, stated in the petitions that affairs of the Qaddafi Stadium were formally under the superintendence, control and management of Punjab Sports Board but subsequently by Government of the Punjab letter dated 5th December 1975, the management and control of Qaddafi Stadium was transferred to the Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan.
2. The petitioners in all the petitions have contended that the orders of their terminations were illegal and violative of the rights guaranteed and secured to them. According to the petitioners Qaddafi Stadium was an establishment employing more than 35 workmen and was a commercial establishment. The respondent resisted these applications and in all the cases raised preliminary objections to the effect that the petitioners had no locus standi to file the applications in as much as the Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan was not Industry within the meaning of section 2 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and that respondent's organization was neither a commercial nor an industrial establishment within the meaning of Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1969. It has also been argued by the respondent that the applications were not competent as no right was guaranteed or secured to the petitioner by or under any law, award or agreement have been violated and that the petitioners failed to give grievance notice in this respect before filing the petition.
3. The cases were first fixed for disposal of the preliminary objections raised by the respondent and the said objections are sought to be disposed of by the instant order.
4. The petitioners appeared as their own witnesses in these respective petitions. The respondent examined R. W. 1 Ghulam Mustafa, Asstt Secretery, Board of Control for Cricket of Pakistan R. W. 2, Sh. Abdul Qadir, Superintendent S. M. Masood and Co. and R. W. 3 Gul Muhammad Officer Incharge, Qaddafi Stadium. The respondent's evidence has been recorded only in Petition No. 268 of 1976 In re : Muhammad Siddiqi v. Qaddafi Stadium.
5. As regards the first objection that the employer in this case was not an industry within the meaning of Industrial Relation Ordinance, 1969, the petitioner stated that matches which are played in the Qaddafi Stadium rent is charged from the organization. Many plots of the Stadium are rented out to nurseries and some portion of the Stadium was rented to Police Department.
Reliance has also been placed on Government of the Punjab Notification No. S. O. (Sch.)-7-49/70, dated 27th October 1970, Exh. P. W.
12. According to this notification the Governor of the Punjab appointed the Lahore Stadium Committee as the Qaddafi Stadium was previously known as Lahore Stadium. Functions of the Committee have also been detailed in this notification and it was provided that the Committee shall maintain and operate the Lahore Stadium on commercial lines.
This notification is of no avail to the petitioners because subsequently by the order, dated 4th February 1975, in com--pliance with the orders of the Prime Minister, the Governor of the Punjab trans--fer red the control of the Qaddafi Stadium to the Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan naturally this was done in super-session of the notification anyhow it appeared from the petition as well as respondent's evidence that although the Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan is association not for profit and the main object of the association is to promote and develope the game of Cricket in Pakistan yet it appears that income is earned from tournaments and matches played in the Stadium. Some part of the Stadium is rented to the Police Department and some plots forming part of the Stadium are rented to nurseries. This is also an admitted fact that various employees have been employed for the Stadium.
6. The definition of the expression "industry" as contained in section 2 (xiv) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is wide enough to include any calling, service, employment or occupation.
Reliance on behalf of the respondent has been placed on certain judicial precedents but the same are distinguishable as they pertain to the period when the term "industry" was defined in the restricted sense.
7. In view of the above I would conclude that the establishment of the employer in this case is an "industry".
8. It is however to be seen as to whether any guaranteed or secured right by or under any law, award or settlement is sought to be enforced by the petitioners through the under consideration petitions. It is alleged by the petitioners that in the Stadium more than 33 workmen were employed and that the order of their termination was illegal and violative of rights guaranteed or secured to them.
9. They have not specifically stated as to what guaranteed or secured rights of the petitioner have been violated and under what law such rights were guaranteed or secured to them. Obviously no settlement or award is involved in this case. The only law under which the petitioners purport to claim their guaranteed rights appears to be the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The peti--tioners have claimed that Qaddafi Stadium was a commercial establishment under the said Ordinance. Qaddafi Stadium or for that matter Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan are positively not an industrial establishment within the meaning of section 2(f) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. It is, therefore, to be seen as to whether the employer's establishment falls within the defini--tion of commercial establishment as defined in section 2(b) ibid. According to the said definition advertising firms, commission or forwarding agents com--mercial agents, clerical department of a factory are an industry or commercial undertaking, establishments of contractors, unit of a joint stock company, insurance companies, banking company or a bank broker office or stock exchange, club, hotel, restaurant, eating house, Cinema, theatre and such other class of commercial establishment as Government may specify by notification are commercial establishments. The establishments of the employer in the under consideration case positively does not fall under any of the aforementioned establishment. Needless to add that the scope of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is limited to such classes of commercial establishment as are specified in clause (b) of section 2 ibid. It is, therefore, concluded that the establishment of the respondent is not a commercial establishment The result, therefore, is that no right guaranteed or secured to the petitioner by or under any lay is sought to be enforced through the under consideration petitions.
These petitions are, therefore, not legally competent under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1968. I would accordingly dismiss all these petitions.