1. ' MRS. MAJIDA RAZVI, J.---The petitioner has filed this petition being aggrieved by a direction contained in a letter dated 7-1-1986 issued by the respondent No,1 i.e, Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Sindh, with the following prayer: "(i) to declare the directive contained in letter dated 7-1-1986 issued by respondent No,1 and the letter dated 29-12-1985 as having been issued without any lawful authority and of no legal effect; and restrain the respondents from taking any action in pursuance of the alleged restoration of allotment and lease in favour of respondent No,4;
(ii) to declare the allotment in favour of respondent No,4 and all actions taken pursuant thereto including execution and registration of lease as having been made without jurisdiction and any lawful authority;
(iii) to grant mandatory injunction directing the respondents to restore possession of Plot bearing No,SNPA-86, Block III, Shaheed-e-Millat Road, Karachi, to the petitioners:
(iv) to permanently restrain the respondents from interfering with the petitioner's Plot No,SNPA-86, Block III, Shaheed-e-Millat Road, Karachi;
(v) to grant costs of the petitioner; and
(vi) to grant any other/further/better relief or reliefs as deemed proper and fit by this Hon'be Court."
2. ' The brief facts are that the petitioner, which is a cooperative society registered under section 10 of the Cooperative Societies Registration Act, 1925, was established on 22-7-1950 and became member of respondent No,6, Karachi Cooperative Housing Societies Union Limited, in the .Year 1952.
3. The Respondent No,6 allotted land to the Petitioner in its Scheme known as Blocks 3, 7 and 8. The present dispute is in respect of a plot situated in Block 3 allotted to the Petitioner which measured approximately 70282 sq. Yards, consisting of 42 residential plots and an amenity plot measuring 2000 sq. Yards and another plot measuring 2377 sq. Yards for the purpose of Park. Out of the 42 residential plots, a plot, bearing No,7 and measuring 3239 sq. Yards was allotted to one Mst. Hanifa Bai Haji Ebrahim and its possession was also handed over to her. After the entire area was developed, the Petitioner Society and its member felt the need for a larger plot for park and, consequently, the said Mst. Hanifa Bai, allottee of Plot No,7, offered her plot, measuring 3239 Sq.
4. Yards in exchange for the park plot measuring 2377 sq. Yards. After some resistance by respondent No,6 on some technical grounds the application for such exchange was approved by it with the undertaking that the exchanged Plot No,7 numbered as SNPA-86 will be only used as a park plot.
5. The exchange was finally approved by the Federal Government and the Town Planning Department. Hence, the original park plot stood transferred in the name of Mst. Hanifa Bai and was numbered as Plot No,7, and the original Plot No,7 was earmarked for park and was renumbered as SNPA-86. The petitioner got the possession of the new park plot and raised a boundary wall around it with proper gates which were locked to avoid any encroachment.
6. ' On 4-8-1973, the respondent 6 was suspended and an Administrator was appointed to manage its affairs. During this period respondent No,2, Al Riaz Cooperative Housing Society, which was registered on 19-5-1966, was admitted to the membership of respondent No,6 which Society (respondent No,2) was, subsequently, expelled from the membership of respondent No,6 for its illegal and corrupt practices. In the year 1980, the petitioner was informed that some people were trying to have a dealing in respect of the said park plot and, as such, published a public notice in the daily "Millat" (Gujrati) and daily "Dawn" as a warning to the general public. Thereafter, in November, 1983 the petitioner came to know that a Constitutional Petition, bearing No,1640/1980, has been filed by one Wali Muhammad Bhurgari (respondent, No,4 herein), claiming to be the allottee of the park plot alleging that the same was purchased by him and a 99 years lease was also executed and registered in his name on 31-1-1975. The petitioner, through the above petition, also came to know that on 31-10-1977, upon promulgation of Martial Law Order (M.L.O.) No, 34 which was reconstituted by M.L.O. 89, issued by Martial Law Administrator, Zone 'C' the allotment of the park plot in favour of respondent No,4 was cancelled and also the fact that the respondent No,4 had averred that he meant to utilise the plot for amenity purposes i.e, for construction of a hospital.
7. All the above facts were never intimated to the petitioner, a member of the said Union.
8. ' The Petitioner filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C. To be impleaded as a party in the said Constitutional Petition which was allowed and orders were passed on 9-12-1980 directing all the parties to maintain status quo, which was confirmed on 26-12-1981.
9. ' On 13-1-1986, the respondent No,4 in order to establish his possession came to the said plot alongwith some 7/8 persons and after breaking open the lock took over possession of the plot and continue, to occupy the same. Consequently, an application was made to the area police and a contempt application was filed in the Constitution Petition. While the said petition was pending, the petitioner received a copy of letter dated 7-1-1986 issued by respondent No,1 (the Registrar), addressed to respondent No,5, the District registrar, City Court Building, directing him to restore registration of the park plot in the name of respondent No,4 as the same having been cleared by the M.L.A., Zone 'C', and a 99 years lease in favour of the said respondent be executed thereafter.
10. Hence, this petition.
11. The contention of Mr. Abid Zuberi, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that an amenity plot could not be allotted to an individual and further that the lease executed in favour of the respondent No,4 does not disclose the purpose cif the grant of the said amenity plot. His further contention was that the park plot allotted to the petitioner could not be allotted to anyone else and that too without notice to the petitioner who had vested interest in the property and, as such, all/any subsequent acts/actions, without any notice to the petitioner, are illegal, mala fide and void ab initio. According to him, a right in rem is a right against the whole world which could not be taken away from the petitioner. He relied on the following cases:
(1) Muhammad Ishaq and another v. Dr. Saiduddin Swaleh and another (PLD 1960 (WP) Kar. 48),
(2) Haji Noor Muhammad and others v. Karachi Development Authority and others (PLD 1975 Kar.
12. 373),
(3) Zohrand and others v. Government of Sindh, Health Department (PLD 1996 Kar. 1),
(4) University of Dacca v. Zakir Ahmed (PLD 1965 SC 90),
(5) Chief Commissioner, Karachi and another v. Mrs. Bina Sohrab Katrak (PLD 1959 SC 45).
(6) Usman Panjwani and another v. Government of Sindh (1996 CLC (Kar) 311),
(7) Federation of Pakistan and another v. Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar (PLD 1989 SC 26),
(8) Yousuf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and others (PLD 1958 SC 104), and
(9) Province of the Punjab v. Dr. S. Muhammad Zafar Bukhari (PLD 1997 SC 351), ' On the other hand, Mr. Khalilur Rehman, the learned counsel for the Respondent No,4, contended that the petition is not maintainable, According to him, there was no allotment in favour of the petitioner nor any lease is in existence. Further, that from 1973 to 1986 there is no correspondence between the petitioner and the respondent No,6 in respect of the said plot. Next. He contended that since the park plot was included in the list for scrutiny which was sent to Martial Law Administrator by the Union (respondent No,6) and the same was cleared, and fresh lease was granted in favour of the respondent. According to him, all orders passed under Martial Law Orders and Regulations are protected by Martial Law Regulation No,107 and Article 270-A of the Constitution and, as such, this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order passed under M.L.O. 247 and relied on the case of Ziaur Rehman (PLD 1973) SC 49).
13. ' Mr. Muneeb Ahmed Khan, the learned Additional Advocate-General, for the Official respondents, stated that the issue in regard to the park plot was never decided by the Authority and further that an amenity plot could not be allotted to an individual. He further stated that whatever decision/direction is given by this Court will be accepted and acted upon by the Official respondents Nos.1, 3 and 5.
14. ' It has not been denied by any of the parties that the original park plot which was later on exchanged with the residential Plot No,7 allotted to Mst. Hanifa Bai, was not originally allotted to the petitioner and so also the exchange of the said plot, which was an indoor management within the Society, was not approved by the concerned authority viz. Karachi Development Authority and the Federal Government. It is pertinent to mention here that in para. 2 of the counter affidavit filed on .Behalf of respondent No,1 in C.P. No,1640 of 1980 (respondent No,6 herein), which was filed by the present respondent No,4, it was admitted that 'respondent No,2 (respondent No,4 herein) was illegally admitted as a member of respondent No,1 by the then Administrator for ulterior motives." It was also admitted in the said counter-affidavit that "the Administration of respondent No,2 has been superseded by Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority by Notification No,SO(C1)/6(23)/84 dated 5-3-1984 having indulged in illegal activities." In para. 3 of the counter-affidavit it was also admitted that the park plot was allotted to Hussaini Cooperative Society, the petitioner herein, and the exchange of the same with a residential Plot was approved and numbered as SNPA-86. In para. 7 of the said counter-affidavit also it was reiterated that "The then Administrator illegally admitted Al Riaz Cooperative Housing Society (respondent No,2 herein) for ulterior motives who illegally allotted the same to the petitioner (respondent No,4 herein) in violation of bye-laws of the Cooperative Housing Societies Union which provided that amenity plots could be allotted to member societies or registered public institutions but not to individuals." In para. 10 of the said counter-affidavit it was submitted that "the allotment, sub-lease, etc. Made in favour of the petitioner (respondent No,4 herein) were wholly illegal, ultra vires and in violation of principles of natural justice as the same was done without cancelling the existing allotment in favour of Intervenor Society. However, it was also submitted in the said counter-affidavit that in pursuance of M.L.O. 34 all unbuilt amenity plots including SNPA-86 were cancelled and resumed by Cooperative Housing Societies Union Limited as per office order dated 13-12-1977 which was notified in daily 'Dawn' and 'Jang' and a meeting was held under the Chairmanship of Governor/C.M.L.A., Zone 'C'on the subject of amenity plots and it was decided that the office order cancelling the plots be communicated to the relevant authorities for compliance. As such, the lease in favour of the petitioner (respondent No,4 herein) in respect of SNPA-86 was revoked and a deed of cancellation in respect of the said amenity plot was registered on 26-1-1980. It was also stated that the allotment made in favour of the petitioner (respondent No,4 herein) was against the constitution of respondent No,1 (respondent No,6 herein) and was in violation of the principles of natural justice as no show-cause notice for cancellation of Plot No,SNPA-86 was issued to the Intervenor (the petitioner herein).
15. ' While going through the said Counder-affidavit it has also come on record that 'during the period of supersession of the Union i.e, 4-3-1973 to 9-11-1983, the Administrator indulged in all sorts of nepotism, jobbery and corruption and the disposal of the land of the Union as a booty. They have tampered with the record of the Union and the record with regard to Plot No,SNPA-86 has been removed from the file of the Union".
16. ' The said petition was withdrawn as an appeal under Martial Law Regulations has been filed and admitted. A copy of the letter, dated 21-7-1985 written by respondent No,1 to M.L.A., Zone 'C' has been provided by Mr. Khalilur Rehman, the learned counsel for respondent No,4, which indicates that actually an appeal was filed before the Martial Law Administrator by the respondent No,1 but a copy of which was neither produced nor supplied.
17. ' After hearing the parties, the legal questions which arise in this petition are as under:--
(1) Whether any show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner before an action was taken for the cancellation of the Park Plot allotted to it?
(2) Once the park plot was allotted by respondent No,6 to the petitioner, which fact has been confirmed by the counter affidavit filed by the said respondent in Civil Petition No,1640 of 1980, could the same be allotted to the respondent No,2, Al Riaz Housing and Society without cancelling the earlier allotment?
(3) Could the park plot be allotted to an individual?
(4) Whether any conversion of the said plot took place or not?
(5) Whether the list of plots submitted to the Scrutiny Committee included the said park plot, if so, whether the same cleared by the said Committee?
(6) Whether the appeal filed before the Marital Law Administrator, Zone 'C' by respondent No,4 was within time if any judicial orders were passed thereon?
18. ' The record indicates that the plot was originally allotted to the petitioner and the same was duly exchange with the plot allotted to one Mst. Hanifa Bai which was approved by the competent Authority. The documents also confirm that tenders were invited by the petitioner for construction of wall and fixation of gate and the same were executed as per the accounts of the petitioners. The complaint to the police also indicates that the wall and gates were already in existence and a Chowkidar posted when dispute arose in regard to taking over the possession of the plot.
19. ' Now, coming to the above questions, all through the proceedings the respondents neither claimed nor proved that any show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner before the said plot was allotted to Ali Riaz Housing Society and in turn to the respondent No,4.
20. ' Mr. Khailur Rehman's contention that there is no correspondence between the petitioner and the Union in the intervening period from 1970 to 1983 (Para. 10 of counter-affidavit) at page 257) is wrong. The tender in respect of the wall to be constructed around the said plot is dated 20-2-1972.
21. There is an letter, dated 21-7-1983 from K.B.C.A. To the petitioner confirming that the plot is meant for park. Again there is a letter, dated 20-8-1983 from Government of Pakistan, Works Division to respondent No,6, referring to 'plot No,7, Block No,3, measuring 2377 sq.Yds in the area of Hussaini Cooperative Housing Society Limited, Karachi" clarifying about the park plot created as a result of the proposed exchange" and directing that it will be used only for park.
22. ' The above correspondence clearly confirms that till 1983 the Government was also seized of the fact that the park plot was allotted and was in the area of the petitioner.
23. ' Meanwhile, Martial Law was declared and Martial Law Order 34 was promulgated on 30-9-1977 which is as under:--- ' "In pursuance of the Proclamation of the fifth day of July, 1977, and in exercise of the powers conferred by Martial Law Order No,3 issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, the Martial Law Administrator, Zone 'C' is pleased to make the following Martial Law Order:-- ' All allotment of the plots which were reserved for roads, hospitals, schools, colleges, libraries, playgrounds, gardens, parks, community centres, mosques, graveyards or for such other amenity/community purposes but were subsequently, unauthorisedly or by the political manoeuvres converted into residential or commercial plots and on which no construction has been made are hereby cancelled and the plots so cancelled shall be resumed by the authority in which the plots initially vested and the amounts, if any, paid by the allottees shall be refunded under the normal rules."
24. ' In pursuance to above an office order, dated 13-12-1977 was issued by the respondent No,6 indicating that the plots reserved for parks, hospitals etc. Illegally allotted to Al-Riaz Society (respondent No,2) ignoring the interest of other affiliated societies are resumed with immediate effect and shall continue to exist for its original use and purpose. This letter/office order shows the park plot in the name of respondent No,4. On 19-4-1979 M.L.O. No,89 was promulgated which is as under:-- ' "In exercise of the powers conferred on me by Martial Law Order No,3 issued by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, I, Lieutenant General, S.M. Abbasi, Martial Law Administrator, Zone 'C' hereby reconstitute Martial Law Order No,34 as follows, which shall be deemed to have always been so reconstituted:--
1. Allotment of amenity plots which have been converted for other purposes in contravention of the law or rules regulating the conversion or for political consideration from 1st January, 1972 to 4th July, 1977 and on which no construction has been made shall stand cancelled and possession thereof shall be resumed by the authority in which the plots initially vested and the amounts, if any, paid by the allottees shall be refunded to them as admissible under the rules.
25. ' Provided that nothing herein contained shall apply to the conversion of amenity plots in the Housing Schemes, made before coming into force of the Sindh (Amendment of Laws) Act, 1974 or in accordance with the procedure laid down in the said Act.
26. Explanation.--Amenity plots mean the plots reserved for roads, hospitals, schools, colleges, libraries, playgrounds, gardens, parks, community centres, mosques, graveyards or for such other public purposes.
2. Any person aggrieved by this order may, within fifteen days of the promulgation thereof, prefer an appeal to Government and orders of Government on such appeal shall be final.
3. Government may, in any individual case of hardship, relax the provisions of para. 2 on such terms and conditions as may be determined."
27. ' Be that as it may, the important question which remains to be decided to whether during all these proceedings the allotment in favour of the petitioner was ever cancelled and, if not, while the same was existing could it be allotted to another Society? It is not the case of the respondent No,4 that the allotment of the disputed plot in favour of the petitioner was cancelled and then it was allotted to respondent No,2 and in turn to respondent No,4. The said respondent has produced a copy of allotment order from respondent No,2 but no possession letter was produced to indicate as to when the said plot was handed over in possession of two respondents. The counter-affidavit filed by the respondent No,6 in the Petition bearing No,1640 of 1980 has clearly supported the contentions of the petitioner and has nowhere claimed that the earlier allotment was cancelled.
28. In view of above discussion, it can safely be said that the earlier allotment was never cancelled.
29. The situation which emerges is that on the day when the said plot was allegedly allotted to respondent No,2 it already stood allotted in the name of the petitioner.
30. ' We have considered this position and in our opinion the second allotment could not be made during the subsistence of the first allotment as such we hold that the said allotment in favour of the respondent No,2 was illegal and as a natural corollary in favour of respondent No,4 too. Reliance can be placed on the case of Muhammad Ishaq and another v. Dr. Saiduddin Swaleh and another (PLD 1960 (W.P.) Kar. 48), wherein it was held that 'Moreover, an allottee, cannot be ejected except when he fails to observe the terms and conditions of the allotment made to him or he is found in the opinion of the Rehabilitation Authority to be an unsuitable person to hold the property allotted to him. If during the subsistence of one allotment order another allotment order is issued then it is merely provisional and must remain floating in the air to settle down in the place of former allottees when the former allottee is ejected. Its concurrent existence would not invalidate the former allotment order and therefore, the former allottees need not have appealed against the second allotment order. In the said case a house situated in Hyderabad was allotted to one Mr. Muhammad Ishaq Muhammad Hashim with four or five other families by the Rent Controller. Its rent was fixed long after the allotment by the Deputy Custodian and the arrears of rent were permitted to be paid by instalments. The instalments were paid but there was still some money due. The Deputy Custodian thought that the allottees were in default and issued an order of ejectment and forwarded it to the Collector for execution. However, the allottees offered to pay the outstanding amounts to the Collector but he refused to accept the offer. However, the money was paid to the Deputy Custodian who cancelled his order of ejectment and sent intimation of the cancellation to the Collector but the Collector did not stop the ejectment proceedings and on the same day, as the orders of cancellation had not reached the Collector from the Custodian, the Collector allotted the premises without notice to the previous allottees Dr. Saiduddin Swaleh, who became interested in getting the premises vacated and obtained the help of the police. The allotment was challenged by some of the earlier allotttees and it was observed as hereinabove.
31. ' In the case of Haji Noor Muhammad and others v. Karachi Development Authority and others (PLD 1975 Kar. 373), it was argued that "under the terms of allotment and the allotment regulations of the K.D.A. Allottee is a mere licensee until the allottee builds a house and executes a regular lease with the K.D.A. And it was held that "This contention has no substance in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Kamaluddin Ansari v. Director, Excise and Taxation (PLD 1971 SC 114) that the allottees of the plot in P.E.C.H. Society were neither licensees nor sub- licensees, though they had been so labelled in the agreement executed between the Government, the housing societies and the individual owners, for they had real interest in the land allotted to him. The criterion that has been laid down by their Lordsbips of the Supreme Court in the case of Abdullah Bhai v. Ahmad Din (PLD 1964 SC 106) for distinguishing between a lease and a license is whether any right in immovable property itself i.e, a right in rem, has passed to the person concerned. In this case clearly a right in rem in respect of the plot has been passed to the allottee".
32. ' Similarly, in the case of Nasira Sultana v. Habib Bank Limited (PLD 1975 Kar. 608) it was held that "the allotment is not a licence simplicitor for the allottee has a right to be put in possession of the plot on payment of second instalment raised construction thereon and on payment of full occupancy value the K.D.A. Was bound to grant lease for 99 years to the allottee".
33. ' In the case of Zohra and others v. The Government of Sindh (PLD 1996 Kar. 1) wherein a question whether a right to admission can be termed as vested right it was held that "a vested right is immediate or fixed right to present or future enjoyment and one that does not depend on an event that is uncertain; in other words, a right which is not subject to any contingency. In the instant case the candidates were permanent residents of and domiciled in the specified District and they had secured more than 50 per cent marks in Intermediate Science (Pre-Medical Group) examination.
34. They were, therefore, by virtue of the Rules of Admission contained in the prospectus, eligible and entitled to apply for admission to a medical college and to have their applications considered according to the relevant rules. That right was not subject to any event or contingency. It was, therefore, a vested right." In the present case in hand there is no dispute that the land was allotted to the petitioners' Society and that exchange was approved by the competent Authority as such in view of the above dictas laid down by the Courts it can be said that the petitioner had vested right in the disputed plot and, as such, the same could not be cancelled Without giving them an opportunity to be heard.##TE ## ' The next question is whether the said plot which was meant only for park could be allotted to an individual if so, under what law or rules. No documents were brought on record to show that the said park plot could be allotted to an individual. On the contrary, the correspondence on record again and again emphasise that the said plot could only be used as park. We have considered bye-law 4-C(III) of the K.C.H.S. Union which clearly specifies that the amenity plots could only be allotted to member societies and not to individuals. This position was not denied by the counsel for the respondent No,4.
35. ' Now, coming to the M.L.Os. 34 and 89, admittedly in pursuance of M.L.O 34 the allotment of the park plot was cancelled in favour of respondent No,2 and in turn lease in favour of respondent No,4 was cancelled; Deed of cancellation was registered on 26-1-1980 and letter to this effect were sent to the parties concerned and was published in press. Again, the resumption of the said plots by the Union was also published in Sindh Gazette. It is strange that while letter dated 29-12-1985 indicates that the park plot was not included in the scrutiny list given to the Martial Law Administrator, Zone 'C', the other letter dated 7-1-1986, impugned herein, shows that the plot was included in the Scrutiny List but was cleared by the Martial Law Administrator. In the circumstances it can be presumed that even if the plot was included in the Scrutiny List the same was done under some misunderstanding.
36. ' The petition filed by the present respondent No,4 was withdrawn on 27-2-1986 and the plot was restored to him and lease executed in his favour in spite of the fact that Deputy Secretary to Martial Law Administrator had written to respondent No,1, Registrar, Cooperative Societies to "solve the matter with mutual consent of all parties outside the Court keeping in view the facts of the case and orders/lease on the subject." The record confirms that no notice was issued to the petitioner before-re-alloting and issuing fresh lease in favour of the respondent No,4. This action in our opinion is illegal and against the principle of equity and natural justice. Reliance can be placed on the case of University of Dacca through its Vice-Chancellor and another v. Zakir Ahmed (PLD 1965 SC 90) wherein the facts were that at the Annual Convocation of the university a group of students who was opposed to the Chancellor presiding over the Convocation, attempted to have resolution passed for boycotting the Convocation approved by the General Body of the students. The meeting, however, ended in pandemonium as a large section of the students were opposed to the resolution and were in favour of the participation in the Convocation. A day before the Convocation both the groups clashed and with the help of the police peace was restored. However, on the day of the Convocation a group of students created disturbances and the police had to intervene to keep peace and subsequently the University was closed for an indefinite period to prevent the situation from worsening. A circular was issued by the Registrar of the University to make thorough inquiry into the matter in order to find out who were responsible for the disturbances and report sought from the teachers who were stationed on the Convocation day in the Pandal and the Board took a serious view and several students were expelled from the University with immediate effect for a period of two years and the respondent was one of them. The record did not disclosed if any explanation was called from any of the students against whom action was proposed to be taken or that any of the student was heard or questioned. It was under the said circumstances that it was held that "all proceedings by whomsoever held, whether judicial or administrative, the principles of natural justice to be observed if the proceedings might result in consequences affecting "the person or property or other right of the parties concerned." This rule applies even though there may be no positive words in the statute or legal documents whereby the power is vested to take such proceedings, for, in such cases this requirement is to be implied into it as the minimum requirement of fairness."
37. ' In the case of Chief Commissioner Karachi and another v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak (PLD 1959 SC 45), it was held that the rule of justice embodied in the maximum 'audi alteram partem' (no man shall be condemned unheard) is not confined to proceedings before Courts but extends to all the proceedings, before whomsoever held, which may affect the person or other right of the parties concerned in the dispute. As a just decision in such controversies is possible only if the parties are given the opportunity of being heard, there can be, as regards the right of hearing, no difference between proceedings which are strictly judicial and those which are in the nature of a judicial proceedings though administrative in form".
38. ' In the case of Usman Panjwani and another v. Government of Sindh 1996 CLC 311 (Kar), wherein a dispute arose over a plot of land it was held that "an order passed in violation of principle of natural justice was not sustainable in law".
39. ' The next question is in regard to appeal as contemplated by M.L.O. 247 whether the same was filed within time as the petition was withdrawn. On our question, Mr. Khalilur Rehman, the learned counsel for the respondent No,4 submitted a copy of a letter dated 21-7-1983 written by respondent No,1 herein to the Martial Law Administrator, Zone 'C' which clearly indicates that an appeal was filed by the respondent No,4 para. 21 of the counter-affidavit by the said respondent in the present petition also supports this fact that an appeal was filed as contemplated by Martial Law Order 247.
40. But neither the copy of the appeal was filed nor it was divulged as to the date of filing. Even the copy of the letter written to respondent No,1 for any such report mentioned in para. 22 of the counter affidavit in respect of the plot was not produced. As such, the statement of the petitioner that the appeal filed by the respondent No,4 was dated 2-2-1985, is taken as correct date for the said purpose. M.L.O. 247 was promulgated on 18-12-1984 with immediate effect and under section 3 thereof appeal was to be filed within 15 days of its promulgation. As such the appeal filed by the respondent No,4 was clearly time-barred. The letter dated 29-12-1985 by Deputy Secretary to Martial Law Administrator to the respondent No,1 is not a decision but a direction to solve the matter with mutual consent of the parties. Therefore, the respondent No,1, instead of forwarding the said letter dated 29-12-1985 has clearly pleaded the case of respondent No,4, which was uncalled for an propriety demanded that he should have been neutral.
41. ' Since no final orders were passed by the Martial Law Administrator in respect of the appeal filed by the respondent No,4 herein the contention of Mr. Khalilur Rehman that all orders passed by the M.L.A. During the period are saved under Article 270-A of the Constitution and cannot be interfered with, is misconceived and has not bearing in this case.
42. ' To sum up the above discussion:
(1) The subject plot which was allotted to the petitioner initially was not cancelled before the same was allotted to Respondent No,2 and in turn to respondent No,4.
(2) No notice was ever issued to the petitioner at the time of allotment of the said plot to the respondent No,2.
(3) The plot under the rules could not be allotted to an individual.
(4) The appeal filed by the respondent No,4 was time-barred and no final orders were passed thereon on merit.
43. The lack of compliance of legal formalities as stated above, supports the contention of the petitioner. In our opinion, all the actions taken in regard to the subject plot subsequent to the allotment in favour of the petitioner, were illegal, void ab initio, and against equity and natural justice.
44. ' In view of the above, we allow this petition as prayed.
45. ' Before parting with the case we must observe that the petitioner was not very vigilant in safeguarding its interest in the past.