' There are number of writ petitions viz Writ Petitions No,437 of 1999 and 693 of 1999 to 722 of 1999 on the same subject against the same respondents involving similar questions of fact and law. The same are proposed to be disposed of through this common judgment.
2. In response to a Tender Notice published in the national press by the Executive Engineer. Punjab Health Engineering Division, Sahiwal, (respondent No,3), for execution of certain drainage schemes, the petitioners participated in the same. It is their case that their bid was the lowest and on opening of the same on 2-1-1999 respondent. No,3 directed them to receive the work order on 4-1- 1999, but to their astonishment the Chief Engineer (respondent No,1) vide order dated 7-1-1999 cancelled all the tenders and directed respondent No,3 to call fresh tenders. This order' has been assailed in these petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, with the following prayer:-- "It is, therefore, humbly prayed that the writ petition may very kindly be accepted and the order of respondent No,1 dated 7-1-1999 be declared illegal, without lawful authority and ineffective against the rights of the petitioners and it may also be declared that the petitioners are entitled to take work order and to start the work and complete the same according to the terms and conditions of tenders."
' When these petitions came up for hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the lowest bids of the petitioners had been accepted by respondent No,3 and the order of respondent No,1 was without notice, hearing or assigning any reason whatsoever, was mala fide and without lawful authority.
4. In view of these assertions the respondents were called upon to submit report and parawise comments which have since been filed. In the comments the position taken by the respondents is that "the case was only at the stage of submission of tender by the petitioners and its receipt by respondent No,3 for further scrutiny. The tender had not yet been accepted and was on the other hand rejected on 4-1-1999". This rejection according to the respondents is in conformity with the terms and conditions of the tender notice and the tender documents inasmuch as any bid could be rejected without assigning any reason. In this way the locus standi of the petitioners has been challenged in filing these petitions.
5. A rejoinder has been filed by the petitioners disputing the assertions of the respondents According to them the bid was accepted on 2-1-1999 by respondent No,3 and that the assertion as to rejection of the bid on 4-1-1999 is mala fide as there is no such order passed by respondent No,3.
6. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the bid of the petitioners had indeed been accepted by respondent No,3 and that if there was any rejection latter made by him, the same was under coercion and duress of respondent No,1. The further contention of the learned counsel is that once a bid had been accepted the same could not be rejected without any notice to the petitioners or hearing them. He relies on Commissioner of Income Tax v. Fazlur Rahman (PLD 1964 Supreme Court 410) and Anisa Rehman v. P.I.A.C. (1994 SCMR 2232) to contend that the principle of natural justice is part and parcel of every statute and the violation thereof is actionable at law,
7. On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate-General relies on the tender notice published in the press wherein it was clearly mentioned that right to reject any or all tenders without assigning any reason was reserved by the respondent. He has further relied on clauses 27 and 29 of the General Directions for the Guidance of the Tenderer, to contend that in case of acceptance of tender, a written communication is sent to the party concerned. According to him since no acceptance of bids of the petitioners had ever taken place, the assertion of the petitioners is without any basis as the bids had been rejected by respondent No,3 on 4-1-1999. A register in original has been produced to show that respondent No, 3 had rejected the bids on 4-1-1999. It is further contended by him that the case involves disputed questions of facts, requiring factual inquiry which cannot be gone into in these proceedings. It has also been submitted that fresh tenders have already been called through publication of notice in the national press on 7-1-1999 and the tenders received in response to the same will be opened on 12-2-1999 and that the petitioners can also participate in the competition.
6. The assertion of the petitioners that their bids had been accepted by respondent No,3 on 2-1- 1999 is not borne out by any record except an oral assertion on their part. In the terms of the tender documents i,e, clause 29 of the General Directions for the Guidance of the Tender, it is provided that "the Engineer-in-charge will notify the successful tenderer by cable and confirm in writing by registered letter that his tender has been accepted". This is the requirement of the conditions of tender that in case the tender is accepted written communication has to be sent to the party concerned. Since no acceptance according to the respondents took place, no such communication was sent to any of the petitioners. The claim of the petitioners, therefore, that their tenders had been accepted is not sustainable.
7: . The other contention on the learned counsel for the petitioners that no rejection of the bids had taken place on 4-1-1999 is also not tenable in view of the clear assertion and stand by the respondents that their bids had been rejected on the said date. In order to shot that indeed such 'a rejection took place, respondent No,3 has produced, a register in original before the Court and also shown the relevant entries at page 311 of the same to the learned counsel for the petitioners where the following endorsement has been made:-- "Tenders pooled, no healthy competition, hence rejected."
' I have no doubt after perusal of the record that respondent No,3 had rejected the tenders. Clause 27 of the General Directions for the Guidance of the Tenderer is as under:- "27. The Engineer-in-charge shall have the right of rejecting all or any of the tenders without assigning any reason thereof. The Engineer-incharge will not be bound to award the contract to the lower or to any other tenderer."
' These are the terms on which the petitioners submitted their tenders and participated in the same. They are equally bound by these stipulations.
8. As the tenders of the petitioners had been rejected by respondent No,3 the question arises as to whether they had any right to be heard before doing so or locus standi to file these petitions. The mere fact that the petitioners were the lowest bidders does not clothe them with a right or locus standi to agitate the same.
' In Meraj Din v. Noor Muhammad (1970 SCMR 542) it was held that even the highest bidder at an auction who had deposited a substantial amount of auction money did not acquire any right whatsoever in the property as the auction was subject to confirmation in terms of relevant conditions of auction which provided that even the highest bid could be rejected without assigning any reason.
' In Munshi Muhammad v. Faizanul Haq (1971 SCMR 533), it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the highest bidder in an auction in absence of final approval was not clothed with any right in the auctioned property and had no locus standi in the matter.
' In Pervez Qureshi v. Settlement Commissioner (1974 SCMR 337), it was held that a mere bid at an auction does not create any contractual right until the bid is confirmed if it is subject to confirmation and the bidder cannot be considered to be a' person aggrieved by cancellation of the auction.
' In Fawwad and Fareen Enterprises Ltd. v. Director of Industries, Government of Sindh, Karachi (PLD 1983 Karachi 340), a Division Bench of the Sindh High Court, which was a case of tenders, it was observed that where the authority had reserved the right to accept or reject the bid the mere fact that the bid was lowest would not confer any right unless the petitioner could prove that the offer had been accepted. In view of the factual controversy involved in the case the petition was dismissed by the learned Division Bench.
9. In the present case the petitioners have failed to prove that their bid was accepted by the respondent, rather the record shows that the bid had been rejected. Unless a bid had been accepted, no agreement came into existence nor any binding promise enforceable at law existed to vest the petitioners with any right or locus standi in the matter. The consistent view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that mere highest bid at an auction or lowest bid in a tender inquiry does not mature into a promise, what to say of a binding agreement between the parties. The petitioners thus clearly lack locus standi in the matter to agitate before this Court.
10. The general proposition that the principles of natural justice as to notice and hearing before any adver3e action is taken against a party is part and parcel of every statute is undisputed, but has no application to the cases of this nature as the bids of the petitioners had at no stage been accepted by the respondent and the rejection as stated above could be done by the respondent without assigning any reason in view of the afore-referred conditions of tenders.
11. As the competent authority in the matter of tenders was respondent No,3 who had the right to accept or reject any of the tenders/bids which power was exercised by him on 4-1-1999 in rejecting the bids of the petitioners, the latter by respondent No,1 was merely a confirmatory step and cannot be made a ground for challenging the order of rejection passed by , the authority competent to do the same.
12. Another aspect which cannot be lost sight of is that it is not that after rejection of the bids of the petitioners the respondents have awarded the contracts through any private negotiation or otherwise to any other party but instead they have again notified through notice for fresh tenders which are to . Be opened on 12-2-1999. The proceedings regarding rejection of the bids thus cannot be in any way regarded as mala fide. To the contrary it ensures a transparency and healthy competition in which even the petitioners can participate.
13. In view of what has been stated above, these petitions have no merit, the declaration sought for and directions prayed by the petitioners cannot be granted. These petitions are accordingly dismissed